Leon H. Saunders, Robert Felton, J. Richard Rees, Saunders Land Investment Corp., a Utah corporation, White Pine Ranches, a Utah general partnership, and White Pine Enterprises, a Utah general partnership v. John C. Sharp, Gerladine Y. Sharp and Associated Title Company, a Utah corporation, as Trustee v. Commissioner of Financial Institutions as Receiver for Tracy Collins Bank and Trust company, as Surety : Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1988
Leon H. Saunders, Robert Felton, J. Richard Rees,
Saunders Land Investment Corp., a Utah
corporation, White Pine Ranches, a Utah general
partnership, and White Pine Enterprises, a Utah
general partnership v. John C. Sharp, Gerladine Y.
Sharp and Associated Title Company, a Utah
corporation, as Trustee v. Commissioner of
Financial Institutions as Receiver for Tracy Collins
Bank and Trust company, as Surety : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Donald J. Winder; Kathy A.F. Davis; Winder & Haslam; Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents.
Robert M. Anderson; Glen D. Watkins; Mark R. Gaylord; Hansen and Anderson; Attorneys for
Plaintiffs/Appellants; John B. Anderson; Anderson & Holland; Attorneys for Counterclaim
defendant/appellant.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Saunders v. Sharp and Sharp, No. 880710 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1484
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
50 
A10 
DOCKET NOT 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
t-Q7y> 
LEON H. SAUNDERS, ROBERT FELTON, 
J. RICHARD REES, SAUNDERS LAND 
INVESTMENT CORP., a Utah 
corporation, WHITE PINE RANCHES, 
a Utah general partnership, and 
WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, a Utah 
general partnership, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
VS. * 
* 
JOHN C. SHARP,<GERALDINE Y. SHARP * 
and ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY, a * 
Utah corporation, as Trustee, * 
Defendants/Respondents, * 
vs. * 
* 
COMMISSIONER OF FINANCIAL * 
INSTITUTIONS AS RECEIVER FOR * 
TRACY COLLINS BANK AND TRUST * 
COMPANY, as Surety, * 
* 
S u r e t y / A p p e l l a n t . * 
RESPONDENTS1 BRIEF 
TO SAUNDERS, ET AL. 
Case No. 880710 -CA 
P r i o r i t y 14 (b) 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT AND FINAL ORDER OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT OF AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Robert M. Anderson (#0108) 
Glen D. Watkins (#3397) 
Mark R. Gaylord (#5073) 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
Sixth Floor 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-7520 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants 
John B. Anderson (#0091) 
ANDERSON & HOLLAND 
623 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 363-9345 
Attorneys for Counterclaim 
De fendant/Appe11ant 
Donald J. Winder (#3519) 
Kathy A. F. Davis (#4022) 
Taiaara K. Prince (#5224) 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
Suite 4000 
175 West 200 South 
P. O. Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Respondents 
DEPOSITED BY 1 
STATE OF UTfii 
AUG17199C 
ev j i t 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LEON H. SAUNDERS, ROBERT FELTON, 
J. RICHARD REES, SAUNDERS LAND 
INVESTMENT CORP., a Utah 
corporation, WHITE PINE RANCHES, 
a Utah general partnership, and 
WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, a Utah 
general partnership, 
P ] a I n t i f f s / App e 11 a n t s, 
vs. 
RESPONDENTS f BRIEF 
TO SAUNDERS, ET AL, 
JOHN' Co SHARP, GERALDINE V, SHAK1 
and ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY, -• 
Utah corporation, as Trustee 
Defendants/Respondents, 
vs, 
COMMISSIONER OF FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS AS RECEIVER FOR 
TRACY COLLINS BANK AND TRUST 
COMPANY, as Surety, 
Hrlor ity JU , 
Surety/Appellant, 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT AND FINAL ORDER OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRIC'- '>URT OF AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, S T - T ^ T 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Robei. ^  M. Anderson (ffU-
Glen D. Watkins (#3397) 
Mark R. Gaylord (#5073) 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
Sixth Floor 
50 West Broadwa; 
Salt Lake City, f;i.«., 
Telephone: ' 80 1 » ^ ^; - 7 ?2 
Attorue,-
Appe 1 1 ••** 
John B. Andersoi i ( #0091 ) 
ANDERSON & HOLLAND 
62 3 East 100 South 
Salt Lake r«-v "tj 
Telephone: '' 
.,*1 
c 4 i u 2 
uonaia 
Kathy A. 
Tamara K 
WINDER & 
• ..naer , -3 51^) 
F. Davis *(#4022) 
. Prince (#5224) 
HAS I AM, P.C. 
Suite 4000 
175 West 2 00 South 
P. O. Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-266* 
Telephone: (8 01) 3 2 2-222 2 
Attorneys for Defendants / 
Respondents 
Attorneys tor 
Defendant-Anr 
LIST OF PARTIES 
Party 
1. Defendants, Counterclaim 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
John C. Sharp 
Geraldine Y. Sharp 
2c Plaintiffs, Counterclaim 
Defendants and Appellants 
Leon H. Saunders 
Robert Felton 
Jc Richard Rees 
Saunders Land Investment 
Corporation, a Utah 
corporation 
White Pine Ranches, a Utah 
general partnership 
White Pine Enterprises,, a 
Utah general partnership 
3. Counterclaim Defendant and 
Appellant 
Kenneth R. Norton dba 
Interstate Rentals, Inc. 
4• Chapter 7 Trustee for 
J. Richard Rees Bankruptcy 
5. Surety and Appellant 
Commissioner of Financial 
Institutions as Receiver 
for Tracy Collins Bank and 
Trust Company 
6. Parties never served in this 
action 
Defendant, Associated Title 
Company, a Utah corporation 
Counterclaim Defendant, 
Paul H. Landes 
Counsel 
Donald J. Winder 
Kathy A, F. Davis 
Tamara K. Prince 
WINDER & HASLAM 
Suite 4000 
175 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Robert M. Anderson 
Glen D. Watkins 
Mark R. Gaylord 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
Sixth Floor 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
John B. Anderson 
ANDERSON & HOLLAND 
623 East 100 South 
P. 0. Box 11643 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
David L. Gladwell 
P. 0. Box 3205 
Ogden, Utah 84409 
Stanford B. Owen 
Patrick L. Anderson 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Pages 
LIST OF PARTIES i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. . xi 
CITATION TO THE RECORD xiv 
JURISDICTION 1 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 8 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 12 
ARGUMENT 20 
POINT I WHITE PINE RANCHES IS REQUIRED TO REQUEST 
LOTS TO BE RELEASED BEFORE THE SHARPS 
HAVE ANY DUTY TO RECONVEY 20 
POINT II SINCE WHITE PINE RANCHES MATERIALLY 
BREACHED THE CONTRACT IT WAS NOT 
ENTITLED TO ANY RELEASES 23 
POINT III PURSUANT TO A MODIFICATION OF THE 
CONTRACT, THE SHARPS RELEASED THE 
ROADWAY BY EXECUTING THE CONSENT TO 
RECORD 26 
POINT IV SUBSEQUENT DOCUMENTS CREATED AN 
EASEMENT OVER WHITE PINE LANE 
IN FAVOR OF THE SHARPS 29 
POINT V BY EXECUTING THE CONSENT TO RECORD, 
THE SHARPS ARE ESTOPPED TO DENY 
ACCESS TO PUD LOT OWNERS 31 
ii 
Pages 
POINT VI WHITE PINE RANCHES FAILED TO 
ESTABLISH A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER 
SECTION 57-1-33 FOR FAILURE TO 
REQUEST A RELEASE 35 
POINT VII WHITE PINE RANCHES IS NOT ENTITLED TO 
DAMAGES OR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE FOR 
ALLEGED BREACH OF CONTRACT 38 
A. WHITE PINE RANCHES' CONTRACT DAMAGES 
CLAIMED ARE TOO SPECULATIVE AND IT 
IS NOT ENTITLED TO HAVE THE 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONTRACT PRICE 
AND FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY...39 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED 
WHITE PINE RANCHES' EVIDENCE REGARDING 
THE INTEREST ON THE CONSTRUCTION LOAN...4 0 
C. WHITE PINE RANCHES IS NOT ENTITLED TO 
INTEREST ON INSTALLMENTS 41 
D. WHITE PINE RANCHES IS NOT ENTITLED 
TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THE 
CONTRACT OR TO HAVE THE PRINCIPAL 
INTEREST ACCRUING ON THE TRUST DEED 
NOTE TOLLED 42 
POINT VIII THE SHARPS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR ATTORNEY'S 
FEES, WHICH FEES ARE REASONABLE............. 43 
A. THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT AUTHORIZE 
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY ' S FEES 43 
B. THE ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED BY THE 
SHARPS WERE REASONABLE 4 6 
CONCLUSION. 49 
ADDENDUM 52 
iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Pages 
CASES; 
Alaska Housing Auth. v. Walsh & Co.. 
O & 3 if m tie \JL O J 1 ^ ^ *\JL d b J \ U JL^S O \J J o o o c s> o t> o Q o c o c> t> o • e c e o e o o s> v c • *J £ 
Amarillo Lodge No. 731 v. City of Amarillo, 
473 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) 
rev'd on other grounds. 488 S.W.2d 69 
(Tex. 1973) o o • . « . . . . o . . 4 4 
American Petrofina Co. v. D & L Oil Supply. 
4*0*3 U l c l O J ^ D O J XT . £t D Z l ^ X 7 / O y e e . e . » « « . e e o . o e o e e e . e 0 . ^ J 
Amoss v. Bennion. 23 Utah 2d 40, 
T D O XT o £ \JL <X> / i£ ^ JL -7 O -/ y . . . . . . . . . o . . . e « o e 9 a e . o « c o c . « e . ^ Z ^ , 4 J 
Ashton v. Ashton. 733 P.2 147 (Utah 1987).... xii 
Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank. 
/ «J / XT . Ct \X Ct ^ O I U ^ C L I l J . a 7 O / y o . . o . . e e e c e e c . « e . e e . e e o o e o e . 0 4 b O 
Bailev v. Mead. 260 Or. 410, 492 P.2d 798 
(1971) 37 
Barker v. Johnson. 591 P.2d 886 (Wyo. 1979) 45 
In re Estate of Bartell. 105 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 
(1989) xii 
Bates v. Bates. 560 P.2d 706 (Utah 1977) 48 
Bembridge v. Miller. 235 Or. 396, 385 P.2d 172 
(1963) 41 
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. 
Salt Lake City. 740 P.2d 1357 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) 25 
Matter of Bisio's Estate. 33 Or. App. 3 25, 
576 P.2d 801 (1978) 33 
Biork v. April Indus.. 547 P. 2 219 
(Utah 1976) 26 
Blomquist v. Bingham. 652 P.2d 900 (Utah 1982) 42, 43 
Brown v. Holden. 410 P.2d 528 (Okl. 1965) 27 
iv 
Pages 
CASES (Cont.): 
Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P„2d 266 
Bunnel v. Bills. 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597 
Burroughs v. Garner, 43 Md. App. 302, 
Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985)............ .47 
Carmen v. Slavens. 546 P.2d 601 (Utah 1976)...............36 
CBN Corp. v. United States. 328 F.2d 316 
I V^ W» O \*> X « X 5 O H J o e e o o o o e e e e e . . o . o . . . o o o . e o . « e 9 e . . . o e e . e ^ 7 
Centennial Entr. v. Mansfield Dev. Co., 
568 P.2d 58 (Colo. 1977) ................ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86 
I ^ , j / O O J . e o . . . . . . . . e e e . . . e e . . . . e . . e . . o . . . . . e e e e e o c c e e e o ^ e / 
City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Heckmann. 
164 Misc. 234, 297 N.Y.S. 592 
(Sup. Ct. 1937)...... .........23, 24 
Clason's Point Land Co. v. Schwartz. 
237 A.D. 741, 262 N.Y.S. 756 
(App. Div. 1933).. 23, 24 
Columbia Dev. v. Watchie, 252 Or. 81, 
448 P.2d 360 (1963) 24 
Cook v. Clovey Ballard Motor Co.. 
69 Utah 161, 253 P. 196 (1927) 43 
Cook v. Gardner, 14 Utah 2d 193, 381 P.2d 78 
(1963) 30 
Coopev v. Keadv. 73 Or. 66, 144 P. 99 (1914) 28 
Copper State Leasing Co. v. 
Blacker Appl. & Furn. Co.. 
770 P.2d 88 (Utah 1988) xi 
V 
Pages 
CASES (Cont.): 
County Plains Corp. v. Nosband Corp.. 
234 A.D. 588, 256 N.Y.S. 10 
Cree Meadows. Inc. v. Palmer. 68 N.M. 479, 
362 P. 2d 1007 (1961) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 
Davis v. Payne & Day. Inc.. 10 Utah 2d 53, 
348 P.2d 337 (1960) .....27 
Dillingham Commercial Co. v. Spears. 641 Po2d 1 
Dillman v. Massey Ferguson. Inc.. 
13 Utah 2d 142, 369 P.2d 296 (1962) .................. 27 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 
(Utah 1988) ..... .44, 48 
Dunn v. McKay. Burton. McMurray & Thurman. 
584 P.2d 894 (Utah 1978) 39 
Ebenezer A.M.E. Zion Church v. 
Corporate Loan & Sec. Co.. 
72 Wash. 2d 128, 432 P.2d 291 (1967) xi 
Eldridge v. Burns. 76 Cal. App. 3rd 396, 
142 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1971) 24 
First State Bank v. Hoehnke Nursery Co.. 
63 Or. App. 816, 667 P.2d 1022 (1983) ....45 
Fortier v. Donna Anna Plaza Partners. 
747 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1984) 46 
Freed Finance Co. v. Stoker Motor Co.. 
537 P.2d 1039 (Utah 1975) 48 
Freightways Terminal Co. v. Industrial & 
Commercial Constr.. 381 P.2d 977 
(Alaska 1963) 30 
General Glass Corp. v. Mast Constr. Co.. 
766 P.2d 429 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 28 
vi 
Pag 
CASES (Cont.): 
Gould v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel.. 
6 Utah 2d 187, 309 P.2d 802 (1957).....•.............39 
Hansen v. Green River Group, 748 P.2d 1102 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). . . . •.xiii 
Hayes v. Xerox Corp., 718 P.2d 929 (Alaska 1986) 37 
Hector, Inc. v. United Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 
/ T X XT . £* \X, j 4 b V w C X X X * X > e s O / y e . « e . o . e . c . » . « e o o e . e « « . c e o o o o < ^ 0 
Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 
J.J.N.P. Co. v. State. 655 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1982) ...... . . . . 29 
Las Vegas Ranch Club v. Bank of Nev., 
97 Nev. 384, 632 P.2 1146 (1981) ......... • ....... 23 , 24 
Leaver v. Grose, 563 P.2d 773 (Utah 1977)... .........28 
Lyman Grazing Ass'n v. Smith, 24 Utah 2d 443, 
473 P. 2d 905 (1970) . 31 
Macaw v. Gross, 452 So.2d 1126 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) ....29 
Maleckv v. Maleckv, 148 Ariz. 121, 713 P.2d 322 
V &"a>jKJjhJ e J . V O Zj J . « . . o . e . . « . . e o o e . . . « e . o o e o o e e o o e . . . o o e . . o . H ! ^ 
Markowitz v. Republic Natfl Bank, 651 F.2d 825 
(2nd Cir. 1981) 23 
Monaco v. Bennion, 99 Idaho 529, 585 P.2d 608 
(1978) 34 
North Clear Lake Dev. Corp. v. Blackstock, 
450 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) 34 
165 Broadway Bldg. Inc. v. City Investing Co., 
120 F.2d 813 (2nd Cir. 1941) .29 
vii 
CASES (Cont.): 
Pack v. Hall Dev. Co.. 667 P.2d 39 (Utah 1983)..... 42 
Ouin Blair Enter, v. Julien Constr. Co.. 
Ranch Homes, Inc. v, Greater Park City Corp,, 
592 P.2d 620 (Utah 1979).•e o...c.c.,.*.......«..•....40 
Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co., 
6 Utah 2d 18, 305 Pc2d 480 (1956)98.,9. ..e....,o31 
Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261, 
Rose City Transit Co. v. City of Portland. 
18 Or. App. 369, 525 P.2d 1325 (1974) ..42 
Salt Lake City Brewing Co. v. Hawke. 
24 Utah 199, 66 P. 1058 (1901) 31 
Sharp v. Brock. 626 S.W.2d 166 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1981) 24 
Shepherd v. French. 612 P.2d 727 
(Okl. Ct. App. 1980) 42 
Shibata v. Bear River State Bank. 115 Utah 395, 
205 P.2d 251 (1949) 36 
Soffe v. Ridd. 659 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1983) 44 
State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987) xii 
Stubbs v. Hemmert. 567 P.2d 168 (Utah 1977) 45 
Teece v. Teece. 715 P.2d 106 (Utah 1986) 36 
Terry v. Panek. 631 P.2d 896 (Utah 1981) 39 
Travner v. Cushing. 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984) 46 
Turtle Mat, v. Haggis Mat.. 645 P.2d 677 
(Utah 1982) 44 
viii 
Pages 
CASES (Cont.): 
Ute Park Summer Homes Ass'n v. Maxwell Land 
Grant Co.. 77 N.M. 730, 427 P.2d 249 
I oL. « 7 w ' J e e e e c e e o o o e e e o e o c > G G e c c c e o o o c e c e e o e e o o e o e e o o G c e e < ^ ^ 
Valley Bank & Trust Co, v. 
U. S, Life Title Ins, Co., 
Ill Utah Adv. Rep. 71 (1989). •............... 28 
Western Cane County Special Serv. Dist No. 1 v. 
Jackson Cattle Co.. 744 P.2d 1376 
^ U L > O L n l « / 0 / J . . c « . e o e « . e . e e o e . . . e . e e « e e . . . . . . . . . . . « * » e e X X 
Western Capital v. Knudsvig. 768 P.2d 989 
^ U UCiiJ, V»» W © / \ > P P . X . ? 0 . s j . . « « « . « o e . o « * o o o . o . o o e o e e o e e . o o e . 2 £ X X 
Wilburn v. Interstate Elec.. 784 P.2d 582 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).................. .... . .... . . . . . . . 3 
Wright v. Horse Creek Ranches. 697 P.2d 384 
I w v J X \J e l ^ / O J j e o . o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . © . . c . o o . e o . c o o o c o c o o o J v J 
Zeese v. Estate of Siegel. 534 P.2d 85 
I \J W»CiXX X «7 / ^ J o o o e o o o c o e o o o c e . o o . e e . o e . o o o e o . e . o o o e o e o e e ^ ^ . 
Zions Properties v. Holt. 538 P.2d 1319 
I W U»GiXX X Z7 / ^ J o o 9 . e e e o . e e . . e o . e o c o a . o e . c e o . e e e o e e o o e e e e o . O a J 
CONSTITUTION: 
Utah Const., Art. 8, Section 3 ..... ............. . . . ... ... . . 1 
STATUTES: 
Utah Code Ann. Section 48-1-6 31 
Utah Code Ann. Section 57-1-33 19, 35, 36 
RULES: 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2-2 (3) . . 1 
R. Utah Ct. App. . Rule 3 (a) . . 1 
ix 
RULES (Cont.): 
Utah R. Civ. P. . Rule 37(b)(2)(c) .. .36 
Vj L » d I I JA . >•» JL V • Xf • f JtvwlJt, 6 O Ce ^ OL y e « o e o c o e o e . o e o e e o e o . . . c o « e « e o e ^C -L 
U w d l l Ax . JZl V -LvJ. . f I \ U J . w 0 » e o . « o . e e o « « o « « « e * e . c c e e « « . e o « « . e e e e « j O 
OTHER AUTHORITIES: 
Baskin, Wasted Words or Persuasive Prose: 
Connecting with the Appellate Court, 
58 Fla. B.J. 69-72 (1985)............ .18 
Spears, Presenting an Effective Appeal, 
21 Trial 95 (6) (November 1985) . . . 18 
21 C.J.S. Covenants Section 62 (1978) 29 
76 C.JoS. Release Section 1 (1976) .28 
McCormick, Evidence Section 266 (2d ed. 1972) ...37 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 47 
Comment e (1982) .40 
x 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In its Brief, Appellants (hereinafter collectively "White 
Pine Ranches") claim only questions of law are on appeal, which 
questions do not require deference by this Court. White Pine 
Ranches' Brief, however, continually argues the inappropriateness 
of Judge Frederick's Findings of Fact.1 
The trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside on 
appeal unless clearly erroneous. Utah R, Civ. P. 52(a); Copper 
State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appl. & Furn. Co., 770 P.2 88, 93 
(Utah 1988); Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. 
Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1987). A finding is 
clearly erroneous only if it is without adequate evidentiary 
As examples, White Pine Ranches argues the "purpose" 
behind the Sharps1 right of approval of the CC&R's and 
plat (Appellants' Brief, p. 6); that Heaton "claimed" 
there was a modification in the parties1 agreement which 
Felton's testimony "disputed" (Id., p. 8); that Sharps 
never responded to White Pine Ranchesf demands to 
release Lot 6 and the road (Id, p. 10); that White Pine 
Ranches did not agree with the Sharps1 right of access 
over the internal roadway (Id., p. 17); that it was 
"painfully obvious" through the Sharps1 testimony they 
never regarded the Consent to Record the CC&R's and plat 
as a reconveyance (Id., p. 21, n. 11); that Sharps did 
not rely in good faith on the advice of counsel (fn., 
pp. 22-25); and that the Sharps' access to the Property 
was "not supported by the evidence" (Id., p. 39). These 
are all arguments disputing Judge Fredericks1 Findings 
of Fact. Alternatively, if only questions of law are on 
appeal, the Findings of Fact are conclusive and this 
Court is limited only to determining whether the Find-
ings of Fact support the Conclusions of Law. Ebenezer 
A.M.E. Zion Church v. Corporate Loan & Sec. Co. , 72 
Wash. 2d. 128, 432 P.2d 291 (1967). 
xi 
support. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); Accord 
Western Capital v. Knudsvicr, 768 Pc2d 989, 991 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
This Court must begin its analysis with the trial court's 
Findings of Fact and not with White Pine Ranches' view of the way 
it thinks the facts should have been found. Ashton v. Ashton, 73 3 
P.2 147, 150 (Utah 1987). White Pine Ranches must first marshall 
all evidence supporting the Findings (which is plentiful), and 
then demonstrate that these Findings are "so lacking in support as 
to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence.1" In re Estate 
of Bartell. 105 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (1989) (quoting Walker, 743 
P.2d at 193). "[AJppellants should recognize that the burden of 
overturning factual findings is a heavy one, reflective of the 
fact we do not sit to retry cases submitted on disputed fact.11 
Id. at 4. 
The trial court found it was necessary to interpret the 
parties' Contract with reference to contemporaneous and subsequent 
documents between the parties and between a party and various 
third parties, by reference to subsequent dealings (course of con-
duct) between the parties, and with reference to contemporaneous 
and subsequent events.2 In such cases, this Court has held the 
standard of review is: 
... [I]f the contract is ambiguous and the trial court 
makes factual findings about the intent of the parties 
2 As examples, the trial court found that Exhibit 15 was 
"ambiguous" (Tr. 733, R. 1645), that the proposed PUD 
plat contained an internal roadway description (cont.) 
xii 
based on extrinsic evidence, our review is strictly 
limited. If those findings are supported by substan-
tial, competent evidence in the record, they are not 
clearly erroneous under Utah R*Civ«Pc 52(a) and we will 
not disturb them on appeal. 
Hansen v. Green River Group, 748 Pe2d 1102, 1104 (Utaho Ctc App, 
1988) (citations omitted). 
2 (cont.): 
"commonly used in plats to dedicate roads to public 
use," (Ex. 39; F. 19, R. 1333, Add. B24) ; that at the 
time of White Pine Ranches' development, it was "an-
ticipated that additional developments by third parties 
would occur . . . including the development of a ski 
resort in White Pine Canyon." (F. 25, R. 13 35, Add. 
B26) ; that the proposed final plat included an Owner!s 
Dedication for a private road and utility easements (F. 
34, R. 1337, Add. B28); that in a subsequent conversa-
tion between Felton and attorney Jon Heaton, it was 
agreed that "access over the road retained if Sharp 
develops undeveloped property Lots 7-12" (F. 37, R. 
1338, Add. B29) ; that it was the actual practice of 
White Pine Ranches to make specific requests for release 
of specific PUD lots after payments were made and no 
default existed (F. 47, R. 1341, Add. B32) ; that White 
Pine Ranches made no claims of breach by the Sharps 
until years after their own admitted breaches (F. 53, R. 
1342, Add. C33; F. 71, R. 1337, Add. B38; F. 59, R. 
1343-1344, B35-36); that the Sharps "perceived" their 
execution of the Consent to Record constituted substan-
tial performance to release the road (F. 60, R. 1341, 
Add. B35); that most of the damages sought by White Pine 
Ranches from the Sharps were the same damages it sought 
in other litigation against SBSID and Summit County (F. 
70, R. 1347, Add. B38) ; that the Sharps did not inter-
fere with White Pine Ranches1 attempts to market the 
Property (F. 72, R. 1347, Add. B38) ; that the Sharps 
repeatedly assured White Pine Ranches they did not 
intend, through foreclosure, to interfere with the lot 
owners1 access rights to the road and utility easements 
(F. 88, R. 1351, Add. B42) , that it was the mutual 
intent of the parties the Sharps be granted use of the 
road in the event of default (F. 89, R. 1351, Add. B42) ; 
and that the Sharps acted in good faith and in reliance 
on the advice of their counsel in refusing to reconvey 
Lot 6, the road and the unplatted acreage (F. 91, R. 
1351, Add. B42). 
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CITATION TO THE RECORD 
Citations to the record will be abbreviated as follows: 
Record on Appeal "R." 
Trial Transcript "Tr." 
Exhibit "Ex." 
Findings of Fact "F." 
Conclusion of Law "C." 
Judgment "J." 
The Addendum includes relevant portions of the Record and Ex-
hibits and shall be cited to as "Add*" with the page number 
following the Record or Exhibit citation. White Pine Ranches 
attached only drafts of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and the Judgment to its Brief. Signed copies of the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Judgment are attached in 
Addendum B. The Addendum has for ease of reference been numbered 
consecutively and has been divided into the following four parts: 
A - The Contract documents, i.e., Trust Deed, Trust Deed 
Note, Earnest Money Agreement, Memorandum of Closing 
Terms, the Owners Dedication of Exhibit "A" attached 
to the Memorandum of Closing Terms and the Warranty 
Deed. 
B - The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the 
Judgment. 
C - Subsequent correspondence between the parties. 
D - Various documents pertaining to White Pine Ranchesf 
damage claims. 
xiv 
JURISDICTION 
Section 3 of Article 8 of the Utah Const,. Section 78-2-2(3) 
of the Utah Code Ann, and Rule 3(a) of the R. Utah Ct. App. confer 
jurisdiction on this Court to hear this appeal. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is from a final Judgment ("Judgment") of the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding, dismissing 
White Pine Ranches' Complaint, no cause of action, and granting 
judgment against Leon H. Saunders ("Saunders"), Robert Felton 
("Felton") and Kenneth R. Norton dba Interstate Rentals, Inc. 
("Norton") on a Trust Deed Note, ordering the property as security 
under the Trust Deed ("the Property") be judicially foreclosed 
and entering judgment for damages suffered due to a wrongful 
injunction against Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Company as surety 
on a bond. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented by White Pine Ranches in this appeal 
appear in a different order in this Brief than in White Pine 
Ranches1 Brief to avoid the redundancy in White Pine Ranches1 
Brief and to provide this Court with a succinct and logical 
organization of the Sharps' arguments.3 
3
 White Pine Ranches' Brief Sharps' Brief 
Point A 1, pp. 14-16 Point III, pp. 26-29 
Point A 2, pp. 16-19 Point V, pp. 31-35 
(cont.) 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action arose when White Pine Ranches filed a Complaint 
the day before a scheduled Trustee's Sale of the Property located 
in White Pine Canyon, Snyderville, Utah. (R. 2-89; F. 95, R. 
1352, Add. B43). The Complaint sought to enjoin the scheduled 
Trustee's Sale, alleging, inter alia, that the Sharps had breached 
the Contract between the parties4 by failing to release Lot 6 and 
3 (cont). 
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3(a), pp. 19-20 
3(b), pp. 20-21 
3(C), pp. 21-22 
4(a), pp. 22-24 
4(b), pp. 25-29 
4(C), pp. 30-32 
5, pp. 32-33 
6(a)-(e), pp. 33-38 
1-4, pp. 38-45 
1-3, pp. 45-49 
, pp. 49-50 
Points I-V, pp. 20-35 
Point III, pp. 26-29 
Points I-V, pp. 20-35 
Point VI, pp. 3 5-3 6 
Point I, pp. 20-22 
Point II, pp. 2 3-26 
Point VI, pp. 35-38 
Point VII, pp. 38-43 
Point IV, pp. 29-31 
Point VIII, pp. 43-49 
Respondents• Brief 
to Commissioner of 
Financial Institutions 
The Contract between the parties includes the Memorandum 
of Closing Terms (hereinafter the "Memo") (Ex. 15, Add. 
A9-13), a Special Warranty Deed (Ex. 17, Add. A16-17), a 
Trust Deed Note (Ex. 3, Add. 5-6) together with an 
Addendum to the Trust Deed Note and a Trust Deed (Ex. 2, 
Add Al-4) (collectively referred to as "the Contract"). 
(F. 10, R. 1330, Add. B21; C. 1, R. 1355, Add. B46.) 
The initial draft of a purchase agreement was prepared 
by Counterclaim Defendant, Paul H. Landes, a signatory 
to the final documents composing the parties1 Contract. 
(Ex. 13; Tr. 728, R. 1645). The parties extensively 
negotiated the terms of the Contract. (Tr. 556, R. 
1644) . For instance, four drafts of the Earnest Money 
were discussed. (Tr. 729-730, R. 1645). The rule of 
construction that ambiguity in a contract is construed 
against its drafter is inapplicable where such contract 
is the result of extensive negotiations between (cont.) 
2 
the roadway and 7.35 acres of the unplatted portion of the Prop-
erty, (R. 2-89). The Complaint further alleged the Sharps had 
breached the Contract by failing to pay their alleged pro rata 
share of the cost of constructing certain improvements on the 
Property by failing to grant an easement to the County on a 10-1/2 
foot strip of land for the sole purpose of widening the County 
roadway,5 and asserted causes of action for fraud,6 slander of 
title, and failure to reconvey. The trial court granted a 
temporary restraining order on September 4, 1986, enjoining the 
Trustee's Sale and the matter proceeded to trial in January and 
March of 1988. 
The case arose against the following background. The 
Property was purchased with a down payment at closing and a 
promise to make five annual installments payable on June 3 0 of 
4 (cont.) 
the parties. Centennial Enter, v. Mansfield Dev. Co. , 
568 P.2d 58 (Colo. 1977). Additionally, the rule only 
functions after the court has considered all pertinent 
extrinsic evidence and is still uncertain as to the 
contract's interpretation. Wilburn v. Interstate 
Elec., 748 P.2d 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
5
 The County roadway has not been widened, there are no 
current plans to do so and the County has never re-
quested an easement from the Sharps. (Ex. 107, p. 15, 
Add. D99; F. 21, R. 1334, Add. B25). 
6
 The claimed misrepresentations were denied by summary 
judgment. (R. 124-125.) 
3 
each subsequent year in the amount of $192,611.06 principal, 
together with accrued interest. (Ex. 3, Add. A6).7 The Property 
was intended to be promptly developed as a Planned Unit Develop-
ment ("PUD") into twelve 4 or 5 acre lots, with an internal 
roadway dedicated to public use. (Ex. 14, Add. A7-8; Ex. 39, Add. 
A14; F. 5, R. 1329, Add. B20).8 The dedication of the roadway was 
of such vital importance to the parties that an initial plat was 
attached as Exhibit "A" to the Memo. (Exhibit "A" is partially 
reproduced in White Pine Ranches1 Addendum ("WPR Add."), pp. 76-
82) . Paragraph 5 of the Memo further provided that "changes in 
the proposed plat and the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and 
Restrictions when prepared shall be subject to the reasonable 
approval of Seller [the Sharps].11 (Ex. 15, Add. A9) . The Sharps 
were concerned that, in the event of default, they possessed 
access to the Property (Tr. 749-750, R. 1645) and Felton knew the 
Sharps "wanted the right to approve them [any changes] reason-
ably." (Tr. 138, R. 1642). 
The Memo also provided after "the recordation of a PUD Plat 
and Declaration of covenants, conditions and restrictions" 
7
 See p. 1, n. 1 of White Pine Ranches1 Brief regarding 
the transfers of White Pine Ranches1 interest in the 
Property among the various partners and partnerships. 
8
 Prior to the parties1 closing and execution of the Memo, 
Summit County had refused to approve a private road 
system. (F. 14, R. 1331, Add. B22). 
4 
("CCRs") that White Pine Ranches would be entitled to the release 
of three PUD lots of its "choice together with said roadway" in 
the proposed plat attached as Exhibit 'A.111 (Ex, 15, para 3., 
Add. A9) (emphasis added). For each $140,000.00 in principal paid 
thereafter and after recordation of the PUD, White Pine Ranches 
"shall be entitled to the release of one (1) lot of Buyer's 
choice." (Ex. 15, para. 1 & 2, Add. A9) (emphasis added). The 
Memo further provided the Sharps were entitled to one sewer 
connection and one culinary water connection in the PUD systems 
"for a connection fee and service fee equal to the pro rata cost 
to the purchaser of a lot." (Ex. 15, para. 7, Add. A10-11).9 
White Pine Ranches defaulted on its June 30, 198 3 payment, 
which default was subsequently cured in November of 1983. (Ex. 
22; F. 27, R. 1336, Add. B27; Ex. 4, 44; F. 31, R. 1337, Add. 
B28) . In December of 1983, White Pine Ranches, with the written 
consent of the Sharps, recorded a plat and the CCRs, which platted 
In their Brief, White Pine Ranches failed to address the 
lower court's finding that they also breached the 
parties' Contract "by failing to make available sewer 
and water connections at the same charge to purchasers 
of a PUD lot." (F. 100, R. 1354, Add. B45) . Although 
construction primarily commenced in 1983 for the sewer 
and water systems, neither was completed or operational 
at the time of trial, nor had the sewer construction 
been approved by the Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement 
District ("SBSID") . (Ex. 83, 83(a), 99-108; F. 82, R. 
1349-1350, Add. B40-41). The trial court concluded 
seven years was an "unreasonable time within which to 
complete the water and sewer systems." (C. 19, R. 1359, 
Add. B50.) (Tr. 366, R. 1643; F. 40, R. 1340, Add. 
B31.) 
5 
only a portion of the Property, instead of the entire Property as 
originally intended. (Ex. 51, WPR Add. 91-131; F. 39-40, R. 1339, 
Add. B30). The plat also differed from White Pine Ranches1 orig-
inal intent by including an Owner's Dedication for a private 
roadway in the PUD. (Ex. 39, Add. A14; F. 19, R. 1333, Add. B24; 
Ex. 1; F. 34, R. 1337, Add. B28). The Sharps were concerned about 
access to the Property in the event they were required to take it 
back in a foreclosure. (Tr. 748-750, R. 1645) . Had the entire 
Property been platted as originally contemplated, access would not 
have been an issue since if the Sharps took it back in a foreclos-
ure sale, they would be owners and purchasers of PUD lots en-
titling them to access under the CCRs recorded. (Tr. 757-759, R. 
1645). Had the roadway remained public, their access also would 
have been assured. Accordingly, at the time the Sharps were asked 
to approve the plat and the CCRs, their continued right of access 
was confirmed with White Pine Ranches both orally and in writing. 
(Ex. 25, 25(a), 26, 26(a), Add. C67-72; F. 35-39, R. 1338-1339, 
Add. B29-30). 
Pursuant to the terms of the Memo and the request of White 
Pine Ranches, the Sharps directed Associated Title, the trustee 
under the Trust Deed covering the Property, to release Lots 1 
through 5 of White Pine Ranches Phase I. (Ex. 23, Add. C65-66; 
Ex. 25, 25(a), Add. C67-68; F. 42, R. 1340, Add. B31; Ex. 15, 
para. 3-4, Add. A9-10). 
6 
White Pine Ranches again defaulted under the terms of the 
Contract in November of 1984 by failing to pay all of the property 
taxes due. The 1984 taxes and all subsequent property taxes 
remained unpaid ($20,3 68.62) through the time of trial. (F. 48-
49, R. 1341, Add. B32). White Pine Ranches further defaulted 
under the terms of the Contract by failing to make all of the June 
30, 1985 installment payment (only $59,709.47 was paid) and any 
remaining installment payment due under the Contract in 1986. 
(Ex. 44; F. 50, R. 1342, Add. B33). 
The Sharps recorded a Notice of Default on September 16, 
1985. (Ex. 55; F. 51, R. 1342, Add. B33) . After White Pine 
Ranches received the Notice of Default, Felton assured "every 
attempt is being made to resolve the problem." (Ex. 31, Add. C75; 
F. 52, R. 1342, Add. B33). As the trial court found: "No written 
or oral claim of default on the part of the Sharps under the 
Closing Documents was made by the plaintiffs [White Pine Ranches] 
until February 27, 1986, subsequent to plaintiffs' own defaults." 
(Ex. 35, Add. C80-81; F. 71, R. 1347, Add. B38; Tr. 200-201, R. 
164 3) . Nor did White Pine Ranches request the release of Lot 6 
and the roadway until long after their own defaults under the 
Contract.10 
1 0
 The district court found that "Plaintiffs1 first re-
quests" for release of Lot 6 and the roadway were 
"February 27, 1986 and May 7, 1986, respectively." (F. 
59, R. 1343-1344, Add. B34-35). Also, White Pine 
Ranches did not request the release of 7.5 acres of the 
unplatted property until February 27, 1986. Id. The 
Contract, however, specifically provides that (cont.) 
7 
Judge Frederick held White Pine Ranches had materially 
breached the Contract and the Sharps had substantially complied 
with its terms. (C. 5-6, R. 1355-1356; Add. B46-47.) The Judge 
concluded that the material, significant and continuing breaches 
of White Pine Ranches excused the Sharps from any obligation to 
reconvey, and found against White Pine Ranches on all other causes 
of action asserted. (C. 4, R. 1355, Add. B46.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are necessary for proper determination of 
this appeal in addition to and or to rectify the statements and 
omissions of facts in the Statement of the Case of the Brief of 
White Pine Ranches: 
1. Exhibit "A" to the Memorandum of Closing Terms contained 
a dedication commonly used to dedicate roads to public use as 
follows: 
Know all by these present that we the undersigned owners 
of the hereindescribed tract of land having caused the 
same to be subdivided into lots and streets to hereafter 
be known as White Pine Ranches Subdivision, do hereby 
dedicate for perpetual use of the public all parcels of 
land shown on this plat as intended for public use . . . 
and do further dedicate the easements as shown. 
(See Ex. 39, Add. A14; Ex. 20, para. 3) (emphasis added). 
10 (cont.) 
only "PUD lots" are to be released. Id. As the dis-
trict court found, "[a]s of these dates, plaintiffs 
[White Pine Ranches] were still and are in default." 
Id. 
8 
2. On July 19, 1983, prior to the recordation of the final 
plat of Phase I of the Property and while the June 30, 1983 
payment was in default, Felton wrote a letter to attorney Jon 
Heaton in which he stated that the final plat had not yet been 
recorded because fl[a]s soon as we file the plat real estate taxes 
on this property are going to go up significantly, which we would 
like to avoid until we had an actual buyer for one of the lots." 
(Ex. 23, Add. C65; Tr. 157-159, R. 1642; F. 28, R. 1336, Add. 
B27) . 
3. On November 18, 1983, Heaton prepared a letter to the 
Sharps on behalf of Saunders as an embodiment of the represen-
tations White Pine Ranches was making or willing to make to the 
Sharps to secure their consent to the final plat. (Tr. 751, R. 
164 5). The letter indicated: 
At a later time in the near future Hy [Saunders] has 
indicated he will seek release of Lots 1 through 5 of 
the platted subdivision along with his road (White Pine 
Lane).... When those releases are made pursuant to 
your [the Sharps1] instruction we will ensure that 
rights are reserved in White Pine Lane for access for 
the southern portions of the property purchased from you 
until your Deed of Trust is fully paid. 
(Ex. 25 and 25(a), Add. C67-68). 
4. On November 21, 1983, Felton wrote Heaton a reply in 
which he stated "[i]t is perfectly acceptable to us [White Pine 
Ranches] that he [Mr. Sharp] retain an easement over White Pine 
Lane to the southern part of his property as well as to Lot 6 from 
White Pine Canyon Road up to the western boundary of Lot 6." (Ex. 
26, Add. C69-70). 
9 
5. Since Felton!s letter seemed to be partially contra-
dictory to the assurances and the discussions Heaton had had with 
Saunders, he called Felton on November 28, 1983 (Tr. 748, R. 
1645) and Heaton noted in the margin of a copy of the letter that 
Felton agreed "access over road [White Pine Lane] retained if 
Sharp develops undeveloped property Lots 7-12 White Pine Ranch." 
(Ex. 26(a), Add. C71-72; F. 37, R. 1338, Add. B29) . 
6. In reliance upon and consideration of the agreement for 
access, the Sharps executed the Consent to Record Phase I of 
White Pine Ranches, which platted only the northern portion of the 
Property. (F. 39, R. 1339, Add. B14; C. 14, R. 1350, Add. B50) . 
7. On January 18, 1984, pursuant to the request of 
Saunders, the Sharps directed Associated Title to release and 
reconvey Lots 1 through 5. (Ex. 23, Add. C65-66; Ex. 25, 25(a), 
Add. C67-68; F. 42, R. 1340, Add. B31; Ex. 15, para. 3-4, Add. A9-
10.) The partial release was not prepared until January 6, 1986 
and recorded on March 26, 1986. (Ex. 45; F. 43, R. 1340, Add. 
B31). White Pine Ranches named Associated Title in the action but 
chose not to serve or pursue Associated Title regarding the delay. 
(F. 43, R. 1340, Add. B31). 
8. On January 17, 1984, Felton sent a letter to Heaton re-
questing Mr. Sharp to consent to a change in the development plan 
stating "[w]hat we plan to do is to do a very tasteful and dis-
crete multi-family development on the thirty (30) acres which is 
10 
the only way it will be economically feasible." (Ex. 29, Add. 
C73; F. 45, R. 1340-1341, Add. B31). 
9. On January 20, 1984, Felton sent a letter to Heaton 
conceding that "the deeds [sic] for the roads [sic] may be dif-
ficult to do." (Ex. 30, Add. C74; F. 44, R. 1340, Add. B31) . 
The Sharps were never presented with a document in recordable form 
releasing the internal road from the Trust Deed. Felton testified 
that "Associated Title probably" would be the ones to prepare that 
reconveyance. (Tr. 178, R. 1642). 
10. On February 24, 1986, Felton sent a letter to Mr. Sharp 
detailing the problems with the project which caused White Pine 
Ranches1 "inability to now complete the timely payments to you." 
(Ex. 34, Add. C76) . This letter concluded "we are certainly not 
blaming you as being directly responsible" and asked the Sharps to 
"be considerate or [sic] our problems as well as the factual 
cause, whether that be intentional, malfeasance (Summit County) or 
an implied or omitted condition of this development." (Ex. 34, 
Add. C79). 
11. After Felton received a notice that the Trustee's Sale 
had been set again for April, Felton sent another letter to Mr. 
Sharp on February 27, 1986. (Ex. 35, Add. C80; F. 59, 62, R. 
1344-1345, Add. B35-36). This letter, for the first time, made a 
claim of a breach of the Contract by the Sharps, requested con-
veyance of the road and approximately 7.5 acres of the unplatted 
Property and demanded approximately $73,000.00 for the costs of 
11 
water and sewer hookups which Felton claimed were "now avail-
able."11 (Ex. 35, Add. C80-81; F. 59, 62, R. 1344-1345, Add. 
B35-36). 
12. The February 27th letter made no claim regarding any 
release of Lot 6. In a subsequent letter dated May 7, 1986, 
Felton requested for the first time the release of Lot 6.12 (Ex. 
37, Add. C82-83; F. 59, R. 1344, Add. B35). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Although White Pine Ranches asserts a plethora of alleged 
errors committed by the trial court, once its motivation in 
filing a complaint is revealed, this case becomes very simple. 
White Pine Ranches was a partnership of desperate men who ran out 
of the dollars needed to honor their obligations.13 After years 
of paying under the Contract without complaint, White Pine Ranches 
As noted above, the water and sewer systems in fact were 
not available at the time of trial, being neither built 
or operational. (R. 1349, Add. B40-41). 
White Pine Ranches claims on p. 26, n. 16 of its Brief 
the fact there was no request for the release of Lot 6 
is a "hypertechnicality" since only one lot was remain-
ing in the platted portion. However, the Sharps were 
advised in the May 7, 1986 letter and Felton so 
testified at trial that White Pine Ranches was "in a 
position to prepare and obtain approval of that plat 
[for the balance of the Property] immediately," which, 
of course, would have created choices between Lot 6 and 
the newly platted lots. (F. 46, R. 1314, Add. B32; Tr. 
100, R. 1642; Ex. 37, Add. C82-83; Tr. 138, 202, R. 
1642, 1643.) 
Felton testified "we have this construction loan that's 
in default and we're desperate at this point. Make no 
mistake about it. Everybody's going bankrupt at this 
point." (Tr. 309, R. 1643). 
12 
was forced to invent excuses for their non-performance and finally 
took the startling and aggressive posture of filing a Complaint 
against the Sharps, even though it admittedly had failed to pay 
property taxes, installment payments and to provide to the Sharps 
certain utility connections. As the trial court found, these 
excuses were never mentioned to the Sharps until immediately prior 
to the filing of their Complaint in September of 1986:14 
Significantly, as bearing upon the credibility of 
plaintiffs1 [White Pine Ranches1] arguments is the fact 
unrebutted that plaintiffs made no claims whatsoever of 
breach by the Sharps until after their own admitted 
breaches of the Closing Documents. 
(F. 53; R. 1342, Add. B33). 
White Pine Ranches made the June 30, 1982 installment payment 
without complaint. (Cf. F. 26, R. 1335-1336, Add. B26-27). 
Although it was made late, no allegation of breach by the Sharps 
accompanied the June 30, 1983 installment payment. (Tr. 208, R. 
1643; F. 30, R. 1336, Add. B27) . On November 21, 1983, Felton 
sent a letter to the Sharps stating "I would again apologize for 
that late (1983) payment." (Ex. 26, Add. C69-70) . The June 30, 
1984 payment was also made without any claims of breach. (Ex. 31, 
Add. C75; F. 52, R. 1342, Add. B33).15 After failure to make the 
14
 White Pine Ranches1 incredible claim on p. 2 of its 
Brief that "after Respondents failed to reconvey the 
property, Appellants ceased making payments," is without 
any citation to or support from the Record. 
1 5
 Also, on p. 2 of its Brief, White Pine Ranches1 attempts 
to sympathetically exploit the amount of down and 
installment payments made to the Sharps. The (cont.) 
13 
June 30, 1985 installment payment in full and after receipt of a 
Notice of Default, Felton wrote the following to Mr. Sharp on 
September 24, 1985: 
I wanted to touch base with you to assure you that I am 
not ignoring this problem and am very concerned since I 
made my portion of the payment and am prepared to 
complete the final payment next year. 
In any event, I wanted to assure you that every attempt 
is being made to resolve the problem and I should have a 
better idea in a couple of weeks as to the ability of 
the remaining interest [in White Pine Ranches] to 
satisfy that obligation. 
(Ex. 31; Add. C75) (emphasis added) . Thus, less than a year 
before the commencement of this litigation, White Pine Ranches had 
made no claims whatsoever of breach by the Sharps.16 
The true motivation behind the filing of a Complaint was 
that White Pine Ranches1 development had turned sour. White Pine 
15 (cont.) 
trial court, however, entered Judgment against White 
Pine Ranches in the amount of $557,642.46 for principal, 
interest and late charges not made through March 22, 
1988, together with a daily per diem thereafter of 
$183.32 (excluding trustee's fees, court costs, attor-
ney's fees and interest thereon). (J. 3, R. 1370, Add. 
B56-63; C. 31, R. 1361-1362, Add. B52-53). 
1 6
 In F. 52, R. 1342, Add. B33, the district court also 
found: 
Felton, in his letter [Ex. 31] made no allegation 
that the Sharps had slandered plaintiffs' [White 
Pine Ranches'] title as a result of the inclusion 
of Lots 1-5 in the Notice of Default [which was 
recorded on September 16, 1985 as described in F. 
51, R. 1342, Add. B33], nor did Felton or any 
other plaintiff allege in 1984 or 1985 any breach 
of the Closing Documents by the Sharps. (Tr. 
183-184, R. 1642). 
14 
The true motivation behind the filing of a Complaint was 
that White Pine Ranches' development had turned sour. White Pine 
Ranches purchased the Property from the Sharps intending to 
promptly develop a residential subdivision. (F. 5, R. 1329, Add. 
B20) . Throughout the negotiations leading up the parties1 Con-
tracts, the Sharps declined to participate in the costs or risks 
inherent in the development of raw land. They were interested in 
selling the Property as they approached retirement. The develop-
ment soured due to a sharply declining real estate market in Park 
City and the extraordinary improvement costs and development 
requirements imposed by Summit County and the SBSID. (Ex. 97; 
Tr. 473, R. 1644; Ex. 86, Add. D89-92; F. 69, R. 1346-1347, Add. 
B37-38). 
At the time White Pine Ranches purchased the Property, "it 
was anticipated that additional developments by third parties 
would occur in the White Pine Canyon vicinity, including the 
development of a ski resort in White Pine Canyon and the develop-
ment of adjoining parcels of land." (Ex. 104, 105, 107 and 117; 
F. 25, R. 13 35, Add. B26). Instead, development potential soured 
as demonstrated by the testimony of White Pine Ranches' own 
appraiser. 
At the hearing in January, 1988 on the Sharps1 Petition for 
Additional Security, the court below found the Property was worth 
approximately $17,500 to $20,000 per acre. (Tr. 493-494, R. 
1644). Previously, LeRoy Pia, White Pine Ranches1 appraiser whose 
15 
valuations were exclusively used throughout the proceedings, 
valued the Property on June 30, 1985 at $29,062,50 per acre. (Ex. 
96). (The fair market value at the time of trial was found to be 
$20,000 per acre. [Supp. F. 2, R. 1394, Respondents1 Brief to 
Commissioner of Financial Institutions, Add. 2]). That this case 
is market motivated is again revealed in a letter authored by 
Felton on January 17, 1984, in which he requested the approval by 
the Sharps of a "multi-family development" on the unplatted 
acreage, "which is the only way it [the development] will be 
economically feasible." (Ex. 29, Add. C73; F. 45, R. 1340-1341, 
Add. B31-32). (A multi-family concept was not adopted.) 
As the market declined, White Pine Ranches1 development costs 
soared, through no fault of the Sharps. (Tr. 208, R. 1643). On 
July 26, 1984, more than one year prior to his letter of apology 
for non-payment to Mr. Sharp (Ex. 31, Add. C7 5) , Felton made 
demand upon Summit County for up to $1,000,000 because of an 
"unreasonable" requirement of an off-site sewer system as opposed 
to the use of septic tanks, the loss of one or more sales because 
of the County's refusal to plow White Pine Canyon Road and due to 
"the imposition of unreasonable and extreme requirements to have 
the subdivision approved." (Ex. 84, Add. D86-87; F. 65, R. 1345-
1346, Add. B36-37). Soon thereafter, White Pine Ranches brought 
suit against Summit County, the SBSID and various officials 
thereof to recover damages in the United States District Court for 
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the District of Utah ("the Federal Court litigation"). (F. 66, R. 
1346, Add. B37). 
In Answers to Interrogatories in the Federal Court litigation 
dated December 28, 1984, White Pine Ranches stated, "Because of 
the imposition of the requirement that Plaintiffs construct an 
off-site sewer approximately one mile in length, the costs of 
developing the entire project became prohibitive." (Ex. 116; see 
also Ex. 107, p. 7; F. 67, R. 1346, Add. B37) . Subsequently in 
thcit litigation, Saunders swore in an Affidavit dated March 17, 
1986: 
As a result of the various delays [caused by the County 
and the SBSID], which are detailed below, the market for 
exclusive building lots is now virtually non-existent, 
costs of improvements escalated to be several times what 
I had anticipated, and much of the real property in the 
project is threatened by foreclosure. 
(Ex. 86, para 10, Add. D90; F. 69, R. 1346-1347, Add. B37-38). 
After careful review of the claims in this Federal Court litiga-
tion, Judge Frederick found "[M]ost of the damages sought to be 
recovered by the plaintiffs [White Pine Ranches] in the lawsuit 
against the SBSID and Summit County are the same damages Plain-
tiffs sought to recover from the Sharps in the present case." (F. 
70, R. 1347, Add. B38). 
Given the aggressive posture taken by White Pine Ranches 
below, it is no wonder that it has taken a shotgun approach on 
appeal.17 Eleven issues are presented on appeal in White Pine 
1 7
 Generally, authorities frown on alleging too many 
points of error. Judge Franklin Spears of the Supreme 
Court of Texas in 1985 stated: "If you cannot win 
reversal with your six best points, then the 2 0th or 
3 0th will probably be unsuccessful, too." (cont.) 
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Ranches1 Brief, pp. 2-4. However, the actual number of issues are 
greatly expanded in the body of the Brief, since there are more 
than two dozen argument headings set forth in the Table of Con-
tents. The following summarizes the Sharps1 response to the 
alleged plethora of trials court errors. 
White Pine Ranches materially breached the Contract by 
failing to pay the entire 1984 or any of the 1985, 1986 and 1987 
property taxes on the Property when due and by failing to pay the 
entire 1985 or any portion of the 1986 installment payment. (F. 
100, R. 1354, Add. B45; C. 2-4, R. 1355, Add. B46) . It was the 
specific practice of White Pine Ranches to request a release of a 
specific PUD lot after required payments were made and provided no 
default existed. (F. 47, R. 1341, Add. B32; Tr. 334, R. 1643). 
Accordingly, since White Pine Ranches1 breaches preceded any 
request for releases, the Sharps were not obligated to release Lot 
6, the roadway or the unplatted acreage. (F. 59, R. 1343, Add. 
B34; F. 100, R. 1354, C. 8, R. 1356, Add. B47). Should this Court 
agree, all of the remaining issues raised by White Pine Ranches 
are moot. The Sharps committed no breach of the parties1 Contract 
17 (cont.) 
Spears, Presenting an Effective Appeal, 21 Trial 95(6) 
(November 1985). See also Baskin, Wasted Words or 
Persuasive Prose: Connecting with the Appellate Court, 
58 Fla. B. J. 69-72 (1985) (A scatter-gun approach 
weakens an argument). 
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and were excused by White Pine Ranches' breaches from further 
performance. (C. 5, 6 & 9, R. 1356, Add. B47). 
Moreover, the Contract provisions respecting release of the 
roadway were modified by the parties when it was agreed the Sharps 
could retain access until the Trust Deed Note was paid in full (C. 
14, R. 1358, Add. B49; see C. 9, R. 1356, Add. B47). Alternative-
ly, the Sharps1 execution of the Consent to Record and the subse-
quent recordation of the final plat and the CCRs on the Property 
constituted a release of the internal roadway and was a non-
exclusive easement, equitable servitude or covenant running with 
the land, allowing an owner of unplatted acreage access to the 
roadway the same as a PUD lot owner. (C. 11, R. 1357, Add. B48) . 
Finally, the Sharps agreed not to and were estopped to deny the 
use of the roadway for the private use of a PUD lot owner. (C. 12 
& 13, R. 1357-1358, Add. B48-49). 
The district court did not err in concluding White Pine 
Ranches failed to show it was entitled to relief under Utah Code 
Ann. Section 57-1-3 3 since the Sharps, in fact, requested the 
trustee to release Lots 1-5 of the PUD. (C. 24, R. 1360, Add. 
B51) . Since White Pine Ranches was not entitled to a release of 
Lot 6, the roadway or the unplatted acreage, there could be no 
cause of action for failure to request a release. Furthermore, 
the Sharps reasonably relied upon the advice of counsel, in good 
faith, which is a valid defense under the statute. (C. 23, R. 
1360, Add. B51). 
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Because White Pine Ranches breached the Contract, it is not 
entitled to any damages. Moreover, the damages sought are too 
remote, speculative and conjectural. (C. 28, R. 1361, Add. B52). 
Further, White Pine Ranches has failed to establish it suffered 
any actual damages. Id. 
The Sharps are entitled to recover their attorney's fees 
under numerous provisions of the parties1 Contract in enforcing 
the Contract, in defending and protecting their right to collect 
on the Note and in prevailing on their Counterclaim. (F. 96, R. 
1352-1353, Add. B43-44). Furthermore, White Pine Ranches failed 
to challenge below the amount of or the reasonableness of the 
award of attorney's fees sought. (R. 1261-1273; Tr. 62, R. 
1640). 
ARGUMENT 
Since detailed citations to the Record and Exhibits have been 
set forth above in the Statement of the Case, Statement of Facts 
and Summary of Argument, citations in this section will, for the 
sake of brevity, generally be limited to the single principal 
reference, usually found in the Findings of Fact or an Exhibit. 
POINT I 
WHITE PINE RANCHES IS REQUIRED TO 
REQUEST LOTS TO BE RELEASED BEFORE 
THE SHARPS HAVE ANY DUTY TO RECONVEY 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that the meaning 
and intent of an agreement can be determined from the course of 
conduct and the action and performance of the parties to the 
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agreement, Zeese v. Estate of Siegel, 534 P.2d 85 (Utah 1975); 
Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz. 501 P.2d 266 (Utah 1972). 
The trial court concluded: "Plaintiffs were obligated, under 
the terms of the Memorandum of Closing Terms and pursuant to their 
own practice, to specifically request and identify lots, including 
Lot 6, for release by the Sharps." (C. 7, R. 1356, Add. B47; 
Accord, F. 47, R. 1341, Add. B32) (emphasis added). This Con-
clusion was based upon the following Exhibits, testimony and 
Findings by the lower court: 
a) The Memorandum of Closing Terms expressly sanctions the 
release of "PUD lots of Buyer's [White Pine Ranches1] choice,11 
given certain conditions discussed more fully above under the 
Statement of the Case. (Ex. 15, para. 3, see Ex. 15, para. 2, 
Add. A9). 
b) Felton testified: "Wait a minute, wait a minute. No, 
just from recalling the contract, I'm going to recant that 
testimony because I do believe the contract says lots of the 
buyer's choice and that would require a choice." (Tr. 334, R. 
1643) . 
c) White Pine Ranches recognized the limited entitlement to 
request the release of PUD lots only. In a letter Felton stated: 
"Upon final plat approval, we will notify you to obtain the 
releases for the lots and the road as per the contract." (Ex. 21, 
Add. C64) (emphasis added). 
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d) It was the practice of White Pine Ranches to request the 
release of specific PUD lots. In a letter, White Pine Ranches 
indicated in the near future it would seek the release of PUD lots 
1-5. (Ex. 25, Add. C67). 1 8 
e) White Pine Ranches was "land banking." That is, White 
Pine Ranches delayed recording a final plat because "[a]s soon as 
we file the plat, real estate taxes are going to go up signifi-
cantly, which we would like to avoid until we have an actual buyer 
for one of the lots." (Ex. 23, Add. C65-66).19 
f) White Pine Ranches wanted to keep open its options as to 
the unplatted acreage, requesting by letter the approval by the 
Sharps of a "multi-family development." (Ex. 29, Add. C73). 
g) White Pine Ranches indicated to the Sharps they could 
plat the remaining Property any time. Accordingly, White Pine 
Ranches "may prepare a plat of the then unplatted acreage and seek 
a release of a portion of it instead of Lot 6." (F. 61, R. 1344, 
Add. B35). Accordingly, ample evidence and authority exists to 
support the trial court's conclusion that White Pine Ranches is 
required to request releases before any such duty arises. 
White Pine Ranches could have chosen any other combina-
tion such as PUD lots 2-6. 
Approximately one-half of the Property had not been 
platted at the time of trial. (C. 34, R. 1363, Add. 
B54.) 
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POINT II 
SINCE WHITE PINE RANCHES MATERIALLY 
BREACHED THE CONTRACT IT WAS NOT 
ENTITLED TO ANY RELEASES 
If this court affirms the lower court's findings that White 
Pine Ranches was required to specifically request and identify 
lots, including Lot 6, for release and White Pine Ranches was in 
breach of the Contract prior to any request for the release of Lot 
6, the roadway and 7.5 acres of the unplatted acreage, then any 
duty to reconvey is excused. Further, the remaining issues raised 
by White Pine Ranches would be moot since they rest upon 
establishment of premises negative to a requirement of a specific 
request for lots to be released and to a finding that White Pine 
Ranches first breached the Contract. 
The failure to pay real estate taxes is a material default 
which precludes a release of lots from of a mortgage. City Bank 
Farmers Trust Co. v. Heckmann. 164 Misc. 234, 297 N.Y.S. 592, 595 
(Sup. Ct. 1937); Clason's Point Land Co. v. Schwartz, 237 A.D. 
741, 262 N.Y.S. 756, 760 (App. Div. 1933). In Markowitz v. 
Republic Natfl Bank, 651 F.2d 825, 827 (2nd Cir. 1981), the court 
held that because the debtor failed to pay taxes for 1972, 1973 
and 1974, but in 1973, requested the release of certain lots, the 
debtor was precluded from demanding release of the property so 
long as he was in default. Moreover, if a trustor (White Pine 
Ranches) is in default at the time it requests reconveyance, the 
beneficiary (the Sharps) is not obligated to reconvey. Las Vegas 
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Ranch Club v. Bank of Nev. . 97 Nev. 389, 632 P.2 1146, 1147-1148 
(1981); see also Sharp v. Brock, 626 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Civ, App. 
1981) (Debtors not entitled to release where they fail to make 
timely demand for release or designate specifically which land was 
to be released).20 
Provisions requiring payment of taxes and certain install-
ments are material. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 297 N.Y.S. at 
594-595. As the court in Clason's Point Land Co., 263 N.Y.S. at 
759-760, noted: 
To ascertain the objects and purposes of the mortgage, 
the instrument must be examined as a whole
 0 The mort-
gagee [seller] was entitled to payment and satisfaction 
of the mortgage debt at a specified time and to the 
preservation of the security intact until such payment 
and satisfaction. The mortgagor [buyer] was bound, 
among other things, to make semiannual payments of 
interest, and to pay taxes, assessments, and water 
charges on the mortgaged premises. The release clause 
20 The cases of Burroughs v. Garner, 43 Md. App. 302, 405 
A.2d 301 at 306 (1979) and Columbia Dev. v. Watchie, 252 
Or. 81, 448 Po2d 360 (1963) cited by White Pine Ranches 
are distinguishable. In Burroughs, the payments en-
titling the plaintiff to a release were prior to any 
defaults by plaintiff and the condition requiring the 
land to be platted before the buyer was entitled to 
release had been waived. In the case at hand, the 
parties clearly intended the Property would be platted 
before being released. In Columbia Dev., the Oregon 
court, sitting in equity, determined under the wording 
of the contract and the "facts and circumstances" 
surrounding execution, entitlement to release survived 
default. The Court found the plaintiff was not prej-
udiced since there was ample security after release. In 
the matter at hand, the Property clearly was not ample 
security. (Co 33, R* 1368, Add. B59; J. 4, R. 1373, 
Adde B54.) Finally, in Eldridge v. Burns, 7 6 Cal. App. 
3rd 396, 142 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1971), another case cited 
by Plaintiffs, the court only held that the buyer was 
entitled to release for entitlement accruing prior to 
default. 
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is not to be viewed as independent of the mortgagor's 
covenants. The various provisions of the mortgage must 
be construed as dependent stipulations. The right in 
the mortgagor to pay stipulated amounts for release of 
parts of the mortgaged premises was a privilege of which 
she might have availed herself, but apparently did not. 
The payment of the interest and taxes was, on the other 
hand, a definite obligation.... 
(citations omitted). 
In a transaction where several documents are executed simul-
taneously and are clearly interrelated, they must be construed 
together and harmonized if possible. Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l 
Bank, 737 P.2d 225 (Utah 1987). It is the obligation of the court 
when interpreting and construing the documents to look at them in 
their entirety and in accordance with their purpose. Big Cotton-
wood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987) c In this case, the operative Contract documents were 
executed simultaneously at the closing on July 16, 1981 and 
should be construed together.21 In construing the operative 
Contract documents as an integrated whole, the release provisions 
in the Memo (Ex. 15, para. 1-4, Add. A9-10) must not be viewed as 
being independent of the provisions for payment of taxes and 
installments in the Trust Deed (Ex. 2, para. 5, Add. A2) and Trust 
Deed Note (Ex. 3, Add. A5). 2 2 White Pine Ranches was in default 
The integration provision of the Memo, para. 9, incor-
porates all other "closing documents executed simul-
taneously herewith." (Ex. 15, Add. All-12). 
White Pine Ranches directly breached the Memo in failing 
to make available to the Sharps within a reasonable time 
sewer and water connections. (F. 100, R. 13 54, Add. 
B45) . 
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under the Contract prior to any request for the release of Lot 6, 
the roadway, or the unplatted acreage23 and was not entitled to 
release of Lot 6, the roadway or any unplatted acreage,. Moreover, 
White Pine Ranches was not entitled to release of the unplatted 
acreage since it had not met another condition of release, 
recordation of a plat. 
POINT III 
PURSUANT TO A MODIFICATION OF THE CONTRACT, 
THE SHARPS RELEASED THE ROADWAY 
BY EXECUTING THE CONSENT TO RECORD 
It is elementary that any contract may be modified by subse-
quent agreement provided that all the elements essential to the 
White Pine Ranches seems to imply that because the 
Sharps didn't assert a default with regard to the 1984 
taxes, that, somehow, the failure to pay those taxes is 
no longer a default. A breach is a breach, however, at 
the time it occurs regardless of whether the non-breach-
ing party seeks to enforce the agreement. Biork v. 
April Indus. . 547 P.2d 219 (Utah 1976), appeal after 
remand 560 Po2d 315, cert, den. 97 S.Ct. 2634, 431 U.S. 
930, 50 L«Edo2d 245 (Damages began to accrue once 
defendant breached agreement. Plaintiffs not required 
to take steps to enforce agreement) ; see Ouin Blair 
Enter, v. Julien Const. Co., 597 P.2d 945 (Wyo. 1979) 
(Parties free to ignore provisions of contract but must 
understand that they bear the consequences of such 
disregard when breach becomes fact of life). Curiously, 
White Pine Ranches seeks to have the argument regarding 
notification both ways. Although White Pine Ranches 
asserts the Sharps should have claimed a default with 
regard to the taxes, White Pine Ranches also asserts 
that it had paid enough of the release price by December 
23, 1983 for release of the roadway, apparently without 
notification to the Sharps. (See Appellants1 Brief, p. 
7) • Further, White Pine Ranches provides no answer to 
the protection the Sharps insisted upon in event of 
default. If the roadway was to be automatically re-
leased from the Trust Deed, how would access rights be 
preserved for the Sharps? 
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formation of a contract are observed. See, Cheney v. Rucker, 14 
Utah 2d 205, 381 Po2d 86 (1963). A party to a written contract 
may orally modify it regardless of any provision in the contract 
to the contrary. Dillman v. Massev Ferguson, Inc., 13 Utah 2d 
142, 369 Po2d 296 (1962); Davis v. Pavne & Dav, Inc., 10 Utah 2d 
53, 348 P.2d 337 (1960). Here, even if the Memorandum required a 
reconveyance of the roadway, the parties clearly modified the 
Contract by agreeing, through the negotiations and correspondence 
(including a letter (Ex. 31) signed by a general partner of White 
Pine Ranches) preceding the execution of the Consent to Record, 
that the Sharps would retain access in consideration of their 
Consent. Additionally, White Pine Ranches accepted the executed 
Consent without requiring more and should be estopped to deny its 
effect. Brown v. Holden, 410 P. 2d 528 (Okl. 1965) (Party cannot 
deny making contract and retain benefits flowing from trans-
action) . 
The Sharps' execution of the Consent to Record the final plat 
and the CCRs constituted a release of the internal roadway, either 
in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5 of the Memo or in accordance 
with the subsequent modification of the Contract. The term 
"release" has been defined as "the relinquishment, concession or 
giving up of a right, claim, or privilege by the person against 
whom it exists or to whom it accrues, to the person against whom 
it might have been demanded." Clearly, the Sharps conceded their 
right of "reasonable approval" of any changes under para. 5 of the 
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Memo. (Ex. 15, Add. A10) . 76 C.J.S. Release Section 1 (1976); 
Coooev v. Keadv, 73 Or. 66, 144 P. 99 (1914). 
The Consent to Record allowed White Pine Ranches to record 
its plat and CCRs which reserved a non-exclusive easement for 
utilities and vehicular and pedestrian access over the private 
roadway. . . . " (F. 39, Add. B30) (emphasis added). White Pine 
Ranches, on page 20 of its Brief, argues in one short paragraph 
that the execution of the Consent was not a "reconveyance."24 
White Pine Ranches did not argue below the concept of "recon-
veyance" as opposed to "release" nor was Judge Frederick asked to 
make such a distinction. White Pine Ranches cannot now raise this 
issue for the first time on appeal. Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. 
U.S. Life Title Ins. Co., Ill Utah Adv. Rep. 71 (1989)*25 
The CCRs to which the Sharps consented may also be construed 
as covenants running with the land or equitable servitudes. 
Leaver v. Grose. 563 P.2d 773 (Utah 1977) (Covenants duly executed 
and recorded are enforceable by interested parties). Covenants, 
The only case cited by White Pine Ranches in that 
paragraph is General Glass Corp. v. Mast Constr. Co., 
766 P.2d 429 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). That case, however, 
dealt with the priority of a trust deed and has nothing 
to do with the issue of release or even, reconveyance. 
Failure to raise the issue below is prejudicial. The 
Sharps may have cured by tendering a deed of recon-
veyance and the court may have fashioned a grant of an 
easement or some similar right in favor of the Sharps to 
protect access in event of default. Moreover, the court 
may have determined the parties1 intent where the words 
"Deed of Reconveyance" are used in the Memo, para. 1, 
and the word "release" is thereafter used in paras. 2 & 
3. (Ex. 15, Add. A9). 
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by agreement, can be made to run with the landc 165 Broadway 
Bldcr. Inc. v. City Investing Co,. 120 F.2d 813 (2nd Cir. 1941); 
21 C.J.Se Covenants Section 62 (1978) . Any person although owning 
a limited estate in property may make a valid covenant. Id. 
Section 3; CBN Corp. v. United States, 328 F<,2d 316 (Ct. CI. 
1964) . 
The Consent and the recordation of the plat and CCRs re-
leased the road and these documents, together with the parties1 
"modification" agreement, granted access to all PUD lot owners as 
well as to the Sharps until the Trust Deed was paid in full. See 
Macaw v. Gross. 452 So.2d 1126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (Partial 
release to be determined from whole instrument not just particular 
portions consistent with reason, probability and practical aspects 
of transaction between parties). 
POINT IV 
SUBSEQUENT DOCUMENTS CREATED AN 
EASEMENT OVER WHITE PINE LANE 
IN FAVOR OF THE SHARPS 
White Pine Ranches argues that the trial court's finding of 
an easement in favor of the Sharps was gratuitous because it did 
not plead the existence of an easement in their Answer or Counter-
claim. (WPR Brief, p. 39). It is well settled law, however, that 
even if both parties litigate the issue, it will be treated in all 
respects as if it had been raised in the pleadings. J.J.N.P. Co. 
v. State, 655 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1982). Here the issue of an ease-
ment was fully litigated below. In fact, attorneys for White Pine 
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Ranches extensively cross-examined Heaton on that issue. (Tr. 
765-767, R. 1645). 
Easements may be created by grant, express or implied, or by 
prescription. Wright v. Horse Creek Ranches, 697 Pc2d 384 (Coloc 
1985)c Additionally, easements may be created by oral grant or 
estoppel. Freiqhtwavs Terminal Co, v. Industrial & Commercial 
Constr.. 381 P.2d 977 (Alaska 1963). 
Here the trial court specifically found both parties by 
mutual intent and agreement granted the Sharps a right to use the 
roadway in event of default. (F. 89, R. 1351, Add. B42) . The 
trial court further found such agreement was memorialized by 
letters between Felton and Heaton and by the recording of the 
Consent to Record. (Id).26 Although White Pine Ranches argue 
that Heaton was not authorized to make the representations to the 
Sharps, Heaton testified otherwise (Tr. 751, R. 1645) and the 
court below has the discretion to believe one witness's testimony 
over another. Cook v. Gardner, 14 Utah 2d 193, 381 P. 2d 78 
(1963)o27 Heaton confirmed by telephone with Felton that "access 
over road [White Pine Lane] retained if Sharp develops undeveloped 
property." (F. 37, R. 1328, Add. B29). The conversation was 
2 6
 Felton's letter of November 21, 1983 (Ex. 26, Add. C67) 
indicates the parties had agreed to an easement in favor 
of the Sharps: "It is perfectly acceptable to us [White 
Pine Ranches] that he [Sharp] retain an easement over 
White Pine Lane." 
2 7
 Throughout Appellants1 Brief, other citations to the 
testimony of Felton or Saunders are set forth as though 
the trial court is required to accept or believe such 
testimony. See, e.g., Appellant's Brief, p. 25, n. 14. 
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memorialized by margin notes of Heaton on a copy of Felton's 
November 21 letter. (Ex. 26(a), Add. C71-72). Moreover, Felton 
was a partner in the General Partnership and, accordingly, could 
bind the partnership with regard to the granting of an easement. 
(C. 15, R. 1359, Add. B50) . Utah Code Ann. Section 48-1-6; Salt 
Lake City Brewing Co. v. Hawke. 24 Utah 199, 66 P. 1058 (1901). 
White Pine Ranches claims that the Consent to Record does not 
create an easement in favor of the Sharps. In so arguing, how-
ever, White Pine Ranches ignores the fact that the Consent is 
attached as Exhibit "A11 to the CCRs, which CCRs White Pine Ranches 
executed and recorded. (Ex. 51, WPR Add. 91-13 5) . It also 
ignores the fact that White Pine Ranches agreed to allow access. 
(Fo 39, Re 1339, Add. B30). This reliance and performance by the 
Sharps is sufficient to remedy any alleged defects under the 
Statute of Frauds, and create an easement by estoppel, if not by 
specific grant. Lvman Grazing Ass'n v. Smith. 24 Utah 2d 443, 473 
P.2d 905 (1970); Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co.. 6 Utah 2d 18, 
305 P.2d 480 (1956). 
POINT V 
BY EXECUTING THE CONSENT TO RECORD, 
THE SHARPS ARE ESTOPPED TO DENY 
ACCESS TO PUD LOT OWNERS 
The Sharps are estopped to deny access to the internal 
roadway and utilities to PUD lot owners. White Pine Ranches 
claims the Sharps' foreclosure will extinguish the covenants and 
easements created by the plat and CCRs, including the non-
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exclusive easement over the roadway created in favor of the PUD 
lot owners. White Pine Ranches makes this argument despite: 
a) The provision in all Notices of Default and Notices of 
Sale recorded against the Property that such Notices ares "SUB-
JECT TO Easements, Encroachments, Restrictions, Rights-of-Way and 
matters of record enforceable in law (sic) equity. (F* 56, R. 
1343, Add* B34). 
b) The Consent to Record grants "a non-exclusive easement 
for water lines, water tank and water systems [and] . . . a non-
exclusive easement for utilities and vehicular and pedestrian 
access over the private roadwayo" (Ex0 51, WPR Addc 91-131). 
c) These same easements were reserved by White Pine Ranches 
when they recorded the final plate (Ex. 1). 
d) The plat and CCRs, with the Consent to Record attached 
as an exhibit, were recorded on December 23, 1983 by White Pine 
Ranchese (F. 40, R. 1339, Add. B30) . 
e) No objection was raised by this release procedure until 
after the Sharps recorded a Notice of Default on September 16, 
1985. (See generally, Ex. 57; F. 40, R. 1339, Add. B30; F. 51 & 
54, R. 1342-1343, Add. B33-34). 
f) The Sharps perceived the Consent constituted substantial 
performance of any obligation under the Memo to release. (F. 60, 
R. 1344, Add. B35). 2 8 
2 8
 See Alaska Housing Auth. v. Walsh & Co., 625 P.2d 831 
(Alaska 1980) (Contractor substantially performed road 
construction contract where road was substantially 
serving its intended purpose). White Pine Ranches 
argues that there can be no substantial perform- (cont.) 
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g) A provision in the Trust Deed, paragraph 9, allows the 
Trustee upon request of the beneficiary (Sharps) to "(a) consent 
to oo. any map or plat of said property; (b) join in granting any 
easement.88 (Ex. 2, Add. A2) . 
h) The parties1 by mutual intent and agreement granted 
access to the Sharps in the event of default* (F, 89, R. 1351, 
Add. B42). 
i) The Sharps repeated assurances, before and after trial, 
to White Pine Ranches that they did not intend to interfere 
through their foreclosure with White Pine Ranches' access and 
utility easements. (F. 88, R. 1351, Add. B42; see also, Ex. 33, 
Add. D85; Tr. 22-25, 27-28 & 43, R. 164). 
j) Heaton's expert testimony at trial that recordation of 
the Consent estopped the Sharps from foreclosing upon the roadway. 
(Tr. 757, 765-766, R. 1645). 
None of the cases cited by White Pine Ranches, however, deals 
with a situation as here, where the seller (mortgagee or 
28 (cont.) 
ance of a material term of a contract. Whether a term 
is material, however, is a question to be determined by 
the trier of fact, Matter of Bisio's Estate, 3 3 Or. App. 
325, 576 P. 2d 801 (1978) (cited by White Pine Ranches) 
as is the question of whether there has been substantial 
performance. American Petrofina Co. v. D & L Oil 
Supply, 283 Or. 183, 583 P.2d 521 (1978). Zions Proper-
ties v. Holt. 538 P.2d 1319 (Utah 1975), does not hold 
substantial performance of material terms is legally 
insufficient, as claimed by White Pine Ranches, but, 
instead, deals with the issue of whether a breach is 
sufficiently substantial to excuse performance by the 
non-breaching party. 
33 
beneficiary) consented to the recordation of CCRs and plat creat-
ing the easement. One who consents to an easement is estopped to 
deny its existence. North Clear Lake Dev. Corp. v. Blackstock, 
450 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Civ. App* 1970) (Successor to common grantor 
who deeded lots without including easement in the legal descrip-
tions estopped to deny the existence of an easement to which its 
grantor had tacitly and specifically consented). 
Similarly, in Monaco v. Bennion, 99 Idaho 529, 585 P. 2d 608 
(1978), the original owners of property depicted an access road on 
a plat of a subdivision of lakeshore property which was "dedi-
cated11 as a private road. A controversy arose as to the validity 
of the "dedication" on the filed plat. The court held "that the 
legal effect of illustrating a private road on a filed plat and 
"dedicating1 it is the creation of an easement in favor of the lot 
purchasers." Id. at 612. The court noted: 
It is presumed that the existing private roadway added 
value to all of the lots embraced in the general plan of 
the plat, and that purchasers invested upon the faith of 
the assurance that such access ways to the lots and the 
boat launching area would not remain the totally private 
property of the owner. The original owner and platter, 
having "dedicated" the private roadway for the use of 
lot purchasers, is estopped to deny that which he has so 
plainly declared. 
Id.; see also Cree Meadows, Inc. v. Palmer, 68 N.M. 479, 362 P.2d 
1007 (1961) (Fee title of owner subordinate to easement granted 
lot owners in plat of subdivision) ; Ute Park Summer Homes Ass'n 
v. Maxwell Land Grant Co.. 77 N.M. 730, 427 P.2d 249 (1967) (Pur-
chaser of lot acquires enforceable right that common areas be used 
in manner designated). 
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That the Sharps have to argue this issue is further evidence 
of White Pine Ranches' straining to assert a default by the 
Sharps, In any other situation, it would be the developers who 
assert the estoppel against the Sharps. Under the common law 
principles cited above and in light of the nature of the executed 
Consent to Record cited above, its attachment to CCRs and plat, 
all circumstances of this case, the Sharps are estopped to deny 
the easement created by the Consent* 
POINT VI 
WHITE PINE RANCHES FAILED TO ESTABLISH 
A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER SECTION 57-1-33 
FOR FAILURE TO REQUEST A RELEASE 
The Sharps did not violate Utah Code Ann. Section 57-1-3 3 by 
failure to reconvey.29 This section is expressly applicable only 
when a beneficiary (Sharps) "refuses to request a reconveyance ... 
for a period of thirty days after written demand therefor is made 
by the trustor rWhite Pines1." The Sharps requested the Trustee, 
Associated Title, to reconvey Lots 1-5 on or about January 18, 
1984, two days before Felton's request, (Ex. 30, Add. C74; F. 42, 
R. 1340, Add. B31). Because of White Pine Ranches' subsequent 
breaches, the Sharps were under no obligation to reconvey the 
roadway or the unplatted acreage. Further, the trial court found 
that even if there was an improper withholding by the Sharps, it 
was not done in bad faith. (F. 91, R. 1351, Add. B42) . White 
Pine Ranches conceded on p. 3 2 of its Brief that "'good faith' may 
The text of this statute is set forth in WPR Add. 133. 
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be a defense ... under Section 57-1-33" and the case law amply 
supports such a conclusion.30 See, e.g., Shibata v. Bear River 
State Bank. 115 Utah 395, 205 Po2d 251 (1949), and the case 
Hector, Inc. v. United Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 741 P*2d 542 (Utah 
1987) . The trial court found the Sharps8 failure, if any, to 
request any written releases of the Property was based upon their 
reliance on Heaton31 and the modified agreement with White Pine 
Ranches for the retention of access to the road until the trust 
deed was satisfied in full. (F. 91, R. 1351, Add. B42; C. 10, R. 
1356, Add. B47). 
The Sharps have never urged this defense except in 
reference to Section 57-1-33. 
The district court did not abuse its considerable 
discretion in refusing to dismiss the Sharps' Counter-
claim and related pleadings or in refusing to strike 
attorney Heaton's testimony when the Sharps produced 
certain of Heaton's documents on the last day of trial. 
(See Appellants' Brief, p. 24, n. 13). Teece v. Teece, 
715 P.2d 106, 109 (Utah 1986), citing Carmen v. Slavens, 
546 P*2d 601 (Utah 1976). White Pine Ranches either had 
these documents, they were of public record or they were 
not produced due to attorney/client privilege under Rule 
37(b)(2)(c), Utah R. Civ. P. (Tr. 981, R. 1647). Judge 
Frederick was "not persuaded based on Heaton's testimony 
that there's been any effort afoot here to try to 
deprive inappropriately the Plaintiffs of their just 
discovery. The privilege could have easily been dis-
covered by one as another party." (Tr. 955, R. 1646). 
Further, White Pine Ranches did not show any prejudice 
thereby. After inquiring of Heaton concerning the 
claimed failure to produce, White Pine Ranches rested 
(Tre 975, R. 1647). Further, all of Heaton's documents 
were tendered to the lower court under seal in the event 
an in camera inspection is deemed appropriate. (Tr. 
973, R. 1347). Any sanctions would be unwarranted 
given such circumstances. Carmen, 546 P.2d 601. 
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White Pine Ranches disputes the trial court's finding that 
the Sharps relied on the advice of counsel, alleging Sharps' 
testimony should be elevated to the status of a judicial admis-
sion. A judicial admission requires "the statement to be a clear, 
deliberate, unequivocal statement of fact, not opinion." Haves v. 
Xerox Corp., 718 P.2d 929, 931 (Alaska 1986) (Counsel's estimate 
of damages an opinion) . If the statement is not clear, is an 
inference or of uncertain memory or if a mistake is shown, a 
judicial admission does not exist. Bailey v. Mead, 260 Or. 410, 
492 P.2d 798, 801 (1971); see also McCormick, Evidence Section 266 
(2d edo 1972). A "party is free to contradict and thus correct, 
his own testimony [or explain it] ; only when his [or her] 
testimony taken as a whole unequivocally affirms the statement [or 
alleged admission] does the rule of conclusion apply." Id.32 
White Pine Ranches takes the statements claimed to be judi-
cial admissions regarding release of the roadway and the lots out 
of the context of Mr. Sharp's full testimony. Mr. Sharp testified 
Professor Wigmore notes "a party's testimony, uttered 
by a layman in the stress of examination, cannot with 
justice be given the conclusiveness of the traditional 
judicial admission in a pleading or stipulation, de-
liberately drafted by counsel for the express purpose 
of limiting and defining the facts in issue. Again, a 
general rule of conclusiveness necessitates an elabora-
tion of qualifications and exceptions which represent a 
transfer to the appellate court of some of ... the 
judge's fact finding function. These duties call for an 
exercise of judgment of the judge who has heard and seen 
the witness. The supervision by appellate judges of 
this trial process can best be exercised under a flexi-
ble standard, rather than a rule of conclusiveness." 
Id. 
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and the lower court found it was his understanding he and White 
Pine Ranches had access to the road when he executed the Consent 
to Record. (Tr. 62-65, R. 1642? F, 39, 40, 42, R. 1339-1340, Add. 
B30-31? F. 88 & 89, R. 1351, Add. B42). Furthermore, Mr. Sharp 
testified, and the court found, he relied on and followed Heaton's 
advice concerning the releases. (Tr. 45 & 49-50, R. 1642; F. 91, 
R. 1351, Add. B42). In fact, Mrs. Sharp testified she also relied 
on Heaton's advice and Heaton may even have made the decision with 
regard to releasing the road. (Tr. 444-445 & 457-458, R. 1644; F. 
91, R. 1351, Add. B42). 
The evidence clearly supports the trial court's finding that 
the Sharps relied upon Heaton and the Sharps' testimony, taken as 
a whole, should not be termed a conclusive admission. 
POINT VII 
WHITE PINE RANCHES IS NOT ENTITLED 
TO DAMAGES OR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
FOR ALLEGED BREACH OF CONTRACT 
Because the trial court did not err in determining that White 
Pine Ranches breached the Contract, it is not entitled to damages, 
specific performance or to have the interest tolled.33 Further, 
should this Court affirm the findings of the district court 
concerning liability, White Pine Ranches' damages arguments are 
moot. 
The court below specifically found that it was White 
Pine Ranches who breached the Contract, not the Sharps. 
(C. 3-5, R. 1355-1356, Add. B46-47) . Accordingly, the 
trial courtfs rulings regarding White Pine Ranches1 
alleged damages, therefore, even if erroneous, were 
harmless and not prejudicial. Rule 5, Utah R. Evid. 
38 
A. White Pine Ranches1 Contract Damages Claimed Are Too Specu-
lative and It Is Not Entitled to Have the Difference Between 
Contract Price and Fair Market Value of the Property. 
It is well settled law in Utah that an award of damages 
cannot be based on mere speculation or conjecture. Dunn v. McKay, 
Burton, McMurray & Thurman. 584 P«2d 894 (Utah 1978); Jamison v. 
Utah Home Fire Ins. Co,, 559 P.2d 958 (Utah 1977); Robinson v. 
Hreinsonr 17 Utah 2d 261, 409 P.2d 121 (1965); Bunnel v. Bills, 13 
Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597 (1962) . Damages must be supported by 
proof on which reasonable minds acting fairly could believe that 
it was more probable than not that the damage was or will be 
actually suffered. Dunn, 584 P. 2d 894; Jamison, 559 P. 2d 958; 
Robinson, 409 P.2d 121; Bunnel, 368 P.2d 597. The evidence on the 
record must contain a degree of certainty which a reasonably 
accurate ascertainment of Contract damages would require. Bunnel, 
368 P.2d at 602. Further, an uncertain cause of damages precludes 
recovery. Terry v. Panek, 631 P.2d 896, 897 (Utah 1981), citing 
Gould v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 6 Utah 2d 187, 309 P.2d 802, 
805 (1957). 
In the instant case, White Pine Ranches1 alleged damages are 
too speculative. Instead, the evidence shows that White Pine 
Ranches failed to show any damages directly resulting from the 
Sharps1 failure to release Lot 6, the roadway and the unplatted 
7.5 acres. The trial court found: 
a) The Sharps had not interfered with White Pine Ranches1 
attempts to sell the Property. (F. 72, R. 1347, Add. B38; see 
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also F. 73-74, R. 1347-1348, Add. B38-39; and F. 77, R. 1348, Add. 
39-40). 
b) Saunders had told a prospective purchaser he could 
convey Lot 6 even though it had not yet been released from the 
Trust Deed. (F. 75, R. 1348, Add. B39; Trc 284, 389, Re 1643). 
c) Felton had written White Pine Ranches1 realtor, stating 
"[t]he current litigation does not affect the marketability or 
encumber that [Subject] property." (F. 76, R. 1348, Add. B39). 
d) White Pine Ranches has "not suffered any damages, 
special or otherwise, as a result of any act or failure to act by 
the Sharps." (F. 93, R. 1352, Add. B43). 
B. The District Court Properly Excluded White Pine Ranches1 
Evidence Regarding the Interest on the Construction Loan. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Ranch Homes, Inc. v. Greater Park 
Citv Corp.. 592 P. 2d 620, 624 (Utah 1979) has set forth the 
guidelines for awarding special damages: 
[T]he only damages recoverable are those that could be 
reasonably foreseen and anticipated by the parties at 
the time the contract was entered into. Mere knowledge 
of possible harm is not enough; the defendant must have 
reason to foresee, as a probable result of the breach, 
the damages claimed. Furthermore, before reliance 
damages may be awarded, the amount of the expenditure 
must be found to have been reasonably made. 
Id. (emphasis in the original) ; see also Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts Section 47, comment e (1982). In Ranch Homes, the Court 
held that even though the sellers of the real property breached 
the option contract, the developers could not recover damages for 
managerial "quarter-backing," architectural, engineering, legal 
services or logo and brochure design because such expenditures 
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were not reasonably foreseeable. Id. See also Conner v. South-
ern Nev. Paving. 741 P.2d 800, 801 (Nev« 1987) (Interest on con-
tractor's construction loan held not contemplated or foreseeable 
at the time of agreement). 
As in Ranch Homes and Conner. the Sharps did not and could 
not reasonably foresee that White Pine Ranches would finance the 
improvements and thereby incur interest. (Tr. 72-73, R. 1642).34 
Instead, White Pine Ranches may have sought to raise the money 
through equity financing35 or may have chosen to pay cash. 
Further, in both actions, White Pine Ranches admitted the con-
struction damages were "unforeseeable," "unreasonable" and "in-
tolerable." (Ex. 84, Addc D86; Tr. 209-210, 212, 222-223, R. 
1643; Tr. 508, 528-529, R. 1644). 
C. White Pine Ranches Is Not Entitled to Interest on Install-
ments . 
In order to be entitled to recover interest on the purchase 
price paid to a seller of real property, the buyer must be de-
prived of the use and possession of the property. Dillingham 
Commercial Co. v. Spears, 641 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1982); see also 
Bembridae v. Miller, 235 Or. 396, 385 P.2d 172, 178 (1963) (Pur-
chaser has a right to possession and vendor a right to interest on 
3 4
 In the Federal Court litigation, White Pine Ranches 
sought to recover these same damages from Summit County 
and the SBSID, alleging their actions caused the losses. 
(F. 70, R. 1347, Add. B38.) 
3 5
 In fact, White Pine Ranches did just this when admitting 
new partners Rees and Howell. (Ex. 48, 49; Tr. 81-82, 
R. 1642.) 
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the unpaid purchase price. Fruits of possession and interest 
mutually exclusive, neither party has right to both). 
Maleckv v. Maleckv. 148 Ariz. 121, 713 P*2d 322 (App. 1985), 
cited by White Pine Ranches, is not germane to the case at hand. 
In Malecky, a wife gave her husband money to purchase a home. The 
court later found the home was the ex-husband's separate property 
and, since the transaction was in the nature of a loan, according-
ly awarded interest thereon. In Rose City Transit Co. v. City of 
Portland. 18 Or. App. 369, 525 P.2d 1325 (1974), the court recog-
nized that interest and possession are mutually exclusive. 
In this case, White Pine Ranches has continually enjoyed the 
continuous use and possession of the Property. There is no 
element of uncompensated use by the Sharps of White Pine Ranches' 
money. 
D. White Pine Ranches Is Not Entitled to Specific Performance of 
the Contract or to Have the Principal Interest Accruing on the 
Trust Deed Note Tolled. 
Because the Sharps did not breach the agreement, as discussed 
above, White Pine Ranches is not entitled to specific performance. 
Shepherd v. French, 612 P.2d 727 (Okl. Ct. App. 1980). Thus, 
White Pine Ranches is not entitled to have the principal and 
interest on the Trust Deed Note tolled. 
The cases on which White Pine Ranches relies, Pack v. Hall 
Dev. Co., 667 P.2d 39 (Utah 1983); Blomouist v. Bingham, 652 P.2d 
900 (Utah 1982); Amoss v. Bennion, 23 Utah 2d 40, 456 P.2d 172 
(1969); and Dillingham Commercial Co., 641 P.2d 1, do not support 
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a claim for tolling interest. In Pack, the court noted that 
interest will not be allowed if the seller has in some way pre-
vented the buyer from taking possession. 
In Blomquist. the court held where a vendor refused to 
close, the buyers were relieved of interest because they were not 
in "actual or beneficial possession and did not divest sellers of 
actual possession," 652 P.2d at 902, Amoss also deals with a 
buyer out of possession of the land. 456 P.2d at 174, 175. Once 
a purchaser is placed in possession, however, interest under the 
contract begins to accrue. The holding in Dillingham Commercial 
Co. is also similar. 641 P.2d at 10. 
Unlike the above cases, White Pine Ranches here has never 
been out of possession of the Property, and its marketing efforts 
over the years clearly show it has enjoyed the use of the Prop-
erty. (F. 72 & 77, R. 1347 & 1349, Add. B38-40). Finally, because 
White Pine Ranches breached the Contract and enjoyed the posses-
sion of the Property without interference by the Sharps, it cannot 
now substantiate a claim that the trial court erred in refusing to 
grant White Pine Ranches specific performance.36 
POINT VIII 
THE SHARPS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR ATTORNEY'S 
FEES, WHICH FEES WERE REASONABLE 
A. The Terms of the Contract Authorize the Award of Attorney's 
Fees. 
In Utah, where provided for by contract, the award of attor-
ney's fees is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. 
36
 White Pine Ranches cannot claim both specific per-
formance and damages under the contract. The two claims 
are inconsistent remedies. Cook v. Clovev Ballard Motor 
Co.. 69 Utah 161, 253 P. 196 (1927). 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988)? Turtle 
Mat, v. Haggis Mat.. 645 P.2d 677 (Utah 1982). The parties1 
Contract includes numerous provisions for the award of attorneyfs 
fees to the Sharps. (F. 77, R. 1348-1349, Add. B39-40). "Provi-
sions and written contracts providing for the payment of attor-
ney's fees should ordinarily be honored by the courts." Soffe v. 
Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1983). White Pine Ranches was found by 
the lower court to be in breach of the Trust Deed, Trust Deed Note 
and Memo. (C. 2-6, R. 1355-1356, Add. B46-47). 
Three separate provisions of the Trust Deed alone provide for 
the recovery of attorney's fees. (Ex. 2, Add. Al-4). Paragraph 6 
provides that the beneficiary (Sharps) "may commence, appear in 
and defend any action ... and ... employ counsel, and pay his 
reasonable fees." Paragraph 7 then requires trustor (White Pine 
Ranches) to "pay immediately" "all sums expended hereunder by 
Beneficiary," especially including sums expended in paragraph 6. 
Finally, under paragraph 16, the Sharps are entitled to "foreclose 
the Trust Deed [and] ... recover in such proceeding all costs and 
expenses incident therein, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 
The word "incident" as used in paragraph 16 means pertaining 
to or involved in although not an essential part of another thing. 
Amarillo Lodge No. 731 v. City of Amarillo, 473 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 488 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 
1973). As set forth below, the Sharps' "defending" of the Com-
plaint pertains to the foreclosure of the Trust Deed. 
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The Trust Deed Note provides that if it "is collected by an 
attorney after default «<>. the undersigned [White Pine Ranches] 
ooc agree to pay ... a reasonable attorney's fee.11 (Ex« 3, Add. 
A5-6). 
In Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P,2d 168 (Utah 1977), the Utah 
Supreme Court denied attorney's fees to the plaintiff in defending 
a counterclaim which did not relate to the collection of a note or 
foreclosure of the property. The issues in this case all relate 
to the collection of the Trust Deed Note and foreclosure of the 
Property. It is White Pine Ranches who alleged the Sharps were 
not entitled to foreclose by virtue of the very issues it now 
claims to be unrelated to such foreclosure. See, e.g., Barker v. 
Johnson, 591 P.2d 886 (Wyo. 1979) (Award of attorney's fees proper 
even though action instituted by buyer for specific performance 
and seller asserted counterclaims of possession and quiet title); 
First State Bank v. Hoehnke Nursery Co., 63 Or. App. 816, 667 P.2d 
1022 (1983) (In an action to foreclose on a mortgage or trust 
deed, bank's contractual right included right to collect attor-
ney's fees in connection with actions or suits that might be 
required to collect its debt in full and to realize on its secur-
ity) . 
Finally, under the Memo, para. 11, the defaulting party shall 
pay all expenses of enforcing the same or any right arising out of 
breach or default, including reasonable attorney's fees. (Ex. 15, 
Add. A12) . The word "enforce" as used in the Memo generally 
means to give effect to or compel obedience to, including to 
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breach of the Contract. See Fortier v. Donna Anna Plaza Partners, 
747 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1984)- The words "arising out of" as 
used in the Memo, mean a transaction which is connected with the 
subject of the action. See County Plains Corp. v. Nosband Corp., 
234 A.D. 588, 256 N.Y.S. 10 (App. Div. 1932) (Defenses to a 
foreclosure action that the plaintiff wrongfully induced the 
lender to withhold final payment under the loan contract and 
failed to release lots as agreed were proper subjects of a coun-
terclaim as "arising out of" the contract). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held where rights under an agree-
ment are denied, the non-defaulting party may take legal action to 
enforce the agreement and collect reasonable attorney's fees from 
the defaulting party. Trayner v. Gushing. 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 
1984) (Award of attorney's fees denied to the "prevailing party" 
since each party was successful on one or more points). 
White Pine Ranches breached the parties' Contract, requiring 
the Sharps to enforce the Contract and defend against the allega-
tions of White Pine Ranches arising out of that breach. Accord-
ingly the Sharps are entitled to recover their reasonable attor-
ney 's fees. 
B. The Attorney's Fees Incurred bv the Sharps Were Reasonable. 
In this matter, White Pine Ranches has repeatedly asserted 
that the case was difficult and complex. The trial court also 
deemed the case to be "somewhat complicated." (Tr. 128, R. 
1642). The Sharps were required to defend, in a trial which 
lasted nearly six days, issues dealing with breach of Contract, 
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failure to release, release of a particular lot and the internal 
roadway, release of unplatted acreage, failure to reconvey, 
slander of title, failure to convey a 10.5 strip of land to the 
County for another roadway, the demand to pay a 1/6 and then 1/13 
share of White Pine Ranches1 total costs for improvements on the 
Property, slander of title, allegations of fraud, and claims for 
unjust enrichmento (See generally White Pine Ranches1 Complaint, 
R. 2-89). In the process, numerous witnesses were called to 
testify at trial and over 125 exhibits were introduced. Further, 
counsel for the Sharps was required to file, brief and argue 
numerous motions and engage in the extensive discovery. (See 
generally R. 128-1628). Given this background, it is obvious 
Sharps8 counsel performed substantial legal services which were 
needed to prosecute their counterclaim and defend against White 
Pine Ranches' Complaint and the trial court so found. (F. 99, R. 
1354, Add. B45) (see Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P. 2 622 (Utah 
1985)). Under the case law cited below, the trial court's finding 
should be sustained. 
The amount involved in this controversy greatly exceeded one-
half million dollars and the Sharps clearly prevailed on all 
issues asserted. Here, the trial court, without objection from 
White Pine Ranches, directed Mr. Winder to proceed by filing an 
Affidavit. "It is this Court's view that Mr. Winder should submit 
an affidavit in support of his claim for attorney's fees on behalf 
of the Defendants [Sharps]." (Tr. 9, R. 1651). The testimony of 
a prevailing party's attorney as to the reasonableness of attor-
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ney's fees is sufficient evidence* Dixie State Bank, 7 64 P*2d. at 
989.37 The court accepted the unrebutted Affidavits of Mr. 
Winder, with itemized billing statements and a signed fee agree-
ment letter attached thereto. (Cfe F. 97, R. 1353, Add* B44,° Tr, 
56, Ro 1640? R. 1285-1320)e Such an unrebutted affidavit is 
competent evidence for an award of attorney's fees. Freed Finance 
Co. v. Stoker Motor Co.. 537 P. 2d 1039, 1040 (Utah 1975) (Attor-
ney^ fees cannot be awarded without a stipulation, unrebutted 
affidavit or evidence). 
Finally, White Pine Ranches1 claim that post judgment attor-
ney's fees and fees incurred on appeal are not recoverable is not 
the law in Utah. In Bates v. Bates. 560 P.2d 706 (Utah 1977), 
attorney fs fees for pursuing an appeal were awarded and Rule 4-
506(3) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration specifically 
recognizes the award of post judgment attorney's fees in default 
judgments0 
The reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the 
case and the fee customarily charged in the community 
for similar services can be gauged from reviewing the 
redacted statements of attorney's fees attached to 
Plaintiffs' Third Supplemental Response to Defendants1 
First Set of Interrogatories dated February 27, 1988. 
(R. 1305-1320). White Pine Ranches' counsel, Mr. 
Anderson, bills his time at $160.00 per hour, Mr. 
Watkins' time at $135.00 per hour, and Mr. Gaylord's 
time at $60.00 per hour; higher fees than are reflected 
in the Affidavits of Attorney's Fees submitted by the 
Defendants. Further, Hansen & Anderson charged higher 
fees than Winder & Haslam for the opposite side of the 
same case. For example, Hansen & Anderson's statement 
for November 16 through December 12, 1987 was 
$14,786.75. In comparison, Winder & Haslam's statement 
for both November ($2,401.00) and December ($10,992.00), 
was less. 
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In summary, the Contract documents in this case should be 
treated as an integrated whole (see Point II, supra) and the 
attorney's fees provisions in each should be applicable to the 
breach of any. The issues litigated in this matter were clearly 
related to the rights of the Sharps to foreclose and to collect 
after White Pine Ranches defaults. White Pine Ranches itself 
recognized the Sharps' foreclosure activities in obtaining a 
temporary restraining order to restrain the Trustee's Sale of the 
Property in September of 1986. The factors for determining 
reasonableness have been met in this case and the unrebutted 
Affidavit of Mr* Winder is competent evidence from which the Court 
can determine an award of attorney's fees. The Sharps are, 
therefore, entitled to their attorney's fees in accordance with 
the terms of their Contract. 
CONCLUSION 
As noted in the Summary of Argument, this case is really very 
simple. The trial court found White Pine Ranches breached mater-
ial terms of the Contract by, inter alia, failing to pay taxes and 
annual principal installments. When White Pine Ranches requested 
certain releases for the first time, it was already in default and 
the Sharps' performance was excused. Under the numerous attor-
ney's fees provisions in the Contract documents, the Sharps are 
entitled to their reasonable attorney's fees. Thus, the Sharps 
respectfully request this Court to affirm the Judgment entered by 
Judge Frederick. 
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DATED this 27th day of September, 1989, 
WINDER & HASLAM 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Respondents Sharps 
Donald J. Windfer 
& ^)rmaJ)^^^>u^^ 
Tamara K.Prince 
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the foregoing RESPONDENTS' BRIEF TO SAUNDERS, ET AL. to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, on this 27th day of September, 1989, to the 
following: 
Robert M. Anderson 
Glen D. Watkins 
Mark R. Gaylord 
Sixth Floor 
Valley Tower Building 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
John B. Anderson 
ANDERSON & HOLLAND 
623 East 100 South 
P. Oo Box 11643 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Stanford B. Owen 
Patrick L. Anderson 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
~TX^(&Q./X/^&,_ 
Tab A 
*WHEN RECORDED, MAP^X): 
Space Above This line For Recorder1! Use. 
TRUST DEED 
With Assignment of Rente 
THIS TRUST DEED, made thia _ 2 Q t h _ day of I^ TTV» , 19Q1_ 
between _PMTT, H.,.T*Nnra, KEESTJEEUSai0.,lFmj\. SAIINDgBS, 
l ! I | K S ! ^ J ? a ^ , as TRUSTOR, 
whose address is i t J S f i & a n c ^ l a ^ ^ ^ ^ 
(Start M * m— Ur> (CUT) (SUU) 
^SOCpTEPiiTTrLE COMPANY § M TRUSTEED and 
JOIjN Cy,o SHARP and GEBAIDB1E Y. SHARP M BENEFICIARY, 
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, 
f 
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property, situated in .Sumrifr 
County, State of Utah: 
SEE EXHIBIT "A* ATERCHED HERETO AND BY THIS REFERENCE INC0RPQRA3ED HEREIN. 
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of 
way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof, 
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the nght, power and authonty hereinafter given to and conferred upon 
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a pro-
missory note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $...963,.055*30 , made by 
Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest aa therein 
set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of 
each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as 
hereafter may lie made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory 
note or notes reciting tliat they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of all sums 
expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with mterest 
thereon as herein provided. 
•NOTE: Trusts* must be a member of the Utah Slate Bar; a bank, buOdlnf and loan association or savtnea 
ami loan association authorized to do such business in Utah; a corporation authorized to do a trust business in 
Utah; or a Utie insurance* or abstract company authorized to do such business in Utah. 
0001 
TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THIS TRUST DEED, TRUSTOR AGREES: 
1. T o keep said property in good condition and repair; not to remove or demolish any building tfureon, to 
complete or restore promptly and in good and workmanlike manner any building which may be constructed, 
damaged or destroyed thereon; to comply with all laws, covenants and restrictions affecting suid property; not 
to commit or permit waste thereof; not to commit, suffer or permit any act upon said property in violation of law; to 
do all other acts which from the character or use of said property may be reasonably necessary, the specific 
enumerations herein not excluding the general; and. if the loan secured hereby or any part thereof is being ob-
tained for the purpose of financing construction of improvements on said property. Trustor further agrees: 
(a) T o commence construction promptly and to pursue same with reasonable diligence to completion 
in accordance with plans and specifications satisfactory to Beneficiary, and 
(b) T o allow Beneficiary to inspect said property at all times during construction. 
Trustee, upon presentation to it of an affidavit signed by Brneficiary, setting forth facts showing a default 
by Trustor under this numbered paragraph, is authorized to accipt as true and conclusive all facts and state* 
ments therein, and to act thereon hereunder. 
2. T o provide and maintain insurance, of such type or types and amounts as Beneficiary may require, on 
the improvements now existing or hereafter erected or placed on said property. Such insurance shall be carried 
in companies approved by Beneficiary with loss payable clauses in favor of and in form acceptable to Beneficiary 
In e w n t of loss, Trustor shall give immediate notice lo Beneficiary, who may make proof of loss, and each insurance 
company concerned is hereby authorized and directed to make payment for suth loss directly to Beneficiary 
instead of to Trustor and Beneficiary jointly, and the iniurance procveds, o'r any part thereof, may be applied 
by Beneficiary, at its option, to reduction of the indebtedness hereby secured or to the restoration or repair of 
the property damaged. 
3. T o deliver to. pay for and maintain with Beneficiary until the indebtedness secured hereby is paid in full, 
such evidence of title as Beneficiary may require, including abstracts of title or policies of title insurance and 
any extensions or renewals thereof or supplements thereto, 
4. T o appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof, the title to 
said property, or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; and should Beneficiary or Trustee elect to 
also appear in or defend any such action or proceeding, to pay all costs and expenses, including cost of evi-
dence of title and attorney's fees in a reasonable sum incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee. 
5. T o pay at least 10 days before delinquency all taxes and assessments affecting said property, including 
all assessments upon water company stock and all rents, assessments and charges for water, appurtenant to or 
used in connection with said property; to pay. when due, all encumbrances, charges, and liens with interest, 
on said property or any part thereof, which at any time appear to be prior or superior hereto; to pay all costs, 
fees, and expenses of this Trust. 
6. Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary or 
Trustee, but without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing 
Trustor from any obligation hereof, may: Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may 
deem necessary to protect the security hereof, Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized to enter upon said 
property for such purposes; commence, appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the 
security hereof or the rights of powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay, purchase, contest, or compromise any 
encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior hereto; and in ex-
ercising any such powers, incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion it may deem 
necessary therefor, including cost of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay his reasonable fees. 
7. T o pay immediately and without demand all sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, 
with interest from date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent (10%) per annum until paid, and the repay-
ment thereof shall be secured hereby. 
I T IS M U T U A L L Y A G R E E D T H A T : 
8. Should said property or any part thereof be taken or damaged by reason of any public improvement 
or condemnation procee ling, or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in any other manner, Beneficiary shall be 
entitled to all compensation, awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and shall be entitled at its option 
to commence, appear in and prosecute in its own name, any action or proceedings, or to make any compro-
mise or settlement, in connection with such taking or damage. All such compensation, awards, damages, rights 
of action and proceeds, including the proceeds of any policies of fire and other insurance affecting said property, 
are hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who may, after deducting therefrom all its expenses, including attorney's fees, 
apply the same on any indebtedness secured hereby. Trustor agrees to execute such further assignments of any 
compensation, award, damages, and rights of action and proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee may require. 
9. At any time and from time to time upon writtten request of Beneficiary, payment of its fees and pre* 
sentation of this Trust Deed and the note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance, for cancellation and 
retention), without affecting the liability of any person for the payment of the indebtedness secured hereby, 
Trustee may (a) consent to the making of any map or plat of said property; (b) join in granting any ease-
ment or creating any restriction thereon; (c) join in any subordination or other agreement affecting this Trust Deed 
or the lien or charge thereof; (d) reconvey, without warranty, all or any part of said property. The grantee in 
any reconveyance may be described as "the person or persons entitled thereto", and the recitals therein of any 
matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of truthfulness thereof. Trustor agrees to pay reasonable Trustee's 
fees for any of the services mentioned in this paragraph. 
10. As additional security, Trustor hereby assigns Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, all 
rents, issues, royalties, and profits of the property affected by this Trust Deed and of any personal property 
located thereon. Until Trustor shall default in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the per-
formance of any agreement hereunder, Trustor shall have the right to collect ail such rents, issues, royalties, 
and profits earned prior to default as they become due and payable. If Trustor shall default as aforesaid, 
Trustor's right to collect any of such moneys shall cease and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without 
taking possession of the property affected hereby, to collect all rents, royalties, issues, and profits. Failure or 
discontinuance of Beneficiary at any time or from t ime to time to collect any such moneys shall not in any 
manner affect the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to collect the same. 
Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of the right by Beneficiary to collect, shall l>e, or be construed to 
be, an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor a 
subordination of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to any such tenancy, lease or option. 
11. Upon any default by Trustor hereunder, Beneficiary may at any time without notice, either in 
person, by agent, or by a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of 
Beneficiary as such receiver), and without regard to the adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby 
secured, enter upon and take possession of said property or any part thereof, in its own name sue for or 
otherwise collect said rents, issues, and profits, including those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, less 
costs and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable attorney's teea, upon any indebtedness 
secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary may determine. 
12. The entering upon and taking possession of said property, the collecton of such rents, issues, and 
profits, or the proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking or 
damage of said property, and the application or release thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any 
default or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice. 
13. The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as 
a waiver of such right and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other 
or subsequent default 
14. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any indebtedness secured here-
by or in the performance of any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due 
f \ and payaBIt* at the option of Beneficiary. In the event of such default, Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee 
^ to execute a written notice of default and of election t o cause said property to IK- sold to salLfy the obligations 
hereof ami Tniatri.* shall file such notice for record in each county * hi rein said property or some part or 
default, and notice of default and notice of safe having been given as then required by law, Trustee, without demand jn Trustor, shall sell sari prop' ' on the date and at the time and place desig '->d in suul notice of sale, either as 
a whole or in separate parcel*, n such order as it may determine (but subje any statutory right of Trustor to 
direct the order in which *uc« .operty, if consisting of several known lots parrels, shall l>e sold), at public 
auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful money of the United Stutes at the time of 
sale. The person conducting the sale may, for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to 
time until it shall be completed and, in every case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration 
thereof by such person at the time and place last appointed for the Bale; provided, if the sale is postponed 
for longer than one day beyond the day designated in the notice of sale, notice thereof shall be given m the 
same manner as the original notice of sale Trustee shall execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed con-
veytng said property so sold, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. The recitals in the 
Deed of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Bene-
ficiary, may bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs and 
expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's 
fees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such sale and revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed; 
(3) all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at 10r/r per annum from date 
of expenditure; (4) all other sums then secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any. to the person or persons 
legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County 
Clerk of the county in which the sale took place. 
Beneficiary shall have the option to. declare all sums 
payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law 
al property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceed-
hereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be 
16. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder, 
secured hereby immediately due and 
for the foreclosure of mortgages on rei . 
ing all costs and expenses incident theret , 
fixed by the court 
17. Beneficiary may appoint • successor trustee at any time by filing for reco* 1 in the office of the County 
Recorder of each county in which said property or tome part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From 
the tune the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority 
and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee Each such substitution shall be executed and 
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law. 
18 This Trust Deed shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, 
devisees, admtnstrators, executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and 
several. The term "Beneficiary" shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured 
hereby In this Trust Deed, whenever the context requires, the masculme gender includes the feminine and/or 
neuter, and the singular number includes the plural. 
19. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public 
record as provided by law Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other 
Trust Deed or of any action or proceeding in which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless 
brought by Trustee. 
20. This Trust Deed shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah 
21. The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale 
hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinbefore set forth. 
Signature of Trustor 
si^iz 
(If Trustor an 
STATE OF UTAH* 
COUNTY OF & J p 83 
On the b.trr. day of . . . . . . S ^ C ^ , A.D. w S L , personally 
appeared before me ...PiUJL.H«..Ii^ES^.Brar7r^ , 
the signer(s) of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that ..they, executed the 
A LQ&SASL xJF^.y^i. 
Notary Public residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 5 ' ^ ' o 5 ^ ^ A i / ( / ^ —{— 
(If Trustor a Corporation) 
STATE OF 
COUNTY OF 
Lk?..r:.... day of .—X .h*?^ , A.I 
appeared before me KEWNETO..R...HHfcN. , who being by me duly sworn, 
On the . L.D. 19 i/.. personally 
says that he is the President of ...Interst3te.aental3 f...Incrr .., 
the corporation that executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument was 
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of its by-laws (or by authority of a resolution 
of its board of directors) and said KEtt^H..R...NQRraN. 
to me that said corporation executed the same. [ \r\ 
.LH*&£*:. 
Notify PL 
My Commission Expires: v^ h J |~ _, L , 
acknowledged 
Public 
EXHIBIT "A" 
Beginning at a point South 89° 43' 36w West along the North 
line of Lot 8, 175.42 feet from the corner of Lots 1 and 8* a 
brass cap set by the Uc S« General Land Office, said brass cap 
also being South 00° 19• 46" West along section line 1336.14 
feet from the Northeast corner of Section 1, Township 2 South, 
Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian? and running thence 
South 89° 438 36" West along the North line of Lots 7 and 8 
2948.98 feet to the Northwest corner of Lot 7; thence South 
00° 13e 29" East along the West line of Lot 7, 1312.84 feet to 
the Southwest corner of Lot 7; thence North 89* 47* 41" East 
along the South line of Lot 7, 832.67 feet? thence North 61° 
008 00" East 195tSo90 feet? thence North 47° 331 15" East 
462.75 feet? thence North 42° 44' 40" East 85.63 feet to the 
point of beginning. 
SUBJECT TO Easements, Encroachments, Restrictions, Rights-of-Way 
and matters of record enforceable in law or equity. 
TRUST DEED NOTE 
DO NOT QCSTXOY THIS NOTfc Vfimm aoaej. ata^a**, »ita Ynatf Dooei 
to Tnaatoo for eonnflmiia, boforo w i n I I I H I wtf W r W i 
J i m 30 
_ 19.11. 
FOE VALUl I£CSVED, ta« aadonipod, Joiariy aod «venily, 
JCHN C. SHARP,and GZ3AIDPJE Y. SHARP^ 
p«f to tfco order o/ 
v r r e wfawnycn c - v - ^ - v g r r -yrrttswn *»TTT>/ g r y r a^ m mnnn r^V io< (J...3J&2,055.2.0...). 
together »tta ioicrcat froa dait a* q e n u oi 3"«EL7E.. p«* c a t ( L 2 - ^ ) per u u u a 00 
aao laooaid arioape*. u*d pnoopei aod iourm payable a* follow*: 
ADOSMXM A3TAC23 HEE5ZO AND BY THIS HkssJkXOL MACE A PART K S 3 S T . 
Each paymeor laail ba applied fine oj accrued taarac aad tao beiaact to dio raduoioa of* phoapai. Aoy 
aaca aooaiLsexK aoc paid* whoa duo ihaii bow iatsroai daereoitor u the n u ^/ e i q h r g g a - ~ 
oaac <_IJL£%) por aaaua uoui poaU and shall ba subject to a late payment charge of 4% 
of such overdue payment. 
II de/auk acorn ia dao paymeatt ad mid inafilTmann oi phaopai uxd inures* or toy part thereof, or ia 
dat performance 0/ aay agraexneor mnr lined ia sho Txuac Deed aocuriag dm 001c, cat holder hereof, at iu 
opooa and without oocics or ^—»-***, not' dodaro the ootiro phndpai bmiaoct aod accruod iotcrcai duo aod 
U dua aoe* ia cailootd by a* artoroey t i t s default ia ch« payment 0/ phncipai or interest, either %ith 
or without auc, tat undersigned, jointly aod acvcnlly, agrao to pay ail caau aod expert*** of collection iiuiuding 
o raa*oa*bic aatoroey'i foe. 
The OMOi, aurruca. gujjraatori aod codonera hereof aevenily w»»\»* prnenuncat for payment, demand 
aad aoar* oi diabooor aod aoopavcocot 0/ chu ante, aod cooacne to any aod ail otcnuona of use , near*ait, 
waiver* or aoouicuiooa chat ma* be granted by the bolder hereof with ropoct to the payment or other pro-
viaioaa of «V^ ante, aod to the reicavae of aoy accuriry, or any pan thereof, with or without lubanranon. 
Tail x«4 by a Truat Deed oi rroo data herewith. 
^ . ^ 
- t f i ^ 
^ ^ 
Ate no 
rmnc: 
? DVINOANTS 
IXHIilT 
AXXJSCU4 
AECBGM to Trmt Deed Note dated June 30, 1981, axaeutad by PAUL H. LUGES, 
JCBEKT FELTCN, LBCM H. SMKOS^ 2HE3S3AIS KE2OTLS, 22C«» a* ttuster ia favor 
of 32ft C. SAB? and G5ULDXNE X- S»RP, aa B m f i d a r y . 
lo S * entire principal balance of 963,055/5b together with accrued interett 
at the rata of tvelva percent (12%) pt£ annua ahall be paid aa follows* 
*, Q* or before June 30, 1582, a principal payment of $192,611.06, or 
acre together with accrued Interest on the entire unpaid principal 
balance ahall be due and payable in fu l l . 
B« On or before June 30, 1583, a principal payment of 5192,611.06, or 
mare together with accrued interest on the entire unpaid principal 
balance shall be due and payable in fu l l . 
C Ch or before June 30, 1984, a principal payment of $152,611.06, or 
acre together with accrued interest on the entire unpaid principal 
balance shall be due and payable in fu l l . 
Do Cn or before June 30, 1985, a principal payment of $192,611.06, or 
more together with accrued interest on the entire unpaid principal 
balance shall be due and payable in fu l l . 
E. Ch cr before June 30. 1986, a principal payment of $192,611.06, or 
more together with accrued interest on the entire «r-aid principal 
balance shall be due and payable in ful l . 
2«. trustor shall have the right to prepay up to 501 of the ; rincipal secured 
hereunder in any one calendar year but in the event of v:y prepayment a 
charge in the amount of $10,000.00 ahall be aateasad f~r each calendar 
year reduced firm the payment schedule by prepayment. 
3c Kenneth R. Norton, President of Interstate Rentals, Inc., individually 
and personally dots hereby guarantee the performance of Interstate 
Centals, Inc. 
EXZ5D this day of June 1981. 
S^'jCKN C. SKn3?,t Beneficiary 
M _ 
AGZSALDI^ *. SKAS?, Beneficiary 
rfV/lllt \ « . L V *»»' 
«4> M a i i f l i t h t i i T i y i i fiirt 
-*— Leon II. Saunders, tlobcrt Vol ton. 
* •• I » '• > " • >*• j i»- '/»' Kcnnerh B.. 2Jor.toa_& PnuLJl—Lnndes. 
u„br •.,— .it ,*, .. ..,«•., -no ,», .„. u u ^ i O O O ^ g ^ . , ^Twenty-Five Thousand and no/100 o ^ 
M* IH« i«« <w check to be immediately negotiated Co Seller , _ _ 
i.. * .« ,J
 <Mif «. .1* ^ . w o< tt» p«or,.., ..«w.«j .• _See^t,tachegLpJ.^t locating appr^xjmALeJjoundariea of 
property. Property consists of 70 acres, more or less, as generally outlined pp the atta 
Exhibit "A". No water rights_are transferred by Seller hereunder. Propert;y_j«_aQld__t0£* 
with access from the County^road_but subject to easements, encroachments f restrictions. 
Ji&hcs-of-way and matters of recorjd.or enforceable in law or equity. 
..... . _ «. — «. . r.ir Summit
 (tmmf W *_Utflh 
The Ml««««f ro t . * * ! r« n**'*f •'••II •!•»• t» n.nid*u *• r*'* at ••»«• r*«v*"r r«i»«naa«J None 
TU M I ^ k M ...... ui < i ,^ iLQJXL.>jyent ,y - s lx . EfrQusanoLt 
anatl U f.»yaM> aa fc»»«^.f_x.? - i 2 P . : J ~ r r ? i ~ r Q - •nHn | r rntca#n«i die a fa rvdoonVd < t y « H m e t * W - K K J I « bcrtbv K a f t w l r d f t t f *T y«w 
Lfcy_pfix_troaa_acrBou 
anatl !«• f»»yaM* aa f u i » * » I — i r - d i ~ . w u * - i i y - r - T I - • nHh.rrntcaanii 
liminary plan, $495,000 „ j,hv,„ ^  j„j M ,,„., (MUia 
M k n . L.kiti, -. i,i .• _ . , - u . ~u . . > ,., ?nl the balancc^in. 
equal annual installments oc principal and interest, the first such payment being due out 
after cloiing. "Closing^sRall "Be immeTiaTeiy'llpo'n recording of Buyer1 s^PUD. Bu7er to pTc 
as_rapid_ly as possible to recording. In all events, closing shall be no later than 6/30/ 
AM additional ^consideration from Purchaser, to Seller, _nt closing, Purchascr_nJ\nll sell. t< 
Seller at_a cost to Seller of $100,000 cash, 50 acre/feet of irrigation water rights froi 
Weber River Decree Auards^A\l_ (Priority__1860)Land_4J6 (Priority 1861). 5uyer, at his opt 
at any time, may pay amounts"in"exce*?s of payments upon the unpaid balance, but no more than 
50% of total principal shall be paid by Buyer in any one p 
calendar year without Seller's advance written approval. tlTe"d'nte of% TosT * "" %~p"d*~uonm 
pv hate p»»»<? «•» l» I IKI IMJT I tn «k» n t a * nKr I p i f i M M i and iHall bctin »• «** Ja i * of puawaaion - h * * dial! K« on 
cne once or c , f o s i ^ . a „, 
,J {iitifHitt end f i | v - i » « ol inturaiuc t l i t l l U tiorn by ih« »*{U$ until d*l» <•< I M N H H I U I at mb»ck «••»« p i " i * f t » i t i c i i t i tu inauf«n«« i n « f « u «ml 01U1 *«p«A»r« oi iKt ptoo«r<» 
la pu-f J M J !••« u< f••*•#*••« n A l l <«h«f ( • •?• •« • ! «ll •••rt(in«n«( «M<<it*««t rlia«t«i Urn* »nJ w*<l m h t i |i«n« rntM«tl>famta ot (fc«t«r« »ca«nat »H» | i u | t i l r el any na««M« 
T V • ll>mii»t irv lal ijn~rtm#mrniT~st^ ( K I . H W S M T i h ~ « a » ~ S * » * t |Q Connttud CB> V r i K Tana and/of ( ^ M T V M I , Q| S idrw.U [ D T»#b and Ouuet fll *P«««al 
»«»•
 k ( D ^"» ' * ! &• •" • I « I H M M O ( M I M M I P Vt^tri | ( ^ i y O <*••*« C.-wmunrty S y t u m d IVi«.«c ( j ) |L t«rnd Yra | t l N,» | U I 
C O N T H A C T O f S A t E O H I N 5 T R U M r j ^ r o r I O N V r Y A N I t T O B t M A I » 8 O N T U B A P I * R « > V m H i R M OI» T l i r U T A H SfC U M T I ^ I < O M M I b M O N I N T I I K N A W 
Purchaser or. i t s C^ r t^ r tr*?h (P Uh f^CT ?<n* Rnnrh This., con t r a c t - I s not- ai>slgnable by Purclv 
«ftttr i t K( f |> l in ( f 4 ln« *fll»t fIt ki«*. I h*ff I w.llMn _ 011C Java IKNM J««» Kcraol . 
In iK# « I ih« | 
t * H U i w d aa li«iwtd«a*d and a«»ctd 
t.«r> la id • r»» ikr halanrt d aawl fH«f«Kaw p«if» of cn«»pl«u eawJ p*Miliaa« aa \ttittm B«ov«d«d |K« • • H - H . H patd K»if • I . . I I 
•rllrr and |Ka< n<a verbal ita 
• t"»«l '*>«• t f rcwtMn iW iK< 
la • Mnd H I . . I »i.J i t t r f i l «Na« •(•*> w»mi «n«trn in •»»•• frcairx <nn.ini«« ik# *«••*# Pfrli«»<«»ary C^taftct brt«wrn inc p*n<h»*r iiui 
mch I t »n».-# I V L I I . * • iKn if >• *•<!•«•» iKall I * ( W M I M J I » k» a n*M id ik«a t»anaa«tMM* tinlaaa inf >n«««awd in »«itm< Kaaain l l la (<t< 
r iMtart akall «l i t * n «•«•« I •"•»•« M»t«*r Rf«nr>i and IN la i iw I'Mikaa* 
IV . d» KrrvK* < c > r * I.. ( * t ty «r« ami iwltll iKr i t i m i and unditHMia tp»«d«d aU««c and Irw wlt tr »t»«'» lit f«*«nian |oud and oiai lr iakl* I M O «Hh tl<*iUii I r >u«b« <• Jair 
8nccl.nl w^rr.inty deeo\ __ 1
 in «Ka natn# id iht oiMthaaaa an>l ••» make fm 
The contract to Seller or the note secured by deed of trust prepared by Seller, as Seller raa 
elect, shall* provide for Into payment penalty and shall provide Purchaser with n release of 
lot for every principal payment of 130% of initial per lot principal balance of the oblipnti 
The down payment nhnll roleirio thrro four-ncrc to fivc-ncro lota and the property required I 
the approved roadway. Unless Seller agrees, no release of any property is required until tl 
completion of the transfer of ownership of the water rights and the final recording of the 
Plat. Purchaser's development plans presently anticipate 12 to 15 four-acre to five-acre lc 
and such plans shall be subject to the reasonable approval of Seller. Notwithstanding anytl 
to the contrary contained within the language of this Earnest Money Agreement, the parties 
agree that Seller is not willing to sell the Property unless from the date of execution h e n 
to closing, all efforts fail to find suitable like property or properties qualifying for a 
tax-deferred exchange under the applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code for pure! 
by Purchaser and exchange with Seller. Failing to find suitable like exchange property or 
properties by such time. Seller is willing to ncll the Property but under no other circum-
stances. Purchaser is willing to exercise best efforts to consummate an exchange. Purchase 
and Seller covenant that each will exercise its best efforts from and after the time of 
signing of this Agreement to seek out suitable exchange property or properties qualifying 
for a tax-deferred exchange of the Property. Each party covenants and warrants that it wil 
immediately notify the other should such property or properties so qualifying be found. Th 
decision regarding the suitability of the property for exchange and ownership by Seller sha 
rest with Seller. The parties acknowledge that the provisions herein regarding the sale of 
the subject Property shall apply if and only if, despite the best efforts of the parties 
hereto, their agents and other parties in Che real property business, suitable like propert 
for exchange is not obtained, by c l o s i n g . ^ A t a time desired by Seller, Purchaser shall all 
Seller to hook into the culinary water system and sewer system developed by Purchaser on th 
subject Property at the same per-hook-up price charged by Purchaser to the buyers of lots 
developed on the nub)cct Property. Purchancr and all of them (through Ken Norton or other-
wise) shall exercise best efforts to transfer to Seller us the water rights (or wltii Seller 
approval in lieu of the water rights) alluded to above the irrigation water available to Pv 
chaser or persons in concert with Purchaser that is most useful to Seller's adjacent proper 
No woik shall be allowed on the property until closing. Until closing, no publicity or rel 
of information regarding this sale shall be made by any purty except a3 necessary to perfor 
actions required hereunder. If Buyer pays the note or coiilfrnct through .muxoved prepayment 
- > ^ 
irs, Buyer shall pay as additional sums a 
' years Jtlwit payment is made. ,. - - . 
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KS?40RAHDUM OF CLOSING TSRH3 
MEMORANDUM OF CLOSING T5RHS dated June 30, 1381, 
executed by JOHN C. SHARP and GERALDIHZ x. SHARP (herein-
after •Seller') , and ROBERT FELTON, L20H H. SAUNDERS, KTHNETH 
R. NORTON, and PAUL H. LANDES (hereinafter collectively 
•Buyer*K 
This Memorandum Lm executed for the express purpose 
i 
of descr ib ing those^matters agreed upon by the p a r t i e s hereto 
which survive the c l o s i n g of the t r a n s a c t i o n . 
1. I t i s a u t u a l l y agreed and understood that a f t e r 
recordat ion of the PUD P l a t and the Declarat ion of Covenants, 
Conditions and R e s t r i c t i o n s , and upon r e c e i p t of each 
$140,000.00 i n p r i n c i p a l (but not i n c l u d i n g the earnest money 
and down payment money), S e l l e r s h a l l execute and d e l i v e r to 
Buyer a P a r t i a l Deed of Reconveyance f o r one (1) PUD l o t * 
2 . Upon the payment of the r e l e a s e p r i c e , feuyer s h a l l 
be e n t i t l e d to the r e l e a s e of one (1) l o t of Buyer's choice upon 
r e c e i p t of the payment or a t any time thereaf ter* 
3 . Zt i s agreed t h a t , a t the time of execution of 
t h i s Memorandum, Buyer has paid to S e l l e r the sua of $620,000.00 
which w i l l r e l e a s e from the Deed of Trust three (2) PUD l o t s . 
Upon the recordat ion of the PUD P l a t and Declaration of Covenants, 
Conditions and R e s t r i c t i o n s wi th the Susstit County Recorder, 
Buyer s h a l l be e n t i t l e d to the r e l e a s e from the Deed of Trust of 
three (3) PUD l o t s of Buyer's cho ice toge ther with the sa id road-
way. 
I f DEFENDANTS 1 EXHIilT 
4* In the event Buyer should pay to Seller any prinei-
pal sun in excess of the agreed upon release price, said sua 
shall be applied toward the next release price, i.e., should Buyer 
sake a principal payment of $160,000.00, the sua of $20,000•00 
($110,000.00 less $140,000.00) shall be applied toward the next 
release price which shall require an additional principal payment 
Of $120,000.00 ($20,000,00 plus $120,000.00 equals $140,000*00) 
to release the next lot. 
5« The proposed plat is attached hereto as Exhibit 
•&• and by this reference incorporated herein*. Seller hereby 
acknowledges and agrees to execute as a lienholder the original 
plat prior to recordation. Changes in the proposed plat and the 
Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions when pre-
pared shall be subject to the reasonable approval of Seller. 
6. Seller agrees to grant to Summit County the ten 
and one-half (10-1/2) foot strip of land outlined in red on 
Exhibit *Xme Said conveyance shall be for the sole purpose of 
widening the County roadway. If possible, sue*, grant shall be 
in the form of an easement. The County indicates that it is 
possible that the County road as it exists is not where it is 
platted. If such proves to be a fact. Seller agrees that upon 
proper vacation, quit claim and abandonment of the platted road 
by the County, Seller shall grant to the County (by way of 
easement if possible) the County road as it exists as it is 
shown on Exhibit m\m. 
7. Buyer agrees to provide Seller wit.*, one (1) sewer 
connection and one (1) culinary water connection into Buyer's 
systems at such time as each is available, and Seller shall pay 
a connection fee and service fee equal to the pro rata cost to 
the purchaser of a lot in Buyer's proposed PUD plus any charges 
of Suanit Water Distributing Company. The sewer and water 
connection granted above can be ummd by Seller in nev 
construction it allowed on the 8.5 acre parcel or for connec-
tion to the existing residence of'seller. Should Seller require 
another water and/or sewer connection, upon payment of 'the same 
charge set forth in the prior sentence, if well and sewer line 
c«pacity i% available in Buyer's systems, and if Buyer shall 
convey to Seller whatever water rights the Board of Health 
would require for one (1) culinary connection (not to exceed 
one acre/foot) and the location of the residences to be located 
on the retained approximately 8.5 acre portion of Seller's 
property shall be subject to the reasonable approval of Leon H. 
Saunders and the residences to be constructed on the said 8.5 
acre parcel shall be subject to the same restrictions as Buyer's 
residences are subject to under the Covenants, Conditions and 
Restrictions of White Pine Ranch PUD, Buyer shall grant to 
Seller another one (1) culinary connection and one (1) sewer 
connection* If Seller does not request the second culinary 
water connection and/or sewer connection. Seller is not 
subject to the conditions set forth in the immediately 
preceding sentence. The location through Buyer's property 
of the sewer line and culinary water line shall be designated 
by Buyer and Buyer will make such designation to the closest 
reasonable connection point to Seller's property* 
8. Buyer and«Seller agree that nonm of them have en-
gaged a Real Estate Broker, Agent or Finder for the purposes of 
effecting this transaction and no commission, fee or other com-
pensation shall be due and owing to any such Broker, Agent or 
Finder as a result of this closing* 
9. This Memorandum and the closing documents executed 
simultaneously herewith contain all the understandings, warranties. 
-3-
representations and agreements among thai parties and the I I M 
a n entered into after each party ham personally and ful ly in -
vestigated a l l facta and circumstances concerning the traa*ac~ 
t i m e ref lected by and con temp La ted herein and none of the 
pmrtimm mrm relying upon any statements or representations not 
embodied herein. 
10* Time i s of the essence of this Memorandum and 
i t may not be oral ly changed, modified or terminated except in 
writing signed by the party against whoa the sane i s sought to 
be enforced• The terms of th is Memorandum shall apply to and 
bind the heirs 9 executors, administrators, successors and 
assign* of the respective parties hereto. 
11. In tfw event of breach or default of any obliga-
tion under th is Memorandum, the defaulting party shall pay a l l 
expenses of enforcing the **cie or any right arising out of breach 
"or default thereof, including reasonable attorneys' fees , whether 
incurred with or without suit And both before and after judgment. 
12. All warranties, covenants, obligations and agree-
ments contained herein shall survive the closing of this trans-
action and any and a l l documents and instruments delivered in 
connection herewith and shal l remain binding upon the parties 
hereto. 
DATED this \L> day of Z T y ^ N , 1981. 
I S?*^ xft^-<> C. SHARP 
^Cl^^t^ ^ 4L* J „ a/^Cd^^ 
_______ sA.^*^? 
Bursa: 
&LS 
LECN H. SAUHDZXS 
- 4 -
BOTZRJ 
. 5 -
OWNER'S DEDICATION 
KNOW ALL BY TriEBE PRESENT THAT WE THE UNDERSIGNED OWNERS 
OF THE 'r-REiN DESCRIBED TRACT OF LAND HAVING CAUSED ~Tr.E SAME TO 
BE SUBDIVIDED INTO LOTS AND STREETS TO HEREAFTER BE .KNOWN AS 
WHITE PINE RANCHES SUBDIVISION, CO HEREBY DEDICATE FOR PERPETUAL 
USE OF THE PUBLIC ALL PARCELS OF LAND SHOWN ON THIS PLAT AS I N -
TENDED FOR PUBLIC USE, AND DO WARRANT, DEFEND, AND SAVE THE CTY 
HARMLESS AGAINST ANY EASEMENTS OR OTHER INCUMBRANCES ON THE DE-
DICATED STREETS WHICH WILL INTERFERE WITH THE CTY S USE, OPERATION, 
AND MAINTENANCE OF THE STREETS AND DO FURTHER DEDICATE THE EASE-
MENTS AS SHOWN. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE UNTO SET MY HAND THIS 
DAY OF , A. D. 1981. 
LEO', n SAUNDERS, XI INDIVIDUAL 
{ DIFENDANTS 
IXHIBIT 
S\,~\J M 
?orded ac Request of . . . 
ar™ • M, Fee Paid $-
by-
Mail tax notice to_Bober£~Eel£oa_ 
. Dcp. I5»vilt_ ~ Page Ref.: 
. Addresf„fM_Exc#ange.£iacj2L 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841U 
WARRANTY DEED 
(Special) 
JOHN C. SHARP and GERALDINE Y. SHARP, his wife, as tenants in common (the 
said John C. Sharp owning an undivided two-thirds (2/3) interest therein grantor 
and the said Geraldine ¥. Sliarp owning an undivided one-third (1/3) interest 
therein) of Salt Lake City, Utah hereby 
CONVEY AND WARRANT against all claiming by, through or under said grantors 
to PAUL H. LANDES, ROBERT FELTOM, LEON H. SAUNDERS and INTERSTATE RENTALS, 
XNCo, a Nevada Corporation, each as to an undivided 25% interest as 
tenants in common and not as joint tenants grantee 
of Salt Lake City, Utah forthejumof 
Ten Dollars and other good and valuable consideration DOLLARS, 
the fojlowing described tract of land in Summit County, 
State of Utah: 
SEE EXHIBIT "A" ATTACHED HERETO AND BY THIS REFERENCE 
INCORPORATED HEREIN. 
mown 
WITNESS, the hand of said grantor , this 
July . A. D. 19 81 
Signed in the Presence of 
GERALDINE T. SHAk 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County o£-.Salt Lake • 
On t W C / . ^ t h - - * -lay of July , A. D. 1*81 
personajl'y.ap^a^ before me
 JQm c < S H A p p .^a GERALDINE Y. SHARP 
the signers" ' of the wiilnn instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that the y executed the 
*• ./\. 
J,Jj.^c^_^fck^Js»«te S~?£. 
£ « , I Hoticf Public. 
My commmton « P , r « . . _ J L " J J L i S . .. R«.ding i«.5L«A? . i . t - & _ L ^ . I . T C J _ . 
EXHIBIT "A* 
Beginning at a point South 89* 43* 36* West along the North 
line of Lot 8, 175*42 feet from the corner of Lots 1 and 8* a 
brass cap set by the Uc S. General Land Office, said brass cap 
also being South 00° 19* 46* West along section line 1336d4 
feet front the Northeast corner of Section 1? Township 2 South, 
Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian? and rurning thence 
South 89* 43* 36* West along the North line of Lo- 7 and 8 
2948.98 feet to the Northwest corner of Lot 1? tb *e South 
QQ° 13' 29* East along the West line of Lot 7, 1.
 c84 feet to 
the Southwest corner of Lot 7? thence North 89* » 41* East 
along the South line of Lot 7, 8 32.67 feet? thencj North 61* 
00s 00* East 1956.90 feet; thence North 4T 33* 15* East 
462.75 feet; thence North 42° 44* 40" East 85„63 feet to the 
point of beginning. 
SUBJECT TO Easements, Encroachme cs, Restrictions, Rights-of-Way 
and matters of record enforceable in law or equity. 
TabB 
\ ': 
Donald J. Winder, Esq. (#3519) 
Kathy A. F. Davis, Esq. (#4022) 
Tamara K. Prince, Esq. (#5224) 
WINDER & HASLAM 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendants Sharps 
'7~~ "•'• w - - ;-'- '^•»-'• riot 
SaHUkc C:.L::;:y Utah 
Or 2 fc 1388 
;
.
;st. Court 
Csp^ty Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEON H. SAUNDERS; ROBERT 
FELTON; J. RICHARD REES; 
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT 
CORPORATION, a Utah corpora-
tion; WHITE PINE RANCHES, 
a Utah general partnership; 
WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, a 
Utah general partnership, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN C. SHARP, and GERALDINE 
Y. SHARP; ASSOCIATED TITLE 
COMPANY, as Trustee, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
JOHN C. SHARP, and GERALDINE 
Y. SHARP, 
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT FELTON; LEON H. 
SAUNDERS; J. RICHARD REES; 
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT 
CORPORATION, a Utah corpora-
tion; KENNETH R. NORTON dba 
INTERSTATE RENTALS, INC., 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C87-1621 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
0017 
00132G 
and PAUL H. LANDES, indivi- : 
dually; WHITE PINE RANCHES, : 
a Utah general partnership, % 
and WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, : 
a Utah general partnership, ; 
9 
Counterclaim-Defendants.. 
This cause came on for trial before the Honorable 
J. Dennis Frederick on January 28, 1988 through January 29, 
1988 and March 22, 1988 through March 25, 1988, with the de-
fendants John C. and Geraldine Y* Sharp (hereinafter the 
"Sharps") appearing by counsel Donald J. Winder, Kathy A* F, 
Davis and Tamara K. Prince, the latter being admitted pro hac 
vice, and plaintiffs White Pine Ranches, White Pine Enter-
prises, Leon H. Saunders (hereinafter "Saunders"), Robert 
Felton (hereinafter "Felton"), J. Richard Rees and Saunders 
Land Investment Corporation appearing by counsel Robert M. 
Anderson, Glen D. Watkins and Mark R. Gaylord. Counterclaim 
defendant Kenneth R. Norton ("Norton") appeared through his 
counsel John B. Anderson, only to introduce a Stipulation and 
Indemnification Agreement between plaintiffs and counterclaim 
defendant Norton. Defendant Associated Title was never served 
in this action. Counterclaim defendant Paul H. Landes (here-
inafter "Landes") was never served in this action. 
The Court, having heard the testimony of witnesses, hav-
ing reviewed and received exhibits, having heard the arguments 
of counsel, having received stipulations of counsel, having 
reviewed memoranda presented by counsel, having presented its 
oral ruling on the issues involved in the case on March 30, 
_2_ 0G1327 
1988, having heard and ruled upon the Plaintiffs1 Objections 
to Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Plaintiffs' Proposed Alternate and Additional Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and upon Plaintiffs1 Objection 
to Affidavit in Support of Request for Attorneys' Fees (in-
eluding a similar motion filed by Norton) on September 16, 
1988, and for good cause appearing, hereby makes and enters 
the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1* On or about December 9, 1980, Leon H. Saunders, 
Robert Felton, Norton and Paul H. Landes entered into an Ear-
nest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase (hereinafter "Earnest 
Money") with the Sharps for the purchase of certain real prop-
erty located in White Pine Canyon, Snyderville, Summit County, 
State of Utah (hereinafter "the Subject Property"). (Exhibit 
14). 
2. Plaintiffs' "development plans presently anticipated 
12 to 15 four-acre to five-acre lots" and the Earnest Money 
provided "such plans shall be subject to the reasonable 
approval of Seller [the Sharps]." 
3. The Earnest Money also provided, inter alia: 
At a time desired by Seller, Purchaser 
shall allow Seller to hook into the 
culinary water system and sewer system 
developed by Purchaser on the subject 
Property at the same per-hook-up price 
charged by Purchaser to the buyers of 
lots developed on the subject Property. 
4. The plaintiffs acted upon the understanding that be-
fore Summit County would approve any planned development, 
_3_ 001323 
nrw Q 
they, as the developer, must provide to Summit County for 
approval an environmental impact statement, a plat map and, if 
a planned residential development, a declaration of protective 
covenants. The Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District 
("SBSID") required all sewer design improvements be approved 
and construction must receive final approval . 
5. Plaintiffs wanted to promptly develop the Subject 
Property and anticipated the approval process would be com-
pleted by June, 1981. 
60 Prior to closing the transaction which was the sub-
ject of the Earnest Money, a Shared Water System Cost Estimate 
was prepared for Saunders by J. J. Johnson & Associates, engi-
neers in Park City. The Estimate proposed two alternatives 
wherein 15 units at Saunders Ranch (subsequently White Pine 
Ranches), known herein as the "Subject Property", develop a 
water system sufficient for its needs and the needs of various 
adjacent properties in order to provide users of the water 
system an economy of scale resulting in lower water system 
costs to each user. (Exhibit 105). Although considered by 
him, Saunders never adopted any of these proposals. 
7. In April, 1981, an Environmental Impact Statement 
(hereinafter "EIS") was prepared by J. J. Johnson for Saunders 
Land Investment Corporation concerning development of the Sub-
ject Property and was delivered to the Sharps prior to clos-
ing * (Exhibit 67) „ 
8. The EIS provided the "sewer system will be connected 
to the Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District and a line 
-4- OOISS'J: 
Si s 
^ g 5 
extension agreement with the Sewer Improvement District will 
be signed." The EIS also provided two alternative water stor-
age systems for the development on the Subject Property which 
would be available to other proposed developments, including 
Ranch Place and Landmark Plaza, as well. The EIS further pro-
vided that the internal traffic circulation in the subject 
project would be via private road. 
9. In April 1981, Felton, Norton, Saunders and Landes 
operated under the assumed name of White Pine Ranches. 
(Plaintiffs1 Complaint, 5151 and 5). 
ID. Thereafter, on or about July 16, 1981, the parties 
closed the sale of the Subject Property through the execution 
of a Memorandum of Closing Terms (Exhibit 15) executed by 
Saunders, Felton, Norton, Landes and the Sharps; a Special 
Warranty Deed (Exhibit 17) executed by the Sharps and convey-
ing the title to the Subject Property to Landes, Felton, 
Saunders and Interstate Rentals, Inc.; a Trust Deed Note ex-
ecuted by Felton, Saunders, Landes, Norton and Interstate 
Rentals, Inc. by its president, Norton, in the amount of 
$963,055.30, together with an addendum to the Trust Deed Note 
(Exhibit 3) outlining the schedule of payments, and a Trust 
Deed covering the Subject Property executed by Saunders, 
Landes, Felton and Interstate Rentals, Inc. by its president, 
Norton, and securing the Trust Deed Note (Exhibit 2) (herein-
after collectively referred to as "the Closing Documents"). 
11. A partnership agreement establishing White Pine 
Ranches was executed September 25, 1982 with Felton, Saunders, 
•5- fVf*21 
Dan Hunter and J. Richard Rees as general partners. (Exhibit 
49). Saunders Land Investment Corporation subsequently as-
sumed and bought out the interest of Dan Hunter in the White 
Pine Ranches partnership. 
12. On June 30, 1982 White Pine Ranches and Howells In-
vestment executed a Partnership Agreement of White Pine Enter-
prises for the purposes of "investing in, managing, leasing, 
developing, subdividing and selling unimproved real estate 
(Exhibit 48) described on Exhibit fAf attached" thereto, which 
unimproved real estate was the approximately 27 southern acres 
of the Subject Property that was never platted. 
13* Both partnerships, White Pine Ranches and White Pine 
Enterprises, are general partnerships. 
14. Preliminary plats (Exhibits 18 and 19) of the Sub-
ject Property were prepared by J. Jo Johnson & Associates for 
the development prior to closing, but were modified by plain-
tiffs because the County Commission was opposed to the private 
road concept. (Exhibit 109). These preliminary plats were 
not approved prior to closing because the County Attorney 
would not approve a private road system (Exhibit 114), A new 
plat was prepared for White Pine Ranches, a Planned Unit De-
velopment ("PUD") and attached as Exhibit "A" to the Memo-
randum of Closing Terms. This Exhibit "A" to the Memorandum 
of Closing Terms platted all of the Subject Property and was 
initialed by all the parties thereto except Felton. (Exhibit 
20). 
15. Paragraph 1 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms (Ex-
hibit 15) provided as follows: 
_6_ 0013C1 
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1. It is mutually agreed and 
understood that after recordation of 
the PUD Plat and the Declaration of 
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, 
and upon receipt of each $140,000.00 in 
principal (but not including the 
earnest money and down payment money), 
Seller shall execute and deliver to 
Buyer a Partial Deed of Reconveyance 
for one (1) PUD lot. (Emphasis added.) 
16. Paragraph 2 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms pro-
vided as follows: 
2. Upon the payment of the 
release price, Buyer shall be entitled 
to the release of one (1) lot of Buy-
er's choice upon receipt of the payment 
or at any time thereafter. (Emphasis 
added.) 
17. Paragraph 3 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms pro-
vided as follows: 
3. It is agreed that, at the time 
of execution of this Memorandum, Buyer 
has paid to Seller the sum of 
$620,000.00 which will release from the 
Deed of Trust three (3) PUD lots. Upon 
the recordation of the PUD Plat and 
Declaration of Covenants, Conditions 
and Restrictions with the Summit County 
Recorder, Buyer shall be entitled to 
the release from the Deed of Trust of 
three (3) PUD lots of Buyer fs choice 
together with the said roadway. (Em-
phasis added.) 
18. Paragraph 5 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms pro-
vided as follows: 
5. The proposed plat is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A" and by this ref-
erence incorporated herein. Seller 
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hereby acknowledges and agrees to exe-
cute as a lienholder the original plat 
prior to recordation. Changes in the 
proposed plat and the Declaration of 
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions 
when prepared shall be subject to the 
reasonable approval of Seller. (Em-
phasis added.) 
19. The proposed plat, Exhibit "A" attached to the Memo-
randum of Closing Terms included a boundary description de-
scribing all of the Subject Property and an Ownerfs Dedica-
tion. The Owner's Dedication is a standard printed form used 
by J.J. Johnson, parallels dedications used in the city limits 
of Park City and is commonly used in plats to dedicate roads 
to public use, not as a dedication for a private road as orig-
inally contemplated in the EIS. The Owner's Dedication pro-
vides in pertinent part as follows: 
Know all by these present that we the 
undersigned owners of the herein de-
scribed tract of land, having caused 
the same to be subdivided into lots 
and streets to hereafter be known as 
White Pine Ranches Subdivision, do 
hereby dedicate for perpetual use of 
the public all parcels of land shown 
on this plat as intended for public 
use, and do warrant, defend, and save 
the city harmless against any ease-
ments or other encumbrances on the 
dedicated streets which will interfere 
with the city's use, operation, and 
maintenance of the streets and do fur-
ther dedicate the easements as shown. 
(Emphasis added.) 
(Exhibit 20). 
20. Paragraph 6 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms pro-
vided in part as follows: 
6. Seller agrees to grant to Sum-
mit County the ten and one-half (10-
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1/2) foot strip of land outlined in 
red on Exhibit "A". Said conveyance 
shall be for the sole purpose of 
widening the County roadway. If pos-
sible, such grant shall be in the form 
of an easement. The County indicates 
that it is possible that the County 
road as it exists is not where it is 
platted. 
21. The County roadway has not been widened, there are no 
current plans to do so, and Summit County has never requested 
such an easement from plaintiffs or the Sharps. 
107, p. 15; Exhibit 87, p. 8; and Exhibit 34). 
(See Exhibit 
22. Paragraph 7 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms pro-
vided in pertinent part as follows: 
7. Buyer agrees to provide Seller 
with one (1) sewer connection and one 
(1) culinary water connection into Buy-
er's systems at such time as each is 
available, and Seller shall pay a con-
nection fee and service fee equal to 
the pro rata cost to the purchaser of a 
lot in Buyer's proposed PUD plus
 m any 
charges of Summit Water Distributing 
Company. The sewer and water connec-
tion granted above can be used by Sell-
er in new construction if allowed on 
the 8.5 acre parcel or for connection 
to the existing residence of Seller.... 
(Emphasis added.) 
23. Subsequent to closing, attorney Jon Heaton represent-
ed Saunders in continuing plaintiffs' attempts, begun prior to 
closing, to obtain County approval of a private road for the 
development. (Exhibit 127). 
24. Before signing the Closing Documents, on June 16, 
1981 and subsequently on November 1, 1983, Plaintiff White 
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Pine Ranches entered into sewer extension agreements with the 
SBSID to install a sewer trunk line up White Pine Canyon pur-
suant to which agreements White Pine Ranches would receive 
reimbursement for their construction costs of the sewer line 
to the development from connection fees charged to third par-
ties connecting to that line: 
Said third parties will be allowed to 
connect to such lines only upon payment 
to the District of the applicable num-
ber of connection fees. The District 
shall retain $100 plus the actual costs 
of construction and inspection from 
each such connection fee and pay the 
balance of each such connection fee to 
Applicant [White Pine Ranches]. 
(Exhibits 80 115(c) and 81 I5C). 
25. At the time plaintiffs were trying to obtain County 
approval of the development and agreeing to run the sewer line 
to Subject Property, it was anticipated that additional devel-
opments by third parties would occur in the White Pine Canyon 
vicinity, including the development of a ski resort in White 
Pine Canyon and the development of adjoining parcels of land, 
all of which future developments would hook into the sewer 
trunk line plaintiffs were to construct, allowing plaintiffs 
the opportunity to recoup expenditures for the sewer system 
through the connection fees paid pursuant to the provisions of 
the line extension agreements • (Exhibits 104, 105, 107 and 
117). 
26. On June 30, 1982, White Pine Ranches paid the Sharps 
the installment payment of $308,177.69, by check (Exhibit 44) 
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enclosed with a cover letter from Felton stating: "Upon final 
plat approval, we will notify you to obtain the releases for 
the lots and the road as per the contract." (Exhibit 21). 
27. On June 28, 1983 and June 30, 1983, Felton and 
Saunders Land Investment Corporation paid to the Sharps the 
sum of $178,165.23 by two checks in the amount of $71,266.09 
and $106,899.14 respectively. (Exhibit 44). The remaining 
portion of the June 30, 1983 installment payment due from 
plaintiffs, a check from Dan Hunter in the amount of 
$106,849.14 was returned for insufficient funds, resulting in 
a default in the June 30, 19823 installment payment. (Exhibit 
22). 
28. On or about July 19, 1983, while the June 30, 1983 
payment was in default and prior to the recordation of a final 
plat on the Subject Property, Felton wrote a letter to attor-
ney Jon Heaton, inquiring about obtaining a release from the 
Sharps of the road and five lots. The letter further ex-
plained that a final plat had not been recorded because "[a]s 
soon as we file the plat real estate taxes are going to go up 
significantly, which we would like to avoid until we have an 
actual buyer for one of the lots." (Exhibit 23). 
29. On or about September 23, 1983, a Notice of Default 
was filed pursuant to the Trust Deed on the Subject Property 
for the default in the June 30, 1983 payment. (Exhibit 24.) 
30. Plaintiffs made no claim during 1983 that the Sharps 
had breached the Closing Documents. 
00133<3 
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31. On or about November 14
 f 1983, the June 30, 1983 de-
fault under the Trust Deed was cured with a payment in the sum 
of $118,397.39 from Saunders Land Investment Corporation (Ex-
hibits 4 and 44). 
32. On or about November 18, 1983, attorney Jon Heaton 
sent a letter to the Sharps enclosing for their approval a 
proposed final plat, which was later recorded with Summit 
County (hereinafter the proposed "final plat"), and a Declara-
tion of Protective Covenants (hereinafter "CCRs"), which Dec-
laration was prepared on behalf of Saunders by Heaton and 
which contained covenants, conditions and restrictions for use 
of respecting a portion of the Subject Property by lot owners. 
(Exhibit 25). 
33. The proposed final plat enclosed with the November 18, 
1983 letter did not plat the entire approximately 60 acre par-
cel as originally contemplated in the Earnest Money and the 
Memorandum of Closing Terms, but platted only the northern 
portion of the Subject Property into six PUD lots, leaving the 
southern portion (approximately 27 acres) of the Subject Prop-
erty unplatted (hereinafter the "unplatted acreage"). (Exhib-
it 1). 
34. The proposed final plat included an Owner's Dedica-
tion for a private road in the PUD and delineated the exist-
ence and location of the private road and certain utility 
easements, including easements for water lines, water tank and 
water systems. (Exhibit 1). 
0G13C 
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35. The November 18, 1983 letter from attorney Jon Heaton 
to the Sharps further provided in pertinent part that; 
At a later time in the near future, Hy 
[Saunders] has indicated he will seek 
release of Lots 1 through 5 of the 
platted subdivision along with his road 
(White Pine Lane).... We will handle 
that matter when it is presented.... 
When those releases are made, pursuant 
to your instruction we will insure that 
rights are reserved in White Pine Lane 
for access for the southern portions of 
the property purchased from you until 
your Deed of Trust is fully paid. (Em-
phasis added.) 
(Exhibit 25 and 25a). 
36. On or about November 21, 1983, Felton mailed a letter 
to Jon Heaton regarding the November 18, 1983 letter to John 
Sharp, The letter provided in pertinent part: "it is per-
fectly acceptable to us that he [Mr. Sharp] retain an easement 
over White Pine Lane to the southern part of his property as 
well as to Lot 6 from White Pine Canyon Road up to the western 
boundary of Lot 6." (Exhibit 26). 
37. On or about November 28, 1983, Felton had a telephone 
conversation with attorney Heaton memorialized by notes of 
attorney Heaton in the margin of Feltonfs November 21, 1983 
letter (Exhibit 26). Felton agreed that "access over road 
[Whits Pine Lane] retained if Sharp develops undeveloped prop-
erty Lots 7-12 White Pine Ranch." (Exhibit 26a). 
38. On or about November 23, 1983, the Sharps authorized 
the recording of a Cancellation of Notice of Default relating 
to ths June 30, 1983 payment (Exhibit 27). 
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39. On or about November 23, 1983, the Sharps, in consi-
deration of the agreement of plaintiffs to allow them access 
over the private roadway (White Pine Lane) in the event of 
foreclosure, and pursuant to their right of approval under 
paragraph 5 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms, also executed 
a Consent to Record Phase I of White Pine Ranches, which Con-
sent after setting forth the metes and bounds description of 
Phase I of White Pine Ranches granted: 
[A] non-exclusive easement for water 
lines, water tank and water systems 
over, under and across the property, 
shown here near the southwest corner of 
the subject property, and specifically 
described in the Declaration of Pro-
tective Covenants and reserving unto 
the owners, for granting to the owners 
of adjacent or nearby property, a 
non-exclusive easement for utilities 
and vehicular and pedestrian access 
over the private roadway shown on the 
plat and from the well sites as de-
veloped. (Emphasis added.) 
(Exhibit 51) . As additional consideration for signing the 
Consent to Record, the Sharps permitted the platting of only a 
portion of the Subject Property. 
40. The proposed final plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I 
sent to the Sharps for approval on November 18, 1983 was re-
corded on December 23, 1983 in the office of the Summit County 
Recorder following the execution of the Consent to Record by 
the Sharps* (Exhibit 1). The CCRs were also recorded in the 
office of the Summit County Recorder on December 23, 1983 and 
the Consent to Record was attached as an exhibit thereto. 
(Exhibit 51). 
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41. After recordation of the final plat, the CCRs and the 
Consent to Record, plaintiffs proceeded with construction of 
the improvements on the Subject Property. However, instead of 
adopting any of the alternatives described in Finding No. 6, 
supra, plaintiffs constructed a small, private water system 
for this development. 
42. On or about January 18, 1984, the Sharps executed a 
direction to the Trustee under the Deed of Trust to release 
from the Deed of Trust Lots 1 through 5 of White Pine Ranches 
(Exhibit 28). 
43. The Partial Reconveyance of Lots 1 through 5 directed 
and authorized by the Sharps, was not prepared by Associated 
Title, the trustee under the Trust Deed, until January 7, 1986 
and was recorded March 26, 1986 (Exhibit 45). No explanation 
of the delay in preparing the Partial Reconveyance was provid-
ed at trial. Plaintiffs, although naming Associated Title as 
a defendant in this action, chose not to serve or pursue and 
question Associated Title for such delay. No other request 
for reconveyance was authorized by the Sharps. 
44. On or about January 20, 1984, Felton sent a letter to 
attorney Heaton expressing astonishment that the deeds to Lots 
1 through 5 had not been received but stating, "I realize that 
the deeds for the road may be difficult to do." (Exhibit 30). 
45. On or about January 17, 1984, Felton sent a letter to 
attorney Heaton requesting the approval by the Sharps of a 
"multi-family development" on the unplatted acreage, "which is 
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the only way it [the development] will be economically feasi-
ble*w (Exhibit 29). A multi-family concept was never adopt-
ed. 
46. Felton testified at trial and affirmed on May 7, 1986 
in a letter sent to the Sharps that the plaintiffs "were in a 
position to prepare and obtain approval of that plat [for the 
unplatted acreage] immediately." (Trial Transcript, p. 110, 
hereinafter "R." 110 and Exhibit 37). 
47. It was the actual practice of plaintiffs and a re-
quirement of paragraph 2 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms to 
make specific requests for the release of specific PUD lots 
from the Sharps after required payments were made and provided 
no defaults existed under the Closing Documents, (R* 334). 
48. Property taxes on the unreleased property (Lot 6 and 
the unplatted acreage) became delinquent pursuant to law on 
November 30, 1984 when plaintiffs failed to pay all of the 
1984 property taxes due on the Subject Property (Stipulation 
of counsel at Trial) in violation of paragraphs 5 and 14 of 
the Trust Deed, which provided in paragraph 5 that the Trustor 
[plaintiffs] agrees "to pay at least 10 days before delinquen-
cy all taxes and assessments affecting said property...." 
(Exhibit 2). 
49. Except for $1,515.24 in property taxes paid on the 
unplatted acreage in 1984, no taxes have been paid on the 
unreleased Subject Property (Lot 6 and the unplatted acreage) 
subsequent to November 30, 1984, and including 1985, 1986 and 
1987 (Stipulation of counsel at Trial), and plaintiffs, there-
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fore, remained in default under the provisions of paragraphs 5 
and 14 of the Trust Deed. 
50. Plaintiffs paid the 1984 installment payment. However, 
on or about June 27, 1985, the Sharps received only a portion 
of the June 30, 1985 installment payment in the form of a 
check from Felton in the amount of $59,709.47 (Exhibit 44). 
51. As a result of plaintiffs' defaults, a Notice of 
Default was recorded on September 16, 1985 covering the Sub-
ject Property as described in the Trust Deed, which descrip-
tion included Lots 1-5. (Exhibit 55). 
52. On or about September 24, 1985, Felton sent a 
letter to Mr. Sharp acknowledging receipt of the September 
1985 Notice of Default and assuring him "every attempt is be-
ing made to resolve the problem...." (Exhibit 31). Felton, 
in his letter made no allegation that the Sharps had slandered 
plaintiffs' title as a result of the inclusion of Lots 1-5 in 
the Notice of Default nor did Felton or any other plaintiff 
allege in 1984 or 1985 any breach of Closing Documents by the 
Sharps. 
53. Significantly, as bearing upon the credibility of 
plaintiffs' arguments is the fact unrebutted that plaintiffs 
made no claims whatsoever of breach by the Sharps until after 
their own admitted breaches of the Closing Documents. (Ex-
hibit 31). 
54. On or about January 10, 1986, Felton wrote a letter 
to Blake G. Heiner of Associated Title Company, the Trustee 
under the Trust Deed, informing him that the Notice of Default 
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(Exhibit 55) and Amended Notice of Sale (Exhibit 56) covering 
the Subject Property included Lots 1 through 5 which were to 
have been released, pursuant to the Sharps' direction. (Ex-
hibit 57) . 
55. In response to Felton's letter (Exhibit 57), Blake 
Heiner for Associated Title Company prepared and recorded an 
Amended Notice of Trustee's Sale against the Subject Property, 
excluding Lots 1 through 5. (Exhibit 58). Other Notices 
filed subsequently against the Subject Property also excluded 
Lots 1 through 5. (Exhibits 3 and 36). 
56. All of the Notices of Default and Notices of 
Trustee's Sale recorded against the Subject Property specif-
ically provided that such Notices are: 
SUBJECT TO Easements, Encroachments, 
Restrictions, Rights-of-Way and matters 
of record enforceable in law (sic) 
equity. 
(Exhibits 5, 36, 55, 56, and 58). 
57. No payment at all was made when the final install-
ment under the Closing Documents was due on June 30, 1986. 
58. The balance owing to the Sharps under the Trust Deed 
Note through March 22, 1988 is $557,642.46, including 
$371,739.35 principal; $23,113.33 interest at 12%; $147,920.21 
default interest at 18%; and $14,869.52 late payment charges 
of 4% on each overdue payment. Interest is accruing at a per 
diem rate of $183.32. (Exhibit 122). 
59 a Plaintiffs made no written or oral request for the 
release of the roadway or Lot 6 prior to their default in 
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November 1984, when the 1984 property taxes became delinquent, 
and prior to their default in failing to make the entire 1985 
installment payment when due. Plaintiffs' first requests were 
made for such releases on February 27, 1986 and May 7, 1986, 
respectively. (Exhibits 35 and 37). Also for the first time 
in the letter dated February 27, 1986, plaintiffs requested a 
release from the Sharps for 7.5 acres of the unplatted acre-
age, despite the provision in paragraphs 1-3 of the Memorandum 
of Closing Terms for the release by the Sharps of "PUD lots" 
only. As of these dates, plaintiffs were still and are in of 
default for the 1984 and 1985 property taxes and the payment a 
portion of the 1985 payment and the full 1986 payment required 
under the Addendum to the Trust Deed Note. 
60. The Sharps perceived that the execution by them of 
the Consent to Record constituted substantial performance of 
any obligation to release the roadway pursuant to paragraphs 3 
and 6 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms. 
61. As plaintiff Felton testified, "the contract [Memo-
randum of Closing Terms] says lots of buyer's choice and that 
would require a choice." After the release of Lots 1-5, 
plaintiffs may have chosen to prepare a plat of the then un-
platted acreage and seek a release of a portion of it instead 
of Lot 6. 
62. Also in the letter of February 27, 1986, Felton de-
manded from the Sharps for the first time approximately 
$73,000.00 as their "cost of the sewer and water hook-ups 
which are now available." (Exhibit 35). No demand for such 
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costs had been made of the Sharps prior to that time nor had 
plaintiffs provided an accounting of such costs. Before 
trial, plaintiffs claimed exorbitant expenses of $1,638,753.61 
for the complete costs for the construction of the improve-
ments on and to the Subject Property (Exhibit 32a). 
63. At trial, plaintiffs claimed costs for the construc-
tion of improvements on and to the Subject Property of 
$1,063,348.10, (Exhibit 60) and plaintiffs modified their de-
mand from the Sharps for water and sewer connection fees to 
$43,706.00. (Exhibit 66). 
64. Prior to actual construction of the sewer system, 
Saunders told the Summit County Planning Commission in a 
meeting on December 14, 1982 that they "would really like to 
have the septic tank system used because of the high cost of 
the sewer line but in the long run it may be the best way to 
go." (Exhibit 79). On or about September 16, 1983, Felton 
wrote Summit County challenging the requirement "to install a 
sewer line up the County road from Highway U-224 to the 
Project, a distance of about one and one-half (1-1/2) miles." 
(Exhibit 79). Felton concluded the letter by declaring: "In 
the event we are required to install the sewer line, we will 
test the validity of that requirement in court." 
65. Plaintiffs made formal demand upon Summit County on 
or about July 26, 1984 for, inter alia, the following damages; 
The sum of $117,297.15 being the 
costs of off-site sewer which we 
were, under protest, required to 
install to service the subdivision. 
*** 
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[W]e [plaintiffs] have lost one sale or 
more sales and anticipate the damages, 
loss of profit and interest at between 
$250,000 and $500,000. 
*** 
[D]amages for the loss of sale, reduction 
in business and damages suffered in reduc-
tion to profit 
(Exhibit 84). 
66. Soon thereafter plaintiffs brought suit in the United 
States District Court, District of Utah, Civil No. C84-2090W, 
against Summit County, the SBSID and various officials thereof 
to recover their claimed damages. 
67. In answer to interrogatories dated December 28, 1984 
in the Federal Court litigation, plaintiffs stated: 
Because of the imposition of the re-
quirement that Plaintiffs construct an 
off-site sewer approximately one mile in 
length, the costs of developing the 
entire project became prohibitive. 
(Exhibit 116; see also, Exhibit 107, p. 7). 
68. In further interrogatory answers on March 31, 1986, 
Saunders declared: 
At the present time I have recently found 
out that the right-of-way servicing my 
property has been forfeited by Summit 
County contrary to law. This will not 
allow my development to proceed, will not 
allow me to recover costs for the capital 
improvement and significantly diminishes 
the value of the property. 
(Exhibit 107, p. 15). 
69. In Saunders1 Federal Court affidavit dated March 17, 
1986, he also swore: 
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10. As a result of the various 
delays [caused by the County and the 
SBSID], which are detailed below, the 
market for exclusive building lots is now 
virtually non-existent, cost of improve-
ments escalated to be several times what 
I had anticipated, and much of the real 
property in the project is threatened by 
foreclosure. 
(Exhibit 86, p. 3). 
70. Most of the damages sought to be recovered by the 
plaintiffs in the lawsuit against the SBSID and Summit County 
are the same damages plaintiffs sought to recover from the 
Sharps in the present case. (Ro 252 and 263? cf„ Exhibits 60 
with 86; see also Exhibits 87, 88, 107, 116 and Plaintiffs' 
Verified Complaint herein). 
71. No written or oral claim of default on the part of 
the Sharps under the Closing Documents was made by the plain-
tiffs until February 27, 1986, subsequent to plaintiffs1 own 
defaults in failing to pay the 1984 and 1985 property taxes 
and failing to pay the full 1985 payment required under the 
Addendum to the Trust Deed Note. 
72. The Sharps did not interfere with plaintiffs' 
attempts to market or sell the Subject Property. 
73. Plaintiffs received only one invitation for an offer 
to purchase Lot 1 or Lot 6, which invitation was not consum-
mated due to the failure of conditions imposed by the one, 
B. F. Sammons, and the failure of such conditions were unre-
lated to any actions or statements of the Sharps. (Exhibit 
88). 
74. One of the conditions of purchase by Sammons was an 
independent appraisal supporting a $220,000 proposed sales 
price' (Exhibit 88). The plaintiffs provided Sammons with a 
letter appraisal, dated August 8, 1986, which had been pre-
pared by LeRoy Pia. (Exhibit 9a). This appraisal stated that 
Lots 1 and 6 had a fair market value of $220,000. On or 
about November 11, 1986, while Sammons and Saunders were still 
negotiating, a letter appraisal was obtained by Steve Clyde, 
attorney for the plaintiffs from the same appraiser, valuing 
the lots at an average of only $190,000.00 (Exhibit 9). The 
November 11, 1986 appraisal was not shown to Sammons. (R. 
283-4). 
75. Saunders had given Sammons "the impression" that 
plaintiffs could convey Lot 6 to him even though it had not 
been released from the Trust Deed, (R. 389; see also R. 284). 
76. On or about March 24, 1987, Felton, pursuant to the 
request of the real estate agent, Steve Clegg, employed by 
plaintiffs to list Lots 1, 2 and 5, wrote a letter to Clegg 
for dissemination to other Park City real estate agents, which 
letter stated M[t]he current litigation does not affect the 
marketability or encumber that [SubjectJ property." (Exhibit 
89.) 
77. After the commencement of this action, the Sharps 
took all reasonable steps to facilitate the sale and marketing 
of the Subject Property as evidenced by a letter dated Septem-
ber 30, 1986, to plaintiffs' prior attorney, Steven Clyde, who 
was notified by Donald J. Winder, the Sharps1 attorney, that 
(j013 
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the Sharps would take all steps reasonable to effect a sale of 
Lot 6 or the unplatted acreage (Exhibit 33), and the Sharps1 
Motion to Appoint a Receiver for the Subject Property in this 
proceeding dated May 14, 1987. 
78. There have been no arms length sales to purchasers of 
PUD lots at the Subject Property wherein sewer and water con-
nection and service fees have been assessed . The only convey-
ance of a PUD lot has been to Felton, a member of the partner-
ships,, At trial, plaintiffs testified that they intended, at 
all times, to include the cost of the sewer and water connec-
tion and service fees within the sales price of lots. (R* 
310-312). 
79. Mr. Sammons was not to be charged any sum above and 
beyond a $220,000 land price for sewer or water connection 
fees. (R. 285). 
80. Felton testified that a purchaser of one of the PUD 
lots listed with real estate agent Clegg would only be charged 
"over and above ... the purchase price" "the hook-up fee to be 
charged by Snyderville Basin for sewer." (R. 310). 
81. If plaintiffs sold a lot to Sammons at $220,000, they 
would not have been "compensated for those [sewer and water] 
improvement costs...." At a $220,000 sales price it's "impos-
sible" to recover the costs of sewer and water improvements to 
the Subject Property. "You have to take a loss." (R. 311-
312). 
82. The sewer system, as of the date of trial, is not 
completed or operational, nor has its construction been 
O'Kift 
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approved by the SBSID. (Exhibits 83, 83a and 99 through 103). 
The culinary water system as of the date of trial is also not 
operational. Under paragraph 7 of the Memorandum of Closing 
Terms, the Sharps do not have to pay connection fees for these 
systems until they are "available." (Exhibit 15). 
83. The sewer system constructed by plaintiffs has a 
capacity to handle between 2,000 and 3,800 connections. (Ex-
hibit 86) . 
84. Under the line extension agreements with the SBSID, a 
connection fee "at the rate in effect at the time of connec-
tion" shall be determined by the SBSID for the system on the 
Subject Property (Exhibit 81, paragraph 4D; see Exhib-
it 80, paragraph 4(d)). The "connection fee shall be paid by 
the property owner" before issuance of a building permit, to 
the Application (the plaintiffs herein), except that the 
SBSID, shall be entitled to "the first $100 of the connection 
fee." 
85. The parties intended the language in the Earnest 
Money concerning "same per-hook-up price" to be synonymous 
with the language contained in paragraph 7, Memorandum of 
Closing Terms, regarding "pro rata cost" to a PUD lot purchas-
er. 
86. Average and reasonable connection fees for culinary 
water and sewer systems in the Park City and Snyderville Basin 
area are $2,000.00 each. (See Testimony of John C. Brown and 
Rex Ausburn, cf« Exhibit 86, p. 6)* 
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87 . The Sharps intended and wanted to be charged only 
what purchasers of a PUD lot would be charged as fees to con-
nect to the culinary water and sewer systems on the Subject 
Property, and the plaintiffs should have understood that this 
was the intent of paragraph 7, Memorandum of Closing Terms. 
88. The Sharps repeatedly assured plaintiffs that they 
did not intend, through their foreclosure, to interfere with 
access rights over the private roadway or to the utility ease-
ments shown on the Consent to Record which the Sharps signed* 
(R. 64; Exhibits 33 and 51; cf. Exhibits 25, 25a, 26 and 26a) . 
89. Correspondingly, it was both the mutual intent and 
agreement of the parties that the Sharps be granted use of the 
roadway in event of default (Exhibits 25, 25a, 26 and 26a), 
which agreement was later memorialized and recorded in the 
Consent to Record. (Exhibit 51). 
90. The inclusion of Lots 1 through 5 in the September 
1985 Notice of Default (Exhibit 55) and December 1985 Amended 
Notice of Trusteefs Sale (Exhibit 56) was inadvertent, un-
intentional and without malice. 
91. In refusing to reconvey Lot 6, the road, the unplat-
ted acreage, the Sharps acted in good faith and relied on the 
advice of attorney Jon Heaton* 
92. The Sharps have been charged trustees1 fees by 
Associated Title in their efforts to foreclose the Subject 
Property in the amount of $1,803.80 (Exhibit 42). 
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93. Plaintiffs have not suffered any damages, special or 
otherwise, as a result of any act or failure to act by the 
Sharps. 
94. Paragraph 13 of the Trust Deed provides that failure 
to promptly enforce any right thereunder does "not constitute 
a waiver of any other right or subsequent default." (Exhibit 
2). 
95. On September 4, 1986, the day before the scheduled 
Trustee's Sale, plaintiffs filed a Complaint commencing this 
action and obtained the issuance of a Temporary Restraining 
Order (TRO) from Judge Judith M. Billings to restrain the 
Sharps from conducting the Trustee's Sale of the Subject Prop-
erty. The TRO required a bond in the amount of $2,400. In a 
hearing held on January 4, 1988, this Court required that the 
bond be increased to $50,000 "to protect the Sharps for the 
payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suf-
fered if the Sharps are found to have been wrongfully enjoined 
or restrained...." 
96. The Trust Deed Note provided that if it "is collected 
by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or 
interest, either with or without suit, the undersigned ... 
agree to pay ... a reasonable attorney's fee." (Exhibit 3)*, 
Paragraph 16 of the Trust Deed provided: "Upon the 
occurrence of any default hereunder, Beneficiary [the Sharps] 
shall have the option to ... foreclose the Trust Deed ... and 
Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover ... a reasonable 
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attorney's fee " (Exhibit 2; see also 5111 thereof) . Fur-
ther, paragraph 6 of the Trust Deed provided that Beneficiary 
(the Sharps) may "commence, appear in and defend any action or 
proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof or the 
rights of [sic] powers of Beneficiary . .. and in exercising 
any such powers ... employ counsel, and pay his reasonable 
fees." Additionally, paragraph 7 of the Trust Deed requires 
Trustor to "pay immediately and without demand all sums ex-
pended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, with interest from 
date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent (10%) per 
annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall be secured 
hereby," Paragraph 11 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms pro-
vided that "the defaulting party shall pay all expenses of 
enforcing the same or any right arising out of breach or de-
fault thereof, including reasonable attorneys1 fees, whether 
incurred with or without suit and both before and after judg-
ment." (Exhibit 15). 
97. Legal services have been rendered to the Sharps by 
the law firm of Winder & Haslam in the nature of time expended 
by individual members, through August 31, 1988, in the amount 
of $144,469.75. 
98. The foregoing amount does not include any services 
performed on or after August 31, 1988, including those servic-
es of Winder & Haslam necessary for finalizing the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and preparing for, re-
sponding to and arguing any post trial motions. The legal 
fees for such matters may be supplemented later. 
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99. The services rendered by the law firm of Winder & 
Haslam, excluding legal research related to attorney's mal-
practice , were reasonably necessary for the development of the 
case and protection of the rights of the Sharps; and the rates 
charged are reasonable and are in accordance with those rates 
generally charged by attorneys in this area for similar ser-
vices. 
100. Plaintiffs breached the Memorandum of Closing Terms 
by, inter alia, failing to make the payments intended thereby 
to the Sharps and by failing to make available sewer and water 
connections at the same charge to purchasers of a PUD lot. 
101. Pursuant to paragraph 12 of the Memorandum of Closing 
Terms, all "agreements contained [t]herein shall survive the 
closing of this transaction...." (Exhibit 15). 
102. The Sharps1 defense of plaintiffs1 Complaint was an 
action purporting to affect the security under the Trust Deed I 
and the rights and powers of the Sharps; related to collecting 
the Promissory Note after default; related to foreclosing the i 
Trust Deed; and related to enforcing the Memorandum of Closing 
Terms and rights arising out of a breach or default thereof. 
103. After closing the sale on the Subject Property, on or 
about July 16, 1981, attorney Heaton represented White Pine 
Ranches relating to the development of the Subject Property 
(R. 789) until the filing by Associated Title of a Notice of 
Default on or about September 16, 1985. (R. 836; Exhibit 55). 
Attorney Heaton did not represent the Sharps between the clos-
ing of the sale and the filing of the first Notice of Default 
~
29
~ Of>^ 0013G| 
, «N S W fM 
> H es JZ <? 
S c/i x < « 
, w o .J « 
5 R ? < 8 
C/> *m Sa CO * 
0046 
on or about September 23, 1983. (R. 791; Exhibit 24) . For a 
period of time after the filing of the first Notice of Default 
on or about September 23, 1983, and after the filing of the 
Notice of Default on September 16, 1985 (R» 793), attorney 
Heaton did represent the Sharps 0 
104. The Sharps have incurred costs of court in this ac-
tion. 
Having made the above Findings of Fact, the Court here-
with makes and enters the following; 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Closing Documents, which term is defined in 
Finding No. 10 above, are the operative documents relating to 
the parties1 closing of the sale of the Subject Property by 
the Sharps to the plaintiffs, and this transaction constitutes 
the Contract between the parties (hereinafter the "Contract")» 
2. Plaintiffs, by their failure to pay the 1984, 1985, 
1986 and 1987 property taxes on Lot 6 and the unplatted acre-
age on November 30 of each respective year, are thereby in 
breach of the Trust Deed. 
3. Plaintiffs' failure to pay the entire June 30, 1985 
installment payment and the 30, 1986 final installment payment 
required pursuant to paragraph ID and IE of the Addendum to 
the Trust Deed Note constitutes a breach of the Trust Deed 
Note, Trust Deed and Memorandum of Closing Terms. 
4. Plaintiffs' breaches were material, significant and 
continuing and were uncured when plaintiffs releases were 
first requested by plaintiffs for the roadway and Lot 6 on 
February 27, 1986 and again on May 7, 1986. 
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5. The breaches by plaintiffs of the Contract occurred 
prior in time to any alleged breaches by the Sharps, and this 
Court specifically holds there were no material or significant 
breaches on the part of the Sharps of their obligations under 
the parties' Contract. 
6. The Sharps have substantially complied with all of 
their obligations under the terms of the parties1 Contract. 
7. Plaintiffs were obligated, under the terms of the 
Memorandum of Closing Terms and pursuant to their own prac-
tice, to specifically request and identify lots, including Lot 
6, for release by the Sharps. 
8. Because the plaintiffs1 material and continuing 
breaches of the parties' Contract preceded timely plaintiffs' 
requests for reconveyance of Lot 6, the roadway and the un-
platted acreage, defendants were not obligated to reconvey Lot 
6, the roadway and the unplatted acreage. 
9. The Sharps were justified in and were excused from 
performance under the Contract to reconvey Lot 6, the roadway 
or the unplatted acreage shown on the final plat of to the 
plaintiffs because the plaintiffs were in breach of the par-
ties1 Contract at the time such reconveyances were requested. 
10. Alternatively, the Sharps1 execution of the Consent 
to Record the final plat of and the CCRs constituted a release 
of the roadway shown on such plat in accordance with para-
graphs 3 and 5 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms. 
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11. The execution of the Consent to Record by the Sharps 
and the subsequent recordation of the final plat and the CCRs 
created a non-exclusive appurtenant easements to run with the 
land, as a covenant running with the land or as an equitable 
servitude, as the case may be, in favor of and for the use and 
benefit of the unplatted acreage and the owners and purchasers 
thereof (including the Sharps), and their invitees, guests, 
heirs and successors in interest, for utilities and for access 
to and the right to use as a means for ingress and egress for 
vehicular and pedestrian access over, under and across the 
private roadway (White Pine Lane) shown on the recorded final 
plat, and a non-exclusive appurtenant easement to run with the 
land, as a covenant running with the land or as an equitable 
servitude, as the case may be, in favor of and for the use and 
benefit of White Pine Ranches Phase I and the owners and pur-
chasers thereof (including the Sharps) and their heirs and 
successors in interest for water lines, water tank and water 
systems over, under and across the Subject Property near the 
southwest corner of the unplatted acreage as shown on the 
final recorded plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I. 
12. The Sharps are estopped to deny the dedication of 
White Pine Lane, pursuant to the final recorded plat, for the 
private use of the parcel owners, their invitees and guests, 
subject to the CCRs and the non-exclusive appurtenant easement 
for the use and benefit of the unplatted acreage described in 
Conclusion No* 11 above. Further, the Sharps are estopped to 
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deny the non-exclusive utility easement also described in Con-
clusion No. 11 above. 
13. The Sharps', by the execution of the Consent to Re-
cord, are estopped to deny the operative and legal effect of 
the recordation of the final plat and CCRs and the rights and 
obligations of the owners of PUD lots as set forth in the re-
corded final plat and CCRs for White Pine Ranches Phase I. 
The final recorded plat and CCRs and the non-exclusive ease-
ments set forth in Conclusion No. 11 above shall remain in 
full force and effect, and not be affected by the foreclosure 
ordered herein, a purchase at the Sheriff's Sale, or a subse-
quent redemption of the subject premises, other than a com-
plete redemption thereof by the plaintiffs herein coupled with 
plaintiffs1 declaration for the extinguishment of the non-
exclusive easement in favor of the unplatted acreage, 
14. Owners and purchasers of the unplatted acreage (in-
cluding the Sharps), and their successors in interest are en-
titled to use of the private roadway (White Pine Lane) for 
access to the unplatted acreage of the Subject Property as set 
forth in the legal description attached hereto as Exhibit "A" 
and incorporated by reference herein, as a result of the 
mutual intent and agreements between the parties to grant to 
the Sharps the use of the roadway, which agreement was memori-
alized by the letters of Heaton and Felton and evidenced by 
the part performance and reliance of the Sharps on such let-
ters and agreements in executing the Consent to Record. 
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15. General partners in a partnership are bound by the 
actions of other partners taken on behalf of the partnership 
and by the actions of the partnership itself* 
16. The language in paragraph 7 of the Memorandum of 
Closing Terms "pro rata cost to the purchaser" is ambiguousf 
necessitating the use of extrinsic evidence to interpret the 
same. 
17* The extrinsic evidence presented at trial demon-
strated that the parties intended to allow the Sharps, at 
their request, one connection each to both the culinary water 
and sewer systems when and if such systems are available and 
operational. 
18. The construction costs of the culinary water and 
sewer systems claimed by the plaintiffs are not reasonable, in 
violation of the reasonable value rule. 
19. Seven years is an unreasonable time within which to 
complete the culinary water and sewer systems and require the 
Sharps to mandatorily hook into these systems, which systems 
still are not yet operational. The Sharps are not obligated, 
but have the option, to hook into the culinary water and sewer 
systems should such systems become operational. 
20. It is an unreasonable interpretation of the language 
"pro rata costs" in the Memorandum of Closing Terms and the 
earlier language in the Earnest Money delineating "the same 
per-hook-up price" to require the Sharps to pay 1/13 of the 
exorbitant construction costs for culinary water and sewer 
hook-ups. Such an interpretation would recast the Sharps as 
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developers rather than the mere sellers of Subject Property 
that they were and intended to be in this transaction. 
21. A reasonable fee to be paid by the Sharps to the 
plaintiffs for a connection to the culinary water and sewer 
systems is $2,000.00 each. 
22. The inclusion of Lots 1-5 in the initial Notice of 
Default (Exhibit 55) and Notice of Trustee's Sale (Exhibit 
56) on behalf of the Sharps was inadvertent, unintentional and 
without malice. 
23. There was no improper holding by the Sharps of any 
requested reconveyance, but even if there were, it was not 
done in bad faith. The Sharps acted in reliance on the advice 
of their counsel, and did so in good faith. 
24. Alternatively, the Sharps did not improperly withhold 
reconveyances and plaintiffs have failed to establish a cause 
of action for failure to reconvey under U.C.A. §57-1-33 <. 
U.C.A. §57-1-33 is applicable only when a beneficiary refuses 
to request a reconveyance within 30 days after written demand 
therefor is made by the Trustor. The Sharps requested the 
Trustee to reconvey Lots 1-5 on or about January 18, 1984, and 
because of plaintiffs1 subsequent breaches were under no obli-
gation to reconvey the remainder of the Subject Property. 
25. As a result of plaintiffs' breaches of the Contract, 
the Sharps were entitled to record all of the Notices of De-
fault and Notices of Sale described in the Findings against 
the Subject Property. 
~
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26. The Sharps acted in good faith and not maliciously in 
having recorded the Notices of Default and the Notices of Sale 
and in refusing to reconvey Lot 6 and the unplatted acreage. 
27. The plaintiffs have not established a cause of action 
for slander of title against the Sharps. The Sharps did not 
act maliciously or cause any special damages to the plain-
tiffs. 
28. All of the damages, including, without limitation, 
those under U.C.A. §57-1-33, claimed by the plaintiffs are too 
remote, conjectural and speculative. The plaintiffs have 
failed to establish they have suffered actual damages result-
ing from any alleged breach by the Sharps, and this Court con-
cludes no such breach by the Sharps occurred. 
29. The attorney's fees incurred by the Sharps in this 
matter through August 31, 1988 in the amount of $144,469.75 
are reasonable and the Sharps are entitled to an award of the 
same. Further, the Sharps are entitled to supplement and aug-
ment this amount by affidavit for their reasonable attorney's 
fees incurred after August 31, 1988 in preparation of the 
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, in responding to any post-
trial motions, in collecting said Judgment by execution or 
otherwise, and, if necessary, after prevailing on any appeal. 
30o The Sharps are entitled to their costs of court in 
the amount as assessed or taxed pursuant to U.R.C.P. 54 and to 
post-judgment interest as provided by law. 
31. By virtue of the significant and material breaches of 
the Contract by the plaintiffs, the Sharps are entitled to 
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judgment against Saunders, Felton, Interstate Rentals, Inc. 
and Norton, jointly and severally, in the following amounts: 
a. i. Principals $ 371,739.35 
ii. Interest through 
March 22, 1988: $ 171,033.54 
iii. Late payment charge: $ 14,869.57 
TOTAL: $ 557,642.46 
together with interest thereon at the per diem rate of 
$183.32 from and after March 22, 1988. 
b. i. Trustee's fees: 
ii. Court Costs: 
iii. Attorneys1 fees through 
August 31, 1988: 
together with interest thereon at the rate of 10% per 
annum from the date of expenditure by the Sharps until 
paid by plaintiffs. 
c. Delinquent property taxes: $ 20,368.62 
together with interest and penalties assessed thereon as 
provided by law, property taxes accruing for 1988, and 
post-judgment interest thereon at the rate of 12% per 
annum. 
32. As a result of the significant and material breaches 
of the Contract by the plaintiffs, the Temporary Restraining 
Order entered in the above captioned matter by the Honorable 
Judith M. Billings on September 4, 1986 was wrongfully issued 
and the Sharps are entitled to have it lifted and dissolved. 
33. The Sharps are entitled to be paid the bond posted by 
plaintiffs with the Summit County Clerk in September, 1986 in 
the amount of $2,400 and to be paid from the security posted 
by Tracy Collins Bank in the amount of $28,570.63 for their 
interest, attorney's fees and other damages incurred as a re-
sult of the issuance of the wrongful Temporary Restraining 
Order, and for which amounts the Sharps are not secured by the 
fair market value of the Subject Property* 
34o The Sharps are entitled to have Lot 6 as described in 
the final recorded plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I and the 
unplatted property more particularly described on Exhibit "A" 
attached hereto or such portions thereof as may be sufficient 
to pay the amounts found to be due and owing under the Judg-
ment, together with interest as set forth hereinabove and 
accrued costs herein, and expenses of sale, sold at public 
auction by the Sheriff of Summit County, State of Utah, in the 
manner prescribed by law for such sales; that said Sheriff, if 
and when the subject premises are sold by him, out of the pro-
ceeds of such sale shall retain first his costs, disbursements 
and commission, and then pay to the Sharps, or to their attor-
neys, the accrued and accruing costs of this action, then said 
sums for the Sharps' attorney's fees, and the amount owing to 
the Sharps for principal, interest, costs and expenses of sale 
and maintenance, taxes, assessments and/or insurance premiums, 
together with accrued interest thereon, or so much of said 
sums as said proceeds will pay, and that the surplus, if any, 
shall be accounted for and paid over to the Clerk of this 
-38- 0G12&P 
38 
S 
< 
* $ 
*« 2 C O O U N 
Court subject to this Court's further order. 
35. All persons having an interest in the subject premis-
es shall have the right, updn producing satisfactory proof of 
interest, to redeem the same within the time provided by law 
for such redemption; that from and after the expiration of the 
period of redemption as provided by law, that the plaintiffs 
above named, and each of them, and all persons claiming by, 
through or under them, or any of them, shall be forever barred 
and foreclosed of all right, title, interest and estate in and 
to the subject premises, and that from and after the delivery 
of the Sheriff's Deed to the subject premises that the 
grantees named therein be given possession thereof. 
36. If a deficiency results after due and proper applica-
tion of the proceeds of such Sheriff's Sale, the Sharps are 
entitled to be awarded a personal judgment against Saunders, 
Felton, Norton and Interstate Rentals, Inc., and each of them, 
jointly and severally, for the full amount of such deficiency. 
37. The Sharps are entitled to have the right, at their 
request, to one connection to both plaintiffs' culinary water 
and sewer systems on White Pine Ranches Phase I for a connec-
tion fee of $2,000 each. 
38. The Sharps are entitled to have the Complaint of the 
plaintiffs dismissed, no cause of action. 
DATED this _fyy€ay of WT
 m, 1988. 
TTEST 
ON KINDLEY 
Cterk 
By Dept-^y Gicrk 
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Donald J. Winder, Esq. (#3519) 
Kathy A. F. Davis, Esq. (#4022) 
Tamara K. Prince, Esq. (#5224) 
WINDER & HASLAM 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendants Sharps 
2 C 1338 
C:sr'- Z-i D:sl Court 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEON H. SAUNDERS; ROBERT 
FELTON; J. RICHARD REES; 
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT 
CORPORATION, a Utah corpora-
tion; WHITE PINE RANCHES, a 
Utah general partnerhip; 
WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, a 
Utah general partnership, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN C. SHARP, and GERALDINE 
Y. SHARP; ASSOCIATED TITLE 
COMPANY, as Trustee, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
JOHN C. SHARP, and GERALDINE 
Y. SHARP, 
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT FELTON, LEON H. 
SAUNDERS; J. RICHARD REES; 
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT 
CORPORATION, a Utah corpora-
tion; KENNETH R. NORTON dba 
^ R . Q>* Ho. a%3b 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C87-1621 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
INTERSTATE RENTALS, INC., 
and PAUL H. LANDES, indivi-
dually; WHITE PINE RANCHES, 
a Utah general partnership, 
and WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, 
a Utah general partnership, 
Counterclaim-Defendants, 
This cause came on for trial before the Honorable 
J. Dennis Frederick on January 28, 1988 through January 29, 
1988 and March 22, 1988 through March 25, 1988, with the de-
fendants John C. and Geraldine Y. Sharp (hereinafter the 
"Sharps") appearing by counsel Donald J. Winder, Kathy A. F. 
Davis and Tamara K. Prince, the latter being admitted pro hac 
vice, and plaintiffs White Pine Ranches, White Pine Enter-
prises, Leon H. Saunders (hereinafter "Saunders"), Robert 
Felton (hereinafter "Felton"), J. Richard Rees and Saunders 
Land Investment Corporation appearing by counsel Robert M. 
Anderson, Glen D. Watkins and Mark R. Gaylord. Counterclaim 
defendant Kenneth R. Norton ("Norton") appeared through his 
counsel John B. Anderson, only to introduce a Stipulation and 
Indemnification Agreement between plaintiffs and counterclaim 
defendant Norton. Defendant Associated Title was never served 
in this action. Counterclaim defendant Paul H„ Landes (here-
inafter "Landes") was never served in this action* 
Having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DE-
CREED that plaintiffs1 Complaint be dismissed, no cause of 
action* 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Saunders, Felton, Interstate Rentals, Inc. and Norton are in-
debted, jointly and severally, to the Sharps in the following 
amounts : 
ao i. Principal: $ 371,739*35 
ii. Interest through 
March 22, 1988: $ 171,033.54 
iii. Late payment charge: $ 14,869*57 
TOTAL: $ 557,642*46 
together with interest thereon at the per diem rate of 
$183.32 from and after March 22, 1988. 
b. i. Trustee's fees: 
ii. Court Costs: 
iii. Attorneys' fees through 
August 31, 1988: 
together with interest thereon at the rate of 10% per 
annum from the date of expenditure by the Sharps until 
paid by plaintiffs. 
c. Delinquent property taxes: $ 20,368.62 
together with interest and penalties assessed thereon as 
provided by law, property taxes accruing for 1988, and 
post-judgment interest thereon at the rate of 12% per 
annum* 
$ 
$ 
$ 
1,803.80 
2 ,881 .04 
144 ,088 .75 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this 
Judgment shall be supplemented and augmented in the amount of 
the Sharps' reasonable attorney's fees as established by affi-
davit and as incurred after August 31, 1988 in preparation of 
the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, in responding to any 
post-trial motions, in collecting said Judgment by execution 
or otherwise, and after prevailing in any appeal. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Temporary Restraining Order entered in the above captioned 
matter by the Honorable Judith M. Billings on September 4, 
1986 was wrongfully issued and it is hereby lifted and dis-
solved. The Sharps are hereby awarded judgment against the 
bond posted by plaintiffs with the Summit County Clerk in Sep-
tember, 1986 in the amount of $2,400.00 and against the secur-
ity posted by Tracy Collins Bank with the Clerk of this Court 
in the amount of $28,570.63, and for which amounts the plain-
tiffs are not secured by the fair market value of the subject 
premises. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Lot 6 as 
described in the final recorded plat of White Pine Ranches 
Phase I and the unplatted property more particularly described 
on Exhibit "A" attached hereto or such portions thereof as may 
be sufficient to pay the amounts found to be due and owing 
under this Judgment, together with interest as set forth here-
inabove and accrued costs herein, and expenses of sale, be 
sold at public auction by the Sheriff of Summit County, State 
of Utah, in the manner prescribed by law for such sales; that 
said Sheriff, if and when the subject premises are sold by 
him, out of the proceeds of such sale shall retain first his 
costs, disbursements and commission, and then pay to the 
Sharps, or to their attorneys, the accrued and accruing costs 
of this action, then said sums for the Sharps1 attorneys' 
fees, and the amount owing to the Sharps for principal, in-
terest, costs and expenses of sale and maintenance, taxes, 
assessments and/or insurance premiums, together with accrued 
interest thereon, or so much of said sums as said proceeds 
will pay, and that the surplus, if any, shall be accounted for 
and paid over to the Clerk of this Court subject to this 
Court's further orders 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all per-
sons having an interest in the subject premises shall have the 
right, upon producing satisfactory proof of interest, to re-
deem the same within the time provided by law for such redemp-
tion; that from and after the expiration of the period of re-
demption as provided by law, that the plaintiffs above named, 
and each of them, and all persons claiming by, through or un-
der them, or any of them, shall be forever barred and fore-
closed of all right, title, interest and estate in and to the 
subject premises, and that from and after the delivery of the 
Sheriff's Deed to the subject premises that the grantees named 
therein be given possession thereof0 I 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that if a 
deficiency results after due and proper application of the 
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proceeds of such Sheriff's Sale, the Sharps are hereby awarded 
a personal judgment against Saunders, Felton, Norton and 
Interstate Rentals, Inc., and each of them, jointly and sev-
erally, for the full amount of such deficiency. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Sharps shall have the right, at their request, to one connec-
tion to both plaintiffs1 culinary water and sewer systems on 
White Pine Ranches Phase I for a connection fee of $2,000 
each. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that a non-
exclusive appurtenant easement shall run with the land, as a 
covenant running with the land or as an equitable servitude, 
as the case may be, in favor of and for the use and benefit of 
the unplatted acreage described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto 
and incorporated herein by reference and the owners and pur-
chasers thereof (including the Sharps) and their invitees, 
guests, heirs and successors in interest, for utilities and 
for access to and the right to use as a means for ingress and 
egress for vehicular and pedestrian access over, under and 
across the private roadway (White Pine Lane) shown on the re-
corded final plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I, recorded with 
the Summit County Recorder; and a non-exclusive appurtenant 
easement to run with the land, as a covenant running with the 
land or as an equitable servitude, as the case may be, in 
favor of and for the use and benefit of White Pine Ranches 
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Phase I and the owners and purchasers thereof (including the 
Sharps) and their heirs and successors in interest for water 
lines, water tank and water systems over, under and across the 
subject premises near the southwest corner of the unplatted 
acreage as also shown on the final recorded plat of White Pine 
Ranches Phase I. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
final plat and Declaration of Protective Covenants recorded 
for White Pine Ranches Phase I with the Summit County Record-
er's Office and the non-exclusive easements set forth above 
shall remain in full force and effect, and not be affected by 
the foreclosure ordered herein, a purchase at the Sheriff's 
Sale, or a subsequent redemption of the subject premises, 
other than a complete redemption thereof by the plaintiffs 
herein coupled with plaintiffs' declaration for the ex-
tinguishment of the non-exclusive easement in favor of the 
unplatted acreage. 
00li| 
Beginning a t a point South 89 degrees 43 ,36".West along the 
North l i n e of Lot 8, 175.42 f e e t from the corner of Lots 1 
and 8, a brass cap s e t by the U.S. General Land Office, sa id 
brass cap a l so being South 00 degrees 19'4 6" West along 
s e c t i o n l i n e 1336,14 fee t from the Northeast, corner of 
S e c t i o n 1, Township 2 South, Range 3 East , Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian; and running thence South 89 degrees 43*36" 
West along the North l i n e of Lot 7 and 8 2948.98 f ee t t o the 
Northwest corner of Lot 7; thence South 00 degrees 13 l 29 w 
East along the West l i n e of Lot 7, 1312.84 feet to the • 
Southwest-corner of Lot 7; thence North 89 degrees 47 f41r t 
East along the South l i n e of Lot 7, 832.67 feet; thence 
North 61 degrees 00'00" East 1956.90 f e e t ; thence Ncrth 47 
degrees 33'IS" East 462.75 f e e t ; thence North- 42 degrees 
44 ! 40 , f East 85.63 feet to the point of beginning. 
LESS and excepting White Pine Ranches, Phase I , a Planned Besidential 
Development/ according to the official plat thereof on fi le and of 
record in the Summit County Eecorder's Office, State of Utah. 
* A .f - - - - * «*> 
TabC 
UwOffteM 
SPEOALE & FSLTON 
Sulx. 220 CaortSnmd Row** C««w 
324 South Saw Sw«t 
SjJtUk«CSty.Ua»> 8*111 
801 389-9216 
June 30, 1932 
Mr. John Sharp 
Dear Mr. Sharp: 
1982, f c r the 
he r s t a l payment 
Purchase of the .Property i n V ; n ; l s 2 > 6 l l . 0 6 pr inc ipa l anc 
cf S203.177.5S i s w m p o M d o . ^ ^
 a p p r c v a l w e 
S i l 5 . 5 6 6 . 6 4 i - ^ s ; f ;* V ^ h e r e l e a s e s for the l o t s anc 
w i l l not i fy ycu t o obta in die 
the read as cer the conwract. 
Very tru l : 
Robert Feito: 
Rr/tp 
t i j c l u s u i ' c 
UwOffioM 
SPEC1ALE & FELTON 
Suits 220 Coofdlntfrd Rnandaj C*nt»r 
324. South Ststs Stmt 
Salt Lak* Oty,Utih 84111-2303 
801 359-9218 
July 19 f 1983 
John Keaton 
Attorney At Law 
424 East 500 South No. 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
He: Sharp Property 
Dear John, 
I was writing this letter to inquire about obtaining the 
release from Mr. and Mrs. Sharp for the road and five lots. 
Under the MEMORANDUM OF CLOSING TERM we are entitled to three 
lot plus one for the payment of each 3140.000.00 in principal. 
The principal has been reduced by over 3380,000.00 and under the 
terms of our agreement we would be entitled to the roadway and 
the five lots. 
At the present time the plat has not been filed and that 
is why I am making this request. As soon as we file the plat 
real estate taxes on this property are going to go up signifi-
cantly, which we would like to avoid until we have an actual 
buyer ready for one of the lots. At the same time, we are 
anxious to obtain an improvement loan and having title to the 
prescribed acreage would greatly assist us in that. 
We redesigned the subdivision a little bit so that it will 
be in tv.o pnases. The first phase constitutes exactly five lots 
and I am enclosing a copy of the plat for your perusal. It is 
this property plus the road which we would like to have deeded 
to the partnership. I think this substantially complies with 
our agreement and I would appreciate it if you would talk to Mr. 
Sharp about it« 
Also, you might tell Jack that I have put a horrendous 
amount of work dueling with Dr. Osguthorpe to guarantee the 
public nature of this road without any cost to him. At the pre-
sent time we have obtained Summary Judgment that the road is a 
public road three rods wide. It is anticipated that this mat-
ter will be appealed since Dr. Osguthorpe is as mad as a wet hen. 
Please let me know if this is alright and I will send the deeds 
over for your clients' signature. 
Very Trul^uYours, 
ROBERT FELTON 
RF/lm 
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Mr. John Sharp 
5068 Hollacay* Boulevard 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Re: White Pine Ranch Property 
Dear Jack: 
Enclosed please find., the Covenants, Conditions and 
Restrictions and the subdivision plat that Ey Saunders proposes 
to record with your approval. The subdivision plat subdivides 
only a portion of the property he purchased from you, 
specifically tne northern portions of the property, 3y Ey's 
signature, which 1 " will obtain to this letter prior to 
releasing your consent to the recordation of the subdivision 
plat, he agrees that you continue to have your right of 
approval with * regard to how the southern portion of the 
property is platted. Your signature on the enclosed consent 
document only acknowledges your approval of his recording the 
plat and the Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, copy here 
enclosed. At a later time in the near future Ey has indicated 
he will seek release of Lots 1 through 5 of the platted 
subdivision along with his road (white Pine Lane) and the ten 
and one-half foot strip to the County Road Commission. We will 
handle that matter when it is presented. For your information, 
I have reviewed the payments under the Note and find that he is 
entitled to tnc^e releases. When those releases are jnace, 
to your instruction we will insure th£~ righ-s are 
in White. Pine Lane rcr access for the southern 
cf_ the property purchased from you until your Deed of 
fuiiv caid. Please call me with anv Questions vcu may 
pursuant 
reservec 
portions 
Trust is 
have. 
*3incerely/f\ .
 v 
T N 
J C T T C . aeaclin 
rCH:se - c c ^ ^ v ^ d i 
r. s . PM*INC£ 
ROBERT M. YCATCS 
OAVIO S. OCU32AHUEJ 
OEN.S «• *SJ2,U» JON C M EATON 
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OF COUNSEL 
MAX K. MAWOUM 
LYLS M. \WARO 
Fir. John Sharp 
5068 Holladay Boulevard 
S a l t Lake C i ty , Utah 84117 
Re: White Pine Ranch Property 
Dear Jack: 
Enclosed please find the Covenants, Conditions and 
Restrictions and the subdivision plat that Hy Saunders proposes 
to record with your approval. The subdivision plat subdivides 
only a portion of the property he purchased from you, 
specifically the northern portions of the property. Bv Hv's 
signature, which I will ofrfain tQ ^ ^ l^<-^ pr"nr t"° 
releasing your consent io frfte re< -n£. 
agrees that *.U i 
i ^ f ^ - Your signature on the enclosed consent 
only acknowledges your approval of his recording the 
the Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, copy here 
At a later time in the near future Hy has indicated 
Lots 1 through 5 of the platted 
road (White Pine Lane) and the ten 
the County Road Commission. We will 
is presented. For your information, 
property 
document 
plat and 
enclosed. 
he will seek release of 
subdivision along with his 
and one-half foot strip to 
handle that matter when it x»
 fcuLC^^uw— ^ 
I have reviewed the payments under the Note and find that he is 
entitled to those releases. When those releases are made, 
your ^e^nrHnn we will insure taac rich_^ s_ are .pursuant to 
^z 
i n s t ruc t ion we wi l l 
:k_„?ine~ Lane ror 
y nnrrnaseo, iroin 
fullv paid. Please call me with any questions vou 
Sincerely, 
JCH:pe 
Encl. 
13983 
Jon Co Heaton 
J DEFENDANTS 
I EXHIBIT 
Approvec: 
Bv 
nrik?o 
Law OfRcas 
SPECIALS & FELTON 
Suit* 220 Coordinated Financial Canter 
324 South Stats StrMt 
Ssit Lafca Cty, Utah 347 71-2303 
801 359-9216 
November 21, 1983 
Jon Heaton 
Attorney at Law 
424 East 5th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RE: White Pine Ranch Property 
Dear Jon: 
Hy gave me your November 18, 1983 letter to Mr. John Sharp• We are in 
almost total agreement with that letter except for one item*, 
Tour letter states something regarding the reservation of an easement 
along White Pine Lane to be retained by Mr. Sharp for access. This was not 
parr of the agreement and is not acceptable since it would mean rewriting our 
Covenants at this late date. With the release of Lots 1 - 5 , Mr. Sharp only 
needs access to Lot 6 on the north half of the property. It is perfectly 
acceptable to us that he retain an easement over White Pine Lane to the 
southern part of his property as well as to Lot 6 from White Pine Canyon Road 
up to the western boundary of Lot 6. Actually, Mr. Sharp has no need for the 
reservation of any easement since all of the property which will not be 
released may be accessed from White Pine Canyon Road. Nevertheless, we think 
it is fair that an easement be retained as far as the western boundary of Lot 
6, 
You should be infomed that we have spent almost two years "fussing11 with 
the County for approval of this project and any future delays are 
intolerable. While I realize that we were late on a portion of the payment 
because Mr. Hunter did not contribute his partnership share, that problem has 
been rectified, including all penalty sums which were due. Tor that delay I 
can only apologize, but I must inform you that any delays in formalizing the 
items referred to in your letter and this letter will result in losing the 
construction financing on this project* That, as you may know, could be very 
expensive. 
In any event, Mr, Sharp has required that we live up to the * exact terms 
of our agreement * Z car. only insist that he now live up to the exact :ems as 
written. There is nc erevision for the reservation of an unnecessary easement 
across our road which would result in rewriting the covenants on the property, 
place an unreasonable burden upon the property to be conveyed, and very 
possibly cause us to lose our construction financing. 
In summary, I would just like to confirm our position that all rights of 
approval which Mr. and Mrs. Sharp retain pursuant to our original purchase 
contract certainly continue as to the southern portion of the property. I 
would again apologize for the late payment, but I certainly think we paid for 
it in full. The easement which Mr. Sharp retains should be limited to the 
property which is not deeded pursuant to the terms of the contract and we are 
certainly in agreement with that as described in this letter. 
Please have your client sign his consent to the recordation immediately 
since time is very crucial to our construction financing. 
Verj. truly yours, 
Robert Felton 
RF/tp 
cc: Hy Saunders 
1899 Long View Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
GOYO 
UwOflBcM 
SPECIALE & FELTON 
Suita 220 Cocrcfln*t*xd financial Cantac 
324 South Stitm Street 
Salt Late Oty, Utah 84111-2303 
801 359-9216 
November 21, 1983 
Jon Heaton 
Attorney at Law 
424 East 5th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RE: White Pine Ranch Property 
Dear Jon: 
Hy gave me your November 18, 1983 letter to Mr* John Sharp* We are in 
almost total agreement with that letter except for one item* 
Tour letter states something regarding the reservation of an easement 
along White Pine Lane to be retained by Hr. Sharp for access* This was not 
part of the agreement and is not acceptable since it would mean rewriting our 
Covenants at this late date* With the release of Lots 1 - 5 , Mr. Sharp only 
^ - O ^ . ^ needs access to Lot 6 on the north half of the property* It is perfectly 
t£ ^^ acceptable to us that he retain an easement over White Pine Lane to the 
southern part of his property as well as to Lot 6 from White Pine Canyon Road 
' * "• \^ up to the western boundary of Lot 6. Actually, Mr. Sharp has no need for the 
tf* reservation of any easement since all of the property which will not be 
released may be accessed from White Pine Canyon Road. Nevertheless, we think 
it is fair that an easement be retained as far as the western boundary of Lot 
" - >. 's; 6. 
\ ^ ^ 
^ \ V -'.. You should be informed that we have spent almost two years "fussing11 with 
^ >^ "-- the County for approval of this project and any future delays are 
£' f r^ intolerable. While I realize that we were late on a portion of the payment 
^* ,. because Mr. Hunter did not contribute his partnership share, that problem has 
£~ /. * been rectified, including all penalty sums which were due. For that delay I 
T
 •& 1/ can on^7 apologize, but I must inform you that any delays in formalizing the 
\ ^ items referred to in your letter and this letter will result in losing the 
construction financing on this project. That, as you may know, could be very •V X£f \ j expensive. 
^\" j In any event, Mr. Sharp has required that we live up to the exact terms 
O ' : (• of our agreement. I can only insist that he now live up to the exact terms as 
written. There is no provision for the reservation of an unnecessary easement 
A : » I ^ 
across our road which would result in rewriting the covenants on the property, 
place an unreasonable burden upon the property to be conveyed, and very 
possibly cause us to lose our construction financing. 
In summary, I would just like to confirm our position that all rights of 
approval which Mr. and Mrs. Sharp retain pursuant to our original purchase 
contract certainly continue as to the southern portion of the property. I 
would again apologize for the late payment, but I certainly think we paid for 
it in full. The easement which Mr. Sharp retains should be limited to the 
property which is not deeded pursuant to the terms of the contract and we are 
certainly in agreement with that as described in this letter. 
Please have your client sign his consent to the recordation immediately 
since time is very crucial to our construction financing. 
Ver^ truly yours, 
Robert Felton 
RF/tp 
cc: Hy Saunders 
1899 Long View Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Q072T 
Liw OfficM 
SPEC1ALE & FELTON 
Suiti 220 Coordinated Financial Cantar 
324 South Ststt Stnaat 
S«ft Uka Ory. Utah S4111-2303 
801 359-9216 
January 17, 1984 
John Heat on 
424 East 500 South 
Sa l t Lake City, Utah 84111 
RE: White Pine Ranches 
Dear John: 
Because of the t ime, expense, and requirements which Summit 
County has imposed upon us , i t appears tha t i t w i l l he 
impract ica l to develop the twelve (12) lo t s at White Pine as 
s i n g l e family r e s i d e n t i a l . I t is our i n t e n t to develop t a s t e f u l , 
mult i-family developments on the t h i r t y (30) acres which have not 
been plat ted* 
Would you p lease reaues t Mr. 
t h i s change in our o r i g i n a l p lan. 
Sharp for h i s consent as to 
I c e r t a in ly don ' t have any 
problem if he r e t a i n s some so r t of review so he p r o t e c t s proper ty 
and the development is not too obnoxious. What we plan to do i s 
to do a very t a s t e f u l and d i s c r e t e mult i - family development on 
the t h i r t y (30) acres which is the only way i t w i l l be 
economically f e a s i b l e . I would apprec ia te i t i f you would ask 
Mr. Sharp to send us h i s consent for t h i s change in concept. 
Verv t r u l y yours , 
Robert Fel ton 
RF/tp 
DEFENDANTS 
EXHIBIT 
0073 pi 1 
Uw Officts 
SPEC1ALE & FELTON 
Suiti 220 Coordinated Financial Camar 
324 South Stat* Street 
Sart Lik* Cry, Utah 34111-2303 
801 359-3216 
January 20, 1984 
John Heat on 
424 East 5 th South 
No. 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RE: Deeds to Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 
Dear John: 
Ky ta lked to me on January 20, 1984, and to my astonishment, 
to ld me t h a t we have not received the deed on our lo t s from Mr. 
Sharp. Would you p l e a s e c a l l me and confirm or explain what the 
s i t u a t i o n i s . 
I r e a l i z e t ha t t he deeds for t he roads may be d i f f i c u l t to 
do, but I am a t a complete loss as t o why the other deed h a s n ' t 
been rece ived . 
Very t r u l y yours , 
r-
Pobert Feltoti 
DEFENDANTS 
I EXHIBIT 
! 30— 
LavOfficst 
SPEC1ALE 81 FSLTON 
5 Trad Cantor. Suits 585 
Salt Lata Gty, Utah 84180 
(801)359-9216 
September 2£ , 1985 
Mr- John Sharo 
10 Vest 300 South 
Suite 201 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8M.01 
SZ: White Pine Ranches 
Dear Mr. Sharp: 
I received a Notice of Default regarding Ey's inability to 
pay his share of the June 30th payment to you. 
I wanted to touch base with you to assure you that I am not 
ignoring this problem and am very concerned since I have made my 
portion of the payment and am prepared to complete the final 
payment next year-
In any event, I wanted to assure you that every attempt is 
being made to resolve the problem and I should have a better idea 
in a couple of weeks as to the ability of the remaining interest 
to satisfy that obligation. 
When I have a better feel for what can be done I will give 
you a call and I would like to sit down and discuss it with you. 
Vezpy truly yours 
Robert Felton 
RF/to 
0375 
Law Offices 
SPEC1ALE & FELTON 
5 Triad Canter, Suits 585 
Salt Lain City. Utah 84180 
(801)359-9216 
February 2 4 , 1986 
Mr. J o h n Sharp 
3 0 0 0 Connor 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84103 
Dear J a c k ; 
I will try and explain to you the difficulties we have 
encountered regarding White Pine Canyon Road which has been one 
of the fundamental problems in the delay of our .project and is 
one of the causes of our inability to now complete the timely 
payments to you. 
When the property was purchased from you it was understood 
that there was a 49.5 foot right-of-way from the State KTghvay up 
to the property. We operated on that assumption when we 
purchased the property. 
In any event, as a condition of the approval of our 
development, Summit County imposed a requirement that we widen 
the County road in accordance with County standards to 24 foot 
driveable surface. After having us agree to that condition the 
County, and especially Mr. Strebel, informed us that D.A. 
Osguthorpe contested the existence of a County road and the 
width. The County was and continues to be unwilling to go to bat 
for us or pursue any legal remedies at all in regards to this 
road and, therefore, we were given the ultimatum that if we 
wanted to develop this property it was our problem to deal with 
Dr. Osguthorpe. 
As a result we were forced to file a lawsuit against 
Osguthorpe which finally ended up in a Summary Judgment 
proceeding in the summer of 1983, almost two years later. The 
District Court Judge stated that where Osguthorpe has property 
just below you the County road was 49.5 feet wide. 
Because of the financial constraints that this delay had 
placed upon us, in conjunction with other problems, we had no 
choice but to go ahead aad perform the required task, even though 
that case has now been appealed to the Supreme Court and should 
it be overruled we would be out of business. 
DEFENDANTS 
EXHIBIT 
>m 
I think you have to understand that at no time had anyone, 
yourself or the County, ever come to our assistance to help 
Vccomplish or solve this problem and the result is still up in 
the air almost five years after we started. 
There is another part of this dilemma which has further 
confused this issue. The County has used a tax-exempt 
description of a road three rods wide originating out of the 
Condas litigation in 1928 and 1980. Those cases described White 
Pine Canyon Road above us as a road three rods wide which appears 
to go right through the middle of your house. 
If you will look on the attached map you will see a red line 
which goes through the middle of your property. That is. the 
described White Pine Canyon Road as set forth in the County's 
tax-exempt description. The existing road is marked by the black 
line . 
If these problems are not enough, there has been a further 
complication. In 1956 Jim Ivers and his wife deeded the County a 
three road right-of-way to try and clear up any discrepancy in 
White Pine Canyon Road where it abutted their property. However/ 
because of a mistake by the surveyor, the road that was described 
does not conform exactly to that on the ground. If you will 
refer to the attached plat you will see the blue line which 
describes the description in the 1956 deeds. You will see that a 
majority of the description exists next to the long right-of-way 
coming off the State highway but at the bend appears to veer off 
the traveled surface somewhat. Also, the description does not 
join about half way up the straight-of-way. This problem, in and 
of itself, would not have bean crucial except for a secret 
arrangement which the County entered into with the Estate of Jim 
Ivers commencing in 1981 and culminating in 1983. 
You should keep in mind that during the period of 1981 to 
1983 we are actively involved in litigating the existence and 
width of a portion of White Pine Canyon Road with Dr. Osguthorpe 
on behalf of the County. 
In any event, in early 1981, Stan Strebel acting on behalf 
of the County enters into secret negotiations with the attorney 
for Jim Tver Sr.'s Estate to change the deeded right-of-way» In 
1981 the Estate of Jim Ivers and Jim Ivers delivered deeds to Mr. 
Strebel for property in White Pine Canyon Road which all lays 
within the fence line but is not even close to the 49*5 width of 
the right-of-way. In fact, the map which shows the property 
which Ivers has given back to the County by these deeds in 1981 
shows that the property is only 11 feet wide on one end of the 
road instead of 3 rods° 
The County, at no point, ever tells us or anyone else about 
this transaction to swap deeds with the Ivers. In any event, Mr. 
Strebel keeps the deeds in his office for two years while we are 
involved in trying to litigate this issue with Osguthorpe. 
0077 
On March 22, 1983 the Summit County Commission, once again 
without notice to anyone, authorizes the deeds to be recorded. I 
am enclosing a copy of the minutes of that day as well as a copy 
of the survey which describes the property which has now been 
deeded from Ivers to the County. In exchange for this the County 
deeded back the entire three rod right-of-way from 1956. This 
amounted to an exchange of over four acres for just over one acre 
of property by the County. 
Last summer Jim Ivers threatened to sue us for trespassing 
because he asserts that the road is only 24 feet wide and to 
support that kind of a surface our pushing road base beyond the 
24 feet was a trespass. 
To keep you fully informed, I should note that in the 1956 
deeds from Ivers to the County there was a reversionary clause 
that stated if the County didn't use the road or maintain it, it 
would revert back to Ivers. There was no time limit on that and 
you can clearly see that a majority of the description did lie in 
the maintained County road portion. 
One now has to ask the question as to where everyone sits 
and as to the road issue alone what has been the problem. If you 
were to look at the map it appears that there is now a road from 
the highway up through Ivers' which varies from 11 to 37 feet 
wide. The County has given up a 49.5 foot right-of-way without 
notice to anyone, there is a case pending in the Utah Supreme 
Court which may completely shut down our project if it is lost 
because the road is not as represented, and there is a described, 
tax-exempt road which may go right through the middle of your 
hous e. 
I have tried to be as detailed in describing the problem of 
this road as I can, and I would be happy to get together with you 
or Jon and tell you in more detail, but the bottom line is that 
this road mess has been a contributing factor to the delay in 
this project and my personal opinion is that we have been hung 
out to dry by everyone. 
While it is unnecessary for me to go into the legal 
ramifications of this mess, I think the ethical considerations 
are certainly obvious. 
One thing I should mention is that, against our wishes, the 
County made us install a sewer line up this Canyon which services 
your property as well as our. This line will service between 
2,000 and 4,000 hook-ups and we had to put it in for our six 
units. 
The transaction I have described with the Ivers family has 
probably narrowed the road to a degree that we will not be able 
to recover sums on hook-up fees, nor will this Canyon be able to 
be developed now to the capacity of the sewer because the roads 
would have to be 44 feet wide and the County has given away its 
right-of-way. 
I understand that you may question your responsibility in 
this action and we are certainly not blaming you as being 
directly responsible, but it was represented to Hy prior to 
buying this property that there wasTa "49".5""foot roa*d right-of-way 
up the Canyon which apparently does not exist and that fact has 
been one of the substantial causes of our problems in this 
development. 
I hope this letter is informative and you can be considerate 
or our problems as well as the factual cause, whether that be 
intentional, malfeasance (Summit County) or an implied or omitted 
condition of this development. 
I look forward to working with you in the future, and if you 
have been out of town I would urge you to give a Hy a call since 
he is anxious to get in touch with you and see what can be worked 
out • 
Very /truly yoyts?, / 
Robert Felton 
RF/tp 
Enclosure 
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Law Offices 
SPECIALE & FELTON 
5 Triad Canter, Suita 585 
Salt Lake Cry. Utah 84180 
(801)359-9216 
February 27, 1986 
Mr. John Sharp 
3000 Connor Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
RE: Notice of Default and Contract 
Dear Jack: 
I received notice that the Trustee's Sale has again been 
scheduled for April. Since it appears inevitable that we will 
have to litigate the contractual rights of the parties I wanted 
to make sure that our position was clear to you. 
The first problem that I need to address is that if we 
institute litigation, which now seems inevitable either in the 
form of a lawsuit or a bankruptcy, I will be requesting Prince, 
Yeates to withdraw as counsel. The reason for this is that 
Howell Investment Company is a partner in the remaining 30 acres 
and Jon Heaton also represents the Howells. Because of this 
conflict of interest I would appreciate knowing the name of your 
new attorney and maybe we can get some of the preliminary matters 
worked out should court action be necessary. 
The other items which present a problem are, besides the 
road problem which I have addressed in a separate letter, the 
fact that you have not deeded us the property to which we were 
entitled and, also, under the terms of the contract you owe us 
approximately $ 73 , 000 . 00• for the cost of water and sewer hook-ups 
which are now available. 
Under the terms of the contract we have paid for 
approximately 7.5 acres of property located in the unrecorded 
area. In addition, in the event you did not pay us the sums due 
for the water and sewer, which we are hereby requesting, and thus 
that sum/approximately $73,000.00,13 applied to the amounts 
alreaay paid, you would be required to deed us 10 acres of 
property. Before I get an exact survey of the property I would 
appreciate it if you would let me know which of the two 
alternatives you would like to pursue. 
If DEFENDANTS f EXHIBIT I 3 <T 
Enclosed with this letter is a breakdownof the costs for 
the water and sewer line dated November 18, 1985. In addition to 
those sums, additional sums for drilling the well in the amount 
of $85,000.00 to $100,000.00 was expended and engineering costs 
in the sum of approximately $75,000.00. The total cost for 
engineering of this project comes to approximately $168,000.00. 
The last item which concerns me is your apparent failure to 
deed the road located in White Pine Ranches Phase I which was 
suppose to have been done approximately three years ago. 
As you can tell, there are substantial terms of the contract 
which were caused by you and have existed for some years and I 
wanted to give you notice of these defects so that there is no 
allegation that you didn't know about them. 
We would be happjr to provTd^^-accounting information and 
survey information if you will put in writing that you 
acknowledge liability, but I don't want to >pend a lot of time 
and money if you do not plan to comply. 
Also, since the described County road apparently goes 
through your living room and is not located whede it is 
designated, I would appreciate it if you would comply with the 
contract and deed the road to the County in conformance with the 
contract. 
I would be happy to discuss this matter with you or your new 
attorney at any time, but I would appreciate a written response 
as to your intentions. 
Very pruly 
y / / I 
Robert Felton 
RF/tp 
cc: Jon Heaton 
Hy Saunders 
0081 
Lew Offices 
SPECIALE & FELTON 
5 Triad Center. Suite 585 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
(801)359-9216 
May 7 , 1986 
John and Geraldine Sharp 
3000 Conner 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
RE: White Pine Ranches 
Dear Mr- Sharp: 
1 have not heard from you or your new attorney as to my 
February 24, 1986 letter. I would like to reiterate the position 
set forth in that letter, as well as alert you to a couple of 
other problems which have arisen. 
The first problem is that your failure to deed us the road 
and lot 6 as provided for in the contract are about to impair a 
sale of that lot and I would again request that you immediately 
deed us the road and the lot as provided for- Those items were 
to have been conveyed to us some years ago. 
The last item which I wish to clear up is any dispute about 
the fact that you will not deed us any property for which we have 
paid on the left side of our road because it is not platted. 
We are in a position to prepare and obtain approval of that 
plat immediately. If you will acquiesce, in writing, that you 
intend to comply with those terms of the contract, we will 
immediately perform that act. 
I find it quite disturbing that we have received no response 
from you whatsoever, in spite of the fact that Hy has requested 
your input. It is my understanding that Mr. Heaton was 
instructed not to respond. 
While you may know that Hy has his own difficulty which 
distrubed me from my position as a member of the partnership and 
a purchaser of the property, I am equally upset by your disregard 
of the contract term and your apparent unwillingness to attempt 
to resolve this matter. 
1 DEFENDANTS EXHIBIT 37 
It appears to me that unless the parties sit down, recognize 
the problems and responsibilities which both sides of this matter 
bear, that some judge or jury is going to be making a decision on 
this case and that title to the property is going to be clouded 
for years* 
I would urge you to get in contact with Hy to see if the 
differences in this matter cannot be resolved, but maybe this is 
just one of those cases where wefre going to have to let someone 
else make the decisions for us* 
Robert Felton 
RF/tp 
cc: Hy Saunders 
0083 
Law Office* 
SPECIALE & FELTON 
6 TRIAD CENTER. SUITE 8 8 8 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 8 4 1 8 0 
801~889-93S6 
March 24, . 1987 
S t e v e Clegg 
P .0 . Box 4365 
Park C i t y , Utah 84060 
RE; White Pine 
Dear S t e v e : 
You asked me to wri te you a l e t t e r regarding some confusion 
as to the l i t i g a t i o n as i t r e l a t e s to the three l o t s you have 
l i s t e d in White Pine Ranches* 
The current l i t i g a t i o n does not a f f e c t the marketabi l i ty or 
encumber that p r o p e r t y . I t i s e s s e n t i a l l y an act ion for a refund 
and damages as a r e s u l t of the extraordinary delays but the 
s e r v i c e s and water are done and guaranteed to those l o t s . 
The s t a t u s of the water i s that the water system i s 
c o m p l e t e l y done and water r i g h t s have been transferred to the 
w e l l and* w i l l be a v a i l a b l e for those three l o t s . 
The sewer system i s completed and the only charge w i l l be 
the hook-up f ee a s s e s s e d by S n y d e r v i l l e Basin Sewer Improvement 
D i s t r i c t . The sewer l i n e i s completed a l l the way through the 
development to the highway. The e l e c t r i c i t y w i l l be i n s t a l l e d as 
soon as anyone wants to build t h e r e . 
None of the pending l i t i g a t i o n a f f e c t s the three l o t s you 
have l i s t e d and the water and sewer are complete and ready to go . 
Robert Fe l toa 
RF/tp 
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WINDER&HASIAM DONALDJ. WINDER 
bUlTE 4004 
175 WEST 200 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101 
(801) 322-2222 
September 30, 19 86 
Mr. Steven E. Clyde 
Attorney at Law 
CLYDE & PRATT 
American Towers, Suite 200 
77 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: Sharp adv. White Pine Ranches 
Dear Steve: 
My clients wish to make their position abundantly clear re-
garding any potential sale of Lot 6 or of any of the unplat-
ted acreage. My clients will not hinder or in any way pre-
vent a sale of such property, upon reasonable terms. If 
they prevail in the litigation or otherwise and obtain a 
return of the property, such a sale could only be of bene-
fit to them. 
Accordingly, should Bob Sammons want to close on a purchase 
of Lot 6 or should you receive any other serious offer, 
please let me know immediately. We will make every effort 
to promptly take all steps reasonable under the circumstances 
to work with your clients concerning a sale of Lot 6 or the 
unplatted acreage. 
Sincerely yours, 
DNALD J. WINDER 
DJW/cas 
cc: John t . and Geraldine Y. Sharp 
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SPEOALE & FRTON 
Suits 220 CFS RnancW Cirnr 
324 South S m StrMC 
Sail Ufc* Oty,Ut*j S*111-2301 
(801) 36&-t21* 
July 26, 1984 
Summit County 
Governoring Board 
of Summit County Commissioners 
Gentlemen: 
The following claim is submitted for your consideration by 
White Pine Ranches, a Utah partnership. The submission of this 
claim should not be construed to imply that claimant believes it 
is necessary or required since the causes of action giving rise 
to our claim do not, in our opinion, require this notice. 
In any event, the claimant, by and through its partner and 
attorney, Robert Felton, submit the following claim: 
1. The sum of $117,297.15 being the costs of the off-site 
sewer which we were, under protest, required to install to 
service the subdivision. This sum is arrived at due to our 
engineers estimate as to the cost and is supported by the 
attached letter. The basis for this claim is fundamentally 
described in my September 16* 1J98J* letter to the Board of 
Commissioners, a'copy of which is attacned to this claim. 
Further, the basis for tnis cxaim violates OMT rights W 
guaranteed under the laws of the State of Utah as well as the 
Constitution of Utah and the Constitution of the United States. 
While there are numerous cases supporting our position as will 
become apparent in the event litigation is necessary the 
fundamental basis is found is a statement by the Utah Supreme 
Court in that a municipal fee "related to services lifce water and 
sewer must not require a newly developed property to bear more 
than their equitable share of the capital share of costs in 
relationship to benefits conferred*. Banberrv Development v« 
South Jordan, Utah, 631 P2d 899 (1981). The Banberry decision 
sets forth seven factors in determining the reasonableness of the 
imposition of capital construction on newly developed property 
and at the requirement of the off-site sewer, in light of the 
fact tha£ the Utah State Health Department was in a position to 
approve the use of septic tanks which were authorized by State 
law and by ordinances of the County renders this requirement 
ur.reascr.ab le. 
r\'\^n 
Damages to be determined f*rjthe 
plow the White Pine Canyon Road 
It is anticipated that becaua 
or more sales and anticipate the damages, .lossif^lprofitiM^S^ 
interest at between $250,000 and $500,000. 
— - The discriminatory application of zoning lavs *with the 
specific intent to extract unreasonable demands from claimant mm 
veil as damage or prevent claimant's project from being 
accomplished. Claimant shall assert claims against the County 
and its employees pursuant to Section 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 et seq. 
for vhich no claim need be filed vith this County Commission. 
Further, claimant shall allege damages for the loss of sale, 
reduction in business, and damages suffered in reduction to 
profit, incidental damages, loss of reputation, or otherwise 
because of the malicious and conserted misapplication and 
discrimination applied to claimant. Said acts on behalf of the 
County and its officers and agents acting in their official 
capacity or otherwise include, but are not limited to: (1) the 
imposition of unreasonable and extreme requirements to have the 
subdivision approved including litigating unnecessary claims; 
(2) discriminatory application of the lavs and ordinances of the 
State of Utah that other land owners were allowed to subdivide 
and develop property with no requirement as to improvements of 
access or municipal services or compliance with County or State 
law; (3) refusal to provide services, including snow plowing 
based upon discriminatory application and thereby depriving 
claimants of access to their property. 
Claimants assert that the damages and liability created by 
this continuing cause of action, to the best of claimant's 
ability, will be between $300,000.00 and $1,000,000.00. 
The foregoing claims may be in part or wholly asserted 
against Stan Strebel as an employee and against Synderville Basin 
Sewer Improvement District in that Utah case lav specifies that 
such special service district is a branch of county government. 
The foregoing claims are hereby submitted for your 
consideration. 
STATE OF UTAH 
C0UHTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
81139 
;U3SC2:BED and SWCRN to before ae, a notarv sublie, on this, 
0'JS7 
th« / July, 1984. _ 
\. »»*»f» Public .f . /i 
My Commission Expires: ff 
RF/tp 
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Robert Felton, 1056 
George H. Speciale, 3053 
5 Triad Center 
Suite 585 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Phone: (801) 359-9216 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
* * * * * * * * * 
WHITE PINE RANCHES, a 
partne rship, 
Plaintiff, 
V8 . 
SUMMIT COUNTY, RON PERRY, 
CLIFF BLONQUIST, and GERALD 
YOUNG, as Commissioners of 
Summit County, STAN STREBEL, 
individually and as Planning 
Director of Summit County, 
SNYDERVILLE BASIN SEWER 
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT, and 
JOHN DOES I through X, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
LEON H. SAUNDERS 
Civil No. C84-2090W 
* * * * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ss 
I, Leon Ho Saunders, being first duly sworn, depose and 
state; 
R0266 
7 . Based upon my e x p e r i e n c e as a r e a l e s t a t e d e v e l o p e r 
s p e c i a l i z i n g in d e v e l o p m e n t s i n Summit County , I a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t 
f i n a l approva l of White P i n e Ranches S u b d i v i s i o n , as s u b m i t t e d , 
would be had in or a b o u t J u n e , 1981 , a l l o w i n g two months e i t h e r 
way f o r u n f o r e s e e n c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 
8 . The r e l e v a n t market f o r e x c l u s i v e b u i l d i n g l o t i n the 
p r i c e range p r o j e c t e d f o r White P ine Ranches S u b d i v i s i o n i s cut 
of s t a t e buyers , p r i n c i p a l l y from the S t a t e of C a l i f o r n i a , and i n 
December, 1980, c o n t i n u i n g through the end of 1 9 8 1 , the marV.et 
f o r such l o t s was e x t r e m e l y a c t i v e . 
9 . From December , 1 9 8 0 , c o n t i n u i n g to the p r e s e n t , I hrve 
e n c o u n t e r e d c o n t i n u a l d e l a y i n g o i n g forward w i t h the p r o j e c t 
through d e l a y s i n the a p p r o v a l p r o c e s s , most of which were c a u i e d 
by the P lann ing Commiss ion and which might have been a v o i d e d or 
s a t i s f i e d at an e a r l i e r t i m e . 
10 . As a r e s u l t of t h e v a r i o u s d e l a y s , which are d e t a i l e d 
be low, the market f o r e x c l u s i v e b u i l d i n g l o t s i s now v i r t u a l l y 
n o n - e x i s t e n t , c o s t of improvements e s c a l a t e d to be s e v e r a l t imes 
what I had a n t i c i p a t e d , and much of the r e a l p r o p e r t y i n the 
p r o j e c t i s t h r e a t e n e d by f o r e c l o s u r e . 
1 1 . Owing to the v a r i o u s d e l a y s , i t became n e c e s s a r y t o 
reduce the scope of the p r o j e c t from t w e l v e (12) t o s i x ( 6 ) f i v e -
a c r e l o t s , and t o s e e k t o u t i l i z e s e p t i c tank sewage d i s p o s a l 
r a t h e r than c o n n e c t i n g t o t h e S n y d e r v i l l e B a s i n Sewer Improvement 
D i s t r i c t • 
0030 
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landowner's accountant that he has not been In the State of Utah 
since 1985 and has no plans to come back to Utah. Apparently I 
will be unable to get his approval. 
38. Plaintiff has incurred costs for the subdivision as 
f ©Hows: 
Construction Financing 
additional Engineering and Architectural Fees 
Water to Service Project Purchased 
from Outside Source 
Well Drilling 
Morley Construction Company for Additional 
Road Construction and Snovplowing 
$650,000.00 
$57,000.00 
$80,000.00 
$65,000,00 
$38,602.26 
Harper Excavating for Excavation and Road Base $11,641.00 
Armco Steel for Conduits for Road $4,470.25 
Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District $2,090.17 
for Engineering Fees (we still owe over $5,000) 
Bruce Ericksen for Tree Removal $350.00 
Steve Clyde for Legal Work for Transfer $4,227.01 
of Water Rights 
Roger Dean for Gravel for Well $794.33 
Bryce Montgomery for Hydrogeologlc Service $75.00 
Rhodes Brothers to Test Pump of Well $6,935.00 
C. & R. Sales for Additional Construction $1,949.45 
The total for these "municipal type services" is 
approximately $923,130.00, or $153,855.75 per lot, 
10 -
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DATED this / 7 — - day of March, 1986. 
QM± 
Leon H« Saunders 
Htkn^ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, the undersigned, do hereby represent that I am the signer 
of the foregoing instrument and that all information contained 
therein is true to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
s^Cc^i 
Leon H. Saunde rs 
(IJU^ A 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ss 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to' before me, a notary public, by Leon 
H. Saunders on this, the / / day of March, 1986. 
-r**"nrrv' 
f/$f W i V NOtary P u b l T r T V ' [\ 7 ,,J 
"J U-jA Residing at: Vl W\a (.J^X, M 
i Atri P <\5 • Cf 1 | i 
My \6-omniission Exjri.-f :es 
TS-flRr-V#j 
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Robert Feltou 1056 
George H. Speciale, 3053 
5 Triad Center 
Suite 585 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Phoue: 1801) 359-9216 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
* * * * * * * * * 
WHITE PINE RANCHES, a 
partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
SUMMIT COUNTY, RON PERRY, 
CLIFF BLONQUIST, and GERALD 
YOUNG, as Commissioners of 
Summit County, STAN STREBEL, 
individually and as Planning 
Director of Summit county, 
SNYDERVILLE BASIN SEWER 
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT, and 
JOHN DOES I through X, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * * 
Plaintiff complains of Defendants and alleges; 
I. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
lc This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U*S.C» §1337 of the 
First and Thiru Causes of Action of this Complaint which arise 
under "Sections 4 and 16 of the CLayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 915 and 
27, to enjoin the activities of Defendants hereinafter recited 
and to recover treble damages and the costs of suit, including 
reasonable attorney's fees, for injuries sustained by Plaintiff 
by reason of Defendants' violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U*S.C. 3^1 and 2. 
B02S4 
AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 
DAMAGES AND FOR DECLARATORY 
AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
Civil No. C84-2090W 
XVIII-
JURY DEMAND 
61. Pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Plaintiff demands a jury trial-
XIX. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Plaintiff demands judgment against the Defendants and each 
of them, 
1. Declariug that the conduct of the Defendants, and each 
of them, is unlawful, 
2o For general damages in an amount to be determined caused 
by Derendants' imposition of unlawful restrictions and conditions 
arising from Defendants' violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act, the Utah Anti-Trust Act, 42 U.S.C 1983, and the 
Constitution of the State of Utah, 
3. Plaintiff is entitled to damages for the reduction in 
value of their property caused by Defendants, loss of the 
property, reasonable cost of work performed, additional costs 
incurred as a result of the actions of the Defendants in a sura 
not less than Six Million Dollars ($6,000,000.00), 
4. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the Defendan:, 
Snydervilie Basin Sewer Improvement District for the value of tie 
benefit conferred upon them by the improvements unlawfully 
required to be installed by Plaintiff in an amount not less thai 
Seven Million Dollars ($7,000,000.00) representing the capital ;o 
be received by the Defendants from hook-up fees to the sewer 
installed by the Plaintiff, 
B0302 
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5. tor punitive damages in an amount treble the amount of 
general damages awarded Plaintiff or as otherwise deemed 
approp riate; 
6. For attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Section 4 of 
the Claycon Act, Utah Code Ann. §76-10-919, and 42 U.S.C. §1988, 
7. For injunctive relief to the extent justified by the 
proof, 
8. For such other and further relief as the Court deems 
just in the premises. 
DATED this /// day of March, 19S6o 
SPECIALE & FELTON 
Ro/bert Felton 
D0303 
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Robert Felton, 1056 
George H. Speciale. 3053 
5 Triad Center 
Suite 585 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Phone, (801) 359-9216 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
* * * * * * * * * 
WHITE PINE RANCHES a 
partnership 
Plaintiff 
vs -
SUMMIT COUNTY, RON PERRY, 
CLIFF BLONQUIST, and GERALD 
YOUNG, as Commissioners of 
Summit County, STAN STREBEL 
individually and as Planning 
Director of Summit County, 
SNYDERVILLE BASIN SEWER 
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT and 
JOHN DOES I through X, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * * * 
I, Hy Saunders, answer Defendants' Interrogatories and 
Request for Production of Documents as follows. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1. Please identify the nature and extent of 
plaintiff's ownership interest in the real property located in 
White Pine Canyon, Summit County, State of Utah, which is the 
subject matter of the plaintiff's claims in this action 
ANSWER* Plaintiff purchased the real property in 
approximately 1981 pursuant to the terms ofa Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. The entire parcel of property which is being purchased 
is approximately sixty (60) acres and was purchased under 
contract from Jack and Geraldine Sharpo The portion of the 
( DEFENDANTS 1 J 0 5 7 1 
I EXHIBIT I 
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ANSWER TO INTERROGATORIES 
AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 
OF DOCUMENTS BY DEFENDANTS 
Civil No. C84-2090W 
include Plaintiff's property in the district and Plaintiff was 
forced to litigate the necessity of this maintenance in the 
District Court of Salt'Lake County, State of Utah. The District 
Court thereafter ordered Summit County to provide said 
maintenance which they have failed and refused to do. 
Also see my deposition taken March 6, 1986. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9. With respect to the allegations 
contained in paragraph 25 of the plaintiff's Complaint, please 
identify all documents worksheets, compilations of data, 
corresondence or other written memoranda which support the 
expenditures identified therein, and set forth the method and 
manner by which the figure of One Million Dollars in damages was 
computed, including the identification of any and all worksheets, 
compilations of data, correspondence or other written memoranda 
or documents used in computing that figure. 
ANSWER. The Amended Complaint sets forth different 
damages. It is anticipated that the damages will be as follows 
and the supporting documents are being produced for counsel. 
(a) Loss of the property at 1981 appraised value 5.4 
million dollars, 
(b) Legal fees for litigation required by the County* 
There is no debt from the Partnership to Mr.- Felton for these 
fees, nor did he keep time, but it is anticipated that a 
reasonable fee for all three cases would be around $30,000.00, 
(c) Engineering costs $158,000 00, 
(d) Improvements $650,000.00 plus accrued interest*to 
March, 1986 in the approximate sum of $19,000 00. This interest 
accrues at the approximate rate of $6,600.00 per month 
J 0583 
(e) Benefit of the bargain as to the Defendant 
Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District for the amount 
realized by the sewer line under the illegal contract in the sum 
of $7,000,000,00 to $12,000,000o00, 
(f) Cost of the well which is being lost approximately 
$100,000 .00, 
(g) See my Affidavit attached hereto as to summary and 
additional costs and damages, 
(h) These only reflect actual damages, not punitive or 
special damages» 
The loan documents are being provided in separate 
documents. In the event there is any property left after 
foreclosure, compensation as to the value of that property as 
proven at trial will be deducted from the alleged damages. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10. Describe with particularity those facts 
upon which you rely in support of the contention in paragraph 27 
of the Complaint that the acts of defendants constitute illegal 
and anticompetitive activities as alleged therein,-
ANSWER. Please refer to my deposition and to the Answer to 
Interrgatory No. 8. It is my understanding that there is an 
exemption in the Utah Anti-Trust Act for authorized action, but 
the actions complained of were without sanction of law and were 
beyond the authority of Mr. Strebel and Summit County. The 
result w.as to frustrate or prevent Plaintiff's development to the 
benefit of other developers* to illegally restrain Plaintiff from 
providing its own sewage removal service and to frustrate 
Plaintiff's development so the project would be lost, thereby 
OJSS - 14 - J 0584 
insuring greater development and more proceeds to the Sewer 
D i s t r i c t to fu l ly cap i ta l i ze on the capital improvements required 
of P l a i n t i f f . I t i s also my understanding that in Utah sewage 
disposal or sewer systems are not governmental type jobs but are 
"private n• 
INTERROGATORY NO- 1 1 . S t a t e w i t h p a r t i c u l a r i t y t h o s e f a c t s 
upon w h i c h you b a s e y o u r c l a i m i n Paragraphs 36 t h r o u g h 46 of the 
F i f t h Cause of A c t i o n of P l a i n t i f f ' s Complaint t h a t the a c t i o n s 
of t h e D e f e n d a n t h e r e i n c o n s t i t u t e a d e p r i v a t i o n of the 
P l a i n t i f f ' s f e d e r a l c i v i l r i g h t s 
ANSWER; P l e a s e s e e my d e p o s i t i o n and Answer to 
I n t e r r o g a t o r y No. 8 h e r e i n . 
I n a d d i t i o n , t h e f a c t s and d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s s e t f o r t h are 
amply d e m o n s t r a t e d by t h e m i n u t e s of the Summit County 
C o m m i s s i o n , Summit County P l a n n i n g Commission and J . J . Johnson 
and A s s o c i a t e s . I n a d d i t i o n , I have been d e p r i v e d of my proper ty 
w i t h o u t due p r o c e s s of law and c o n t r a r y t o l a w . 
At t h e p r e s e n t t i m e I have r e c e n t l y f o u n d - out t h a t the 
r i g h t - o f - w a y s e r v i c i n g my p r o p e r t y has been f o r f e i t e d by Summit 
County c o n t r a r y t o l a w . T h i s w i l l not a l l o w my deve lopment to 
p r o c e e d , w i l l n o t a l l o w me t o r e c o v e r c o s t s f o r the c a p i t a l 
i m p r o v e m e n t and s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i m i n i s h e s t h e v a l u e of the 
p r o p e r t y . A 60 f o o t r i g h t - o f - w a y has been t a k e n as a requirement 
by Summi-t C o u n t y . Summit County has t a k e n l a r g e sums of money 
from me t-o i m p r o v e c a p i t a l p l a n t s which are n o t l o c a t e d on my 
p r o p e r t y . 
T ncrocr 
LeRoy Pia, 4444 South 700 East, No. 204, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. Mr. Pia is an appraiser who is currently doing an 
appraisal on the property. No report has yet been received, but 
when it is, it will be produced for the Defendants-
John Haycock, 50 West 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. Mr. 
Maycock has been contacted regarding being available as an expert 
witness to testify as to the transactions between the Ivers, the 
road, and the legality or authority of the requirements imposed 
upon Plaintiff. At the present time he has not been retained 
but has expressed his willingness to testify. His testimony will 
be requested in the same general areas as that of Mr. Anderson. 
DATED this [j f— day of March, 1986. 
Leon K. Saunders 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: S S * 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I , Leon H. S a u n d e r s , do h e r e b y d e c l a r e s t a t e t h a t t h e 
f o r e g o i n g i n s t r u m e n t i s t r u e to the b e s t of my knowledge , 
i n f o r m a t i o n and b e l i e f 
- NQgl^4js 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN t o b e f o r e me, a notaryv p u b l i c , on t h i s , 
t h e S i r day of March, 1 9 8 6 . V \ ^ * 
« i r e s : 
N o t a r y \ P u b l i c \ A 
R e s i d i n g a t ; CN/VM 
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